ПОЛИТИКА И РЕЛИГИЈА У САВРЕМЕНОЈ КИНИ
Јоана Вардега, Веишан Хуанг, Тсеринг Топгнал, Рафаел Израели, Шаохуа Ванг

АНАЛИЗЕ
Маркус Смит и Питер Марден, Алберта Гиорги

ПРИКАЗИ, НАУЧНА КРИТИКА И ПОЛЕМИКА
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ШТАМПАЊЕ ОВЕ ПУБЛИКАЦИЈЕ ФИНАНСИЈСКИ ЈЕ ПОМОГЛО МИНИСТАРСТВО ВЕРА РЕПУБЛИКЕ СРБИЈЕ

Политикологија религије је публикација научног карактера. Сви радови пролазе научну рецензију од најмање два квалификована рецензента. Објављује научне чланке, научну критику и полемику и приказе књига. Радове објављене у овој публикацији није дозвољено прештампавати било у деловима било у целини без изричите сагласности издавача. Ставови изнети у текстовима изражавају личне ставове аутора и нису ставови уредништва нити институција у којима су они запослени.

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РЕЧ ГОСТУЈУЋЕГ УРЕДНИКА

Важећи Устав Народне Републике Кине садржи одредбе о "слободи говора, штампе, окупљања, удруживања и демонстрација" (чл. 35) али и о слободи религије (чл. 36)\(^1\), а документи централне владе, издати након Културне Револуције, осуђују бившу политику верске елиминације.\(^2\) Иако је Комунистичка партија Кине формално атеистичка, она препознаје и декларативно подржава: будизам, таоизам, ислам, католицизам и протестантизам, као главне религије у земљи.\(^3\) Као знак подршке првим двема, влада организује Светски будистички форум од 2006. године (сваке треће године) као и Међународни форум на Даодеђингу (2007. и 2011. године), трансформирајући их у медијске догађаје. Влада такође одобрава религијске фестивале, даје дозволе и финансира обнове историјских храмова и сл. Са тачке гледишта правних одредби и информација доступних медијима, атеистичка влада изгледа не само толерантна према религији, већ креира повољне услове за њу и не лимитира верски живот грађана. Али, политика Кине према религији је много сложенија.

Прво, не уживавају све религијске традиције и покрети декларисану слободу и помоћ. Ситуација са народним култовима, религијама етничких мањина и новим верским покретима није регулисана; оне које нису под контролом се сматрају за илегалне и забрањене. Верским групама које нису повезане са горе поменутих пет религијских традиција је ускраћена права на заштита. Друго, пет подржаних религијских традиција су под сталним надзором (од стране Државне Администрације за верска питања, која је су-первизор Бироу за верска питања на провинцијском и локалном нивоу) и ретрикацијама. Познати и joш увек обавезујући Документ бр. 19 из 1979., који гарантује овим религијама правни статус, као и члан 36 Устава из 1982. године садржи одредбу о заштити колективних "убичајених верских активности", без ближег одређења од чега се те уобичајане активности састоје. Други документи, као што је Одредбе о верским питањима Народне Републике Кине, на мењу им функционисање у оквиру регистрованих асоцијација (нрп. у односу са не – аутотоним традицијама: Самостални покрет комитета\(^4\) Протестантских цркава у Кини, Кинеска католичка патриотска организација) у ре-

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гистрованом центру, вођеном од стране особља регистрованог и одобреног од стране власти. Верске организације су углавном задужене да промовишу моралне вредности, без обавезе да се фокусирају на философски или тео-
лошки аспект њихових доктрина, које су теме већ помињаних форума или фестивала а то треба да допринесе друштвеној хармонији, хармонији у свету итд. Ових пет великих религиозних традиција функционишу под стриктним правилима институција, које су посвећене националном интегритету, оне су заштићене или и надгледане од стране централах и локалних органа власти. Ово се јасно види на примеру будизма у Тибету или ислама у Сикјангу, али у случају независних црквених покрета развијених у оквиру католичанства и протестантизма – ово није лак задатак. Неки истраживачи отворено кажу да у политици Кине према религији има више контроле него заштите. И на крају, Партијска сагласност и подржавање коегзистенције религије и социјалистичке идеологије и њихово укључивање у дискурс грађења нације, подразумева један утилитаран поглед који се заснива на томе да ако већ искорењивање религије и сујеверја није успело, онда барем да их ис-
користимо у складу са тим, економски потенцијал сакривен у религијама је изворишћен кроз стварање покрета ходочашћа, искушавањем обавезе задржавања места верског обожавања од стране локалних власти, и сл. Упркос бившој радикалној политици Мао Цедунга и савременим рестрикцијама, Кина се сусреће са оживљавањем вере у последњих тридесет година, посебно у руралним областима. Значајан процент грађана, старости између 16 и 39 година, себе описује као верника. Од 1990. официјални извори су потврдили да има 100 милиона припадника религија које су признате и регистроване, више од 100,000 верских места и око 300,000 професионалних верских службеника са преко 3,000 орга-
низованих верских група (宗教团体). На врху су следбеници различитих нерегистрованих религија, као што су бројне хришћанске групе, као и покрети као Zhong Gong или Qilin culture, народни култови као и следбеници Краља Змаја или Бога Среће итд. Савремене кинеске студије говоре о 300 милиона верника.

