Do business interest groups prefer to lobby bureaucrats or elected politicians? Under which conditions do they combine insider lobbying with outsider strategies? This panel examines corporate lobbying and venue choice: the strategic decisions business interest groups make about whom to target, through which channels, and at which stages of the policy process.
Within the interest group literature, venue choice commonly refers to groups' selection of institutional targets, such as politicians, civil servants, regulatory agencies, or other public bodies. The panel welcomes theoretical and empirical contributions that investigate the determinants and consequences of these choices. It focuses in particular on corporate political activity through lobbying and on the strategies employed by business associations, firms, and other groups representing business interests.
Although a growing body of research examines the relationships among interest groups, bureaucrats, and politicians, the intersection of corporate lobbying and public administration remains comparatively underexplored. This panel seeks to advance this area of research by bringing together work on business-government relations, lobbying strategies, administrative politics, and policymaking.
The panel welcomes contributions on topics including, but not limited to:
- Conceptualisations and definitions of corporate lobbying and corporate political activity;
- Insider and outsider lobbying strategies used by business interest groups;
- The determinants and consequences of business groups' venue choices;
- Relationships between business interest groups and bureaucrats, civil servants, and regulatory agencies;
- The role of politicians, bureaucrats, and business actors in policymaking;
- The "iron triangle" and other forms of business-politics-bureaucracy interaction;
- How institutional settings shape lobbying strategies and access to public administration;
- The implications of corporate lobbying for policy outcomes, accountability, and democratic representation.