Овај број, посвећен Кини, садржи пет чланака који се баве различитим аспектима религије и политике у овој земљи, истражујући их из историјске и упоредне перспективе, истражујући континуитет и дисконтинуитет између прошлости и садашњости. Неки од чланака имају


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изражену историјску перспективу, други пак стављају у први план савремене токове, као на пример како се индивидуалне верске традиције усклађују са савременом политичком реалношћу и испитују њихову позицију. Аутори су истраживачи са различитим академски фокусом и позадином, што је на крају резултирало интересантном полифонијом мишљења у вези са овом сложеном темом, полифонијом која је често провоцирала бурну дискусију у раној фази ревизије достављеног материјала.

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THE WORD OF GUEST EDITOR

The current Constitution of the People’s Republic of China has provisions on “freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration” (art. 35) as well as the freedom of religion (art. 36),¹ and the documents of the central government, issued after the Cultural Revolution, condemn the former policy of religions elimination². Although The Communist Party of China is officially atheist, it recognizes and declaratively supports: Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism, listed as the main religions of the country³. As a sign of support of the first two, the government has organized World Buddhism Forums since 2006 (every 3 years) and International Forums on the Daodejing (in 2007 and 2011), transforming them into media events. It also endorses religious festivals, gives permissions and finances rebuilding of historical temples, etc. From the point of view of legal regulations and the information available in the media, the atheist government seems not only tolerant towards religions, but also creating favourable conditions and not limiting the religious life of citizens. However, the policy of China towards religions is more complex.

First of all, not all religious traditions and movements can enjoy the declared freedom and support. The situation of folk cults, ethnic minorities religions and new religious movements is not regulated; the ones not subject to control are regarded as illegal and banned. Religious groups not affiliated with one of the five great religious traditions mentioned above are denied legal protection. Secondly, the five supported religious traditions are under permanent supervision (by the State Administration for Religious Affairs, which supervises Religious Affairs Bureaux at the provincial and local levels), as well as restrictions. The famous and still binding Document No.19 from 1979, which guarantees those religions a legal status, as well as art. 36 of the constitution from 1982, contain a provision on protecting collective “normal religious activities”, without specifying what such normal activities are supposed to consist in. Other documents, such as Regulations on Religious Affairs of the People’s Republic China, impose on them functioning within the frames of registered associations (e.g. in relation to non-native traditions: Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee of the Protestant Churches in


China, Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association) in registered headquarters and led by a religious personnel registered and approved by the authorities. Religious organizations are supposed to mainly promote moral values, not necessarily focusing on other philosophical or theological aspects of their doctrine, which is reflected in the subjects of the mentioned forums or festivals appealing to social harmony, harmonious world, etc. The big five operate under constricted guidelines of the institutions, concerned about national integrity, protected but also monitored by central and local political authorities. As clearly visible in the case of Buddhism in Tibet and Islam in Xinjiang, but also as regards the underground, independent church movements, developed among Catholics and Protestants – it is not an easy task. Some researchers say outright that the goal of the Chinese policy towards religions is control rather than protection. And finally, the Party consenting to the co-existence of religions with the socialist ideology and including them into nation-building discourses, assumes an utilitarian view according to which since uprooting religions and superstitions was unsuccessful, they should at least be useful. Therefore, the economic potential hidden in religions is used through organizing a pilgrimage movement, taking off the necessity to maintain the places of religious worship from the local authorities, etc.

Despite a former radical policy of Chairman Mao and the modern day restrictions, China has been experiencing a religious revival in the last thirty years, especially in the rural areas. A significant percentage of citizens, mostly in the age group between 16-39 is described as believers. Since 1990 official sources have stated in relation to the recognised and registered religions 100 million religious believers, more than 100,000 religious sites and about 300,000 professional religious personnel with over 3,000 religious organized religious groups (宗教团体).

On top of that there are also adherents to various non-registered religions, such as numerous Christian groups and also movements like Zhong Gong and Qilin culture, folk cults as well as followers of Dragon King or God of Fortune, etc. More recent Chinese studies state as many as 300 million of religious believers.

This special edition, dedicated to China, features five articles on various aspects of politics and religion in this country, questioning them from both historical and contemporary perspectives, exploring the continuity and discontinuity between the past and present. Some of the articles present more historical overview, others place greater emphasis on the latest developments, for instance on how individual religious traditions adapt to today’s political reality and nego-

tiate their position. The authors are researchers with various academic focuses and backgrounds, which ultimately results in an interesting polyphony of opinions on a complex issue, a polyphony often provoking tumultuous discussions as early as at the stage of reviewing submitted materials.

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TOPIC OF THE ISSUE

POLITICS AND RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
MAO ZEDONG IN PRESENT-DAY CHINA –
FORMS OF DEIFICATION

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to present how in China, a country combating religious beliefs, Mao Zedong has become a cult object and how the fondness towards the “Great Helmsman”, often adjacent to deification, is manifested in the present-day country. During his life, Mao Zedong was the central character of the political and social sphere of the People’s Republic of China. Admiring and, to some extent, identifying himself with the First Emperor of China, Mao was to become his contemporary version. The height of the personality cult occurred during the Cultural Revolution and was manifested in mass adoration of the Chairman. After his death and reckoning of merits and faults (in a 7:3 ratio, with dominance of the first ones), Mao seemed to be evanescing in the shadow in the modernizing China. The Maoists were fighting against religion, the feudal superstitions, however in recent years, in the officially atheist China, some beliefs in supernatural beings, power of religious rituals and offerings for ghosts reappear, as well as the interest in Buddhism, Taoism, syncretic sects and Christianity. Among the hope bringing powers there appears also deified Mao, as the creator of powerful China. The places connected with the Chairman, located on the route of the “Red Tourism” are visited by masses of the Chinese. Talismans with his image are supposed to provide security, good fortune and even prosperity. Mao is becoming a deity in the nationalistic pantheon of the power gaining China.

Key words: China, Communist Party of China, Little Red Book, Mao Zedong, nationalism

There is one special place in the middle of the “Middle Kingdom”, a place of a great symbolic meaning: Tiananmen Gate, placed between Tiananmen
Square and the previous Emperors’ Palace, Forbidden City. A huge portrait of Mao Zedong has been hanging on that gate since 1949, overlooking at China. The first portrait, hung there in February 1949, was just an early draft and it was replaced by the first official one before Mao declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China on October 1st. Mao was shown in a military cap and a coarse woolen jacket. During the decades, the portraits hung at the gate were aging with the Chairman, presenting him with no head covering, in a uniform sometimes called Maoist (although the pattern originates from Sun Yat-sen) and with paternal expression. The final official portrait was based on a photo shot in 1964, presenting Mao en face, with both ears visible – like a symbol of the leader listening to the voice of the Chinese nation. Since 1949 the portrait of “The Great Helmsman” constantly overlooks the Tiananmen Square. Even during the students’ protests of spring 1989, the demonstrators did not dare to remove the portrait. During those hot spring days some of them, who tried to assassinate Mao’s image, have been turned over to the authorities by the other students. In recent years some voices, calling for removal of the Chairman’s portrait from the Tiananmen gate and replacing it by the Sun Yat-sen’s one, have started to appear. There were also some attempts to damage it. Nevertheless, Mao Zedong has remained an important symbol not only of the Communist Party of China, Chinese politics and ideology, but also of the whole nation. A national symbol, being revered and respected to the extend bordering a religious worship.

In 1958, while referring to the end of the cult of Stalin in the Soviet Union, Mao Zedong said: “There are two kinds of cult of the individual. One is correct, such as that of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and the correct side of Stalin. These we ought to revere and continue to revere for ever. It would not do not to revere them. As they held truth in their hands, why should we not revere them? We believe in truth; truth is the reflection of objective existence. A squad should revere its squad leader, it would be quite wrong not to. Then there is the incorrect kind of cult of the individual in which there is no analysis, simply blind obedience. This is not right.” Therefore a leader, representing the truth, should be revered. Mao wouldn’t oppose such a justified personal cult.

On July 1921, when 27 years old Mao Zedong was among thirteen party members attending the first congress of Communist Party of China, probably no one expected how important historical role will be played by him in future. However, the First CPC National Congress Memorial Site in the Former French Concession in Shanghai presents quite a different version of history. The wax sculptures depicting the scene of that significant meeting show the other twelve members sitting around one noble, standing figure, listening and smiling as Mao Zedong makes his speech. Indeed, history is written by the victors.

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The height of cult of Mao Zedong

Mao Zedong as the founder of the People’s Republic of China was a central figure of the Chinese politics until his death on September 9, 1976. Although at the beginning of the 1960s Mao seemed to lose his position, he managed to regain political influence. The peak of the Chairman’s cult coincided with the Cultural Revolution, and manifested itself in a massive admiration for the Chairman, following his ideas and the ubiquity of images of the “Red Sun”. Hysterical admiration was manifested also in ritual dances expressing loyalty to Mao. They were performed by young Red Guards in order to maintain the bond with the beloved leader. During that years children were given names associated not only with the revolution, but also with Mao Zedong personally, like Weidong (protecting Mao). The national anthem was unofficially replaced by a popular folk song, which lyrics were changed into:

“The east is red, the sun is rising,
China has brought forth a Mao Zedong.
He works for the people’s welfare.
Hurrah, He is the people’s great savior.”

The writings of Mao Zedong were compiled by Lin Biao into a handbook, the *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong*, known as the Little Red Book. This book, containing selected quotations from Mao’s speeches and writings, during the Cultural Revolution has become almost a sacred script. It was printed in 900 million copies, becoming the second most frequently published book of the world after the Bible. It should be emphasized, however, that this result was achieved in a much shorter period of time. At schools, workplaces, community centers, parks, there were sessions of reading and interpretation of Mao’s statements, and many Chinese, particularly raised in his cult the Red Guards, learnt whole passages by heart.

A visual symbol of the personal cult were the Chairman Mao badges. It is estimated that in 1969 around 90 percent of the Chinese population had them pinned to the clothes just above the heart. Some of the Mao followers wore several or even dozens of badges. The badges were produced in thousands of designs, and the number of them is estimated at about five billion. The badges were treated with great respect: there were reports of mobs attempting to lynch people who accidentally destroyed the image of Mao; they were collected and even traded. Probably the most impressive collection is that of Lin Yizhou, containing over 200 thousand badges. Lin’s collection began when he got a prize

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for outstanding performance during the ideological meeting in 1966. Later he started to collect and buy them (the most expensive was bought for 5000 RMB).

Mao’s appearance on posters was an important element of propagation of his cult. In many of the Chinese houses the posters and paintings depicting Mao had replaced the old ancestor altars. The scale of the phenomenon is clearly visible in numbers: it is estimated that the overall number of the Chairman’s images produced during his life time exceeded 2.2 billion, surpassing three times the population of China at that time. Ways of portraying Mao on the propaganda posters were diversified. The early posters were showing Mao among the other Communist leaders. On one poster from 1950, “Celebrating the People’s Republic of China’s National Day”\(^5\), Mao’s portrait is carried by a joyful parade along with that of Sun Yat-sen. Posters presenting the success of the Land Reform also include pictures of Mao placed on the walls of the peasants’ houses. Three posters of this type are particularly interesting: “Moving into a new house” present the family members jointly hanging the Great Helmsman’s image on the wall of their new house; “Chairman Mao gives us a happy life” poster presents a workers’ family with chubby children, abundant food, colorful toys, nice clothes and modern radio and clock. There is no doubt who provided them with that wealth. The last one, “Warmly love Chairman Mao” poster, shows four children, healthy and, smiling, presenting Mao’s portrait.

After the failure of the Great Leap Forward a new set of cheerful posters was designed and printed: they presented Mao visiting Chinese villages. On the “Chairman Mao loves children” poster Mao is surrounded by a group of smiling people, on the other one he is stroking a sick baby with great sensitivity and care. The next one presents the Chairman offering his car to bring a child to the hospital. The last poster of this series presents the happy family’s reminiscence about that event and the little photo of the Chairman, once again clearly indicating the benefactor.

Many posters designed after 1965, like the “East is red” or “Advance victoriously while following Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line in literature and the arts”, show another face of Mao, being almost a personification of the sun, illuminating the surrounding with benevolent rays. One of the posters (“To go on a thousand ‘li’ march to temper a red heart”) shows a march of young people with the painting of young Mao carried in front, just like a religious image in a procession. Sometimes the Mao’s picture wasn’t even necessary, since his Red Book played the same symbolical role, as on “Criticize the old world and build a new world with Mao Zedong Thought as a weapon” poster, with young, enthusiastic Red Guard members keeping the books close to their heart, while they set off to fight against the old elements at the outset of the Cultural Revolution. Similar

\(^5\) Su Guoqing, Qingzhu Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guoqingjie, this and other mentioned here posters might be seen at site http://chineseposters.net (accessed 29.03.2012).
posters were created during the whole period of Cultural Revolution: “Long live chairman Mao! Long, long live!”, “Firmly grasp large-scale revolutionary criticism”.

On the poster “Greet the 1970’s with the new victories of revolution and production” a worker and a peasant are unified in joy, with a working tool in one hand, and Little Red Book in other one. The Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong seem to be a necessary guidebook for steelworkers, soldiers, constructors of the bridge over the Yangzi, inventors of the atom bomb, and revolutionary people all over the world (as in “Chairman Mao is the great liberator of the world’s revolutionary people”). Even the Mao’s wife, Jung Chang, was pictured with the Little Red Book, as on posters: “Learn from the valiant standard-bearer of the Great Cultural Revolution, comrade Jiang Qing, and pay her respect!”, “The invincible thought of Mao Zedong illuminates the stage of revolutionary art!”. When millions of youth were sent from the cities to countryside, on the posters they were depicted travelling with smiles on their faces and the Little Red Books in their hands. On some posters from that period Mao is shown among people, creating waves of enthusiasm and happiness and the will to fight (“The reddest reddest red sun in our heart, Chairman Mao and us together”, “Forging ahead courageously while following the great leader Chairman Mao!”.

After Mao’s death his images have started to be less common. However, there are at least two posters presenting him in afterlife. One, named “Celebrate a festival with jubilation” shows an imaginary scene of a cordial gathering of Mao and the other leaders of the first generation of Chinese Communists: Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi. The “Happy universe” presents Mao sitting in the paradise, above the clouds, surrounded by birds, flowers, fruits and two sentences: “He is savior of the people” and “He gave happiness to the people”.

Some of the Mao’s posters are still visible, especially in rural areas. They might be found even in Tibet. The state media agency, Xinhua, gives the following explanation of this phenomenon: “many people hang Chairman’s photos at home, always together with portraits of the Buddha. ‘Our lives changed a lot, especially in recent years’ said 45-year-old Tenzin Tsering from Gyanbe village of Konjo county, Qamdo. ‘Like the living Buddhas, we revere him’”.

Chairman Mao is sometimes compared with previous rulers of the Middle Kingdom, and perceived as a contemporary emperor of China. He himself admired Qin Shihuangdi, the China’s first emperor and was convinced that it would be very useful to combine the ideas of Marx and Qin Shihuangdi. In 1958, Mao referring to the text of the historian Fan Wenlan, indicating the tradition of respect for modernity and neglect of the past, expressed his regret that the historian did not quote the first emperor, who was an expert in such activities. Mao reminded that Qin Shihuangdi “buried alive 460 scholars, while we buried

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46,000. In our suppression of the counter-revolutionaries, did we not kill some counter-revolutionary intellectuals? I once debated with the democratic people: You accuse us of acting like Qin Shihuangdi, but you are wrong; we surpass him 100 times. You berate us for imitating Qin Shihuangdi in enforcing dictatorship. We admit them all." In a speech at the CPC plenum in Lushan in 1959, Mao said: “We are under combined attack from within and outside the Party. The rightists say: Why was Qin Shihuangdi overthrown? Because he built the Great Wall. Now that we have built the Tiananmen we shall collapse; this is what the rightists say”. An unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Mao, known as the “Project 571”, based on accusing the Chairman of turning into the China’s largest feudal tyrant, reminiscent of Emperor Qin Shihuangdi. Despite any criticism, Mao’s ambition had been fulfilled; Qin Shihuangdi, went down to the history as a creator of the united China, that Mao Zedong is seen as the founder of New China, People’s Republic of China.

How much was left of the Mao’s cult after his death?

After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, retreat from his cult wasn’t immediate. His successor Hua Guofeng tried to continue China’s policy under the guidance of Mao by promoting the “Two Whatevers” policy – “We will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave”. However, Hua soon was ousted from power by Deng Xiaoping and in the early 1980s Mao’s deeds were officially divided into good and bad in the ratio 7:3. Although the thought of Mao Zedong is still enshrined in the Constitution of the PRC as an ideological basis, China follows the path of transformation, designated by Deng Xiaoping. However, it seems that Mao Zedong has not disappeared completely. Moreover, in recent years he has gained a status similar to a deity in some spheres.

Mao Zedong himself remains a symbol affiliated with the New China, as a founder of the People’s Republic of China, and the Chinese version of both Lenin and Stalin in one person. He is still commonly referred to with great respect as the Chairman Mao (Mao Zhuxi). While his achievements are still being discussed, the main emphasis is not on the Communist ideology or class struggle, but on creation of the New China. The CPC could not afford to condemn Mao’s deeds, as the Great Leap Forward or the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution, because it would mean the rejection of huge part of the Party’s heritage. Furthermore, since

the eighties the manifestations of sentimental attitude towards Mao are found among the poorer strata of society – as a symbolic opposition to the cult of money, individualism and westernization, which are the results of Deng’s reforms.

How far those sentiments are from a semi-religious cult? In ancient China, the Imperial Courts had an official pantheons of deities. High-level officials and generals were able to join the pantheon. The authority had power to validate the legitimacy of the gods, and those in turn were giving political legitimacy to a ruler. The Maoists fought against religion as a feudal superstition, that should be removed from the social life of the new Chinese nation. Temples and monasteries were demolished, countless religious artifacts were destroyed, nuns and monks were sent to re-education or forced to go back to secular life. But in the last thirty years in an officially atheist China, a great come back of the belief in supernatural beings, the power of religious rituals, sacrifices for the spirits might be observed. Since the eighties the authorities have helped to rebuild temples that serve as tourist attractions but also as a religious cult sites, attracting a growing number of pilgrims. The revived interest in Buddhism, Taoism, syncretic sects, and Christianity has been noticeable. Most of those religions or spiritual movements are acceptable, except those which might potentially jeopardize the authorities such as Falun Gong. Although there is nothing like a state temple of Mao Zedong, his image appears in a semi-religious context.

By visual dominating the Tiananmen gate by his portrait, Mao Zedong had dominated the symbolic center of the People’s Republic of China during his life. After death, in the heart of China, on the central part of Tiananmen Square, the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall was erected. This most imposing building has 57 thousand square meters. Even although Mao signed the pledge to be cremated, the Politburo decided to permanently preserve his body. The mausoleum was constructed after his death, by engaging hundreds of thousands voluntary workers. It was built “with the unique national style”\(11\). The construction not only engaged people from all over the China, but also materials from many provinces. Among the stones used to build the hall there were some brought from Mt. Everest, from Tangshan (which was struck by a massive earthquake few months earlier), and also water and sand from the Taiwan Strait. Mao’s body, covered with the flag of Communist Party of China, was placed in the crystal coffin, surrounded with national symbols. Nowadays the Memorial Hall is open for public and the admission is free. People still tend to line up to enter and pay tribute to the Chairman, bowing in the traditional Chinese manner and offering white flowers. However, this “traditional” pilgrimage has also undergone some touch of modernity – at present on online booking of the time of visit for the groups is possible.

Throughout the whole country, the Chinese tourists and organized school and companies groups visit places connected with the Communist Party

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\(11\) This and further information about the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall come from its official website: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/113427/ (accessed 7.03.2012).
of China, the first generation of revolutionary leaders and, most of all, Chairman Mao. Those destinations are promoted among young generations to arouse patriotism. China’s National Tourism Administration has named year 2005 the “Year of Red Tourism” and has issued a list of “30 choice red tourism routes” and “100 classic red tourism sites”. “Red tourism” is ideologically motivated but as professor Chen Xiongzhang at the School of Society, Culture and Tourism Industry of Guangxi Normal University asserts, “Red tourism should be market-oriented. (…) Without consideration of the role of the market forces, red tourism would have no vigor.”

On the trail of “red tourism” there is a Shaoshan village in Hunan province, where Mao was born and his parents’ house is still preserved, transformed into a kind of sanctuary. The number of visitors has increased, from 3 million in 2005 to 6.5 million in 2010. The site is rarely visited by individual tourists, as if they come to Shaoshan by the public transport, they usually join the groups lead by the local guides, which prevents them from missing any of the important sites at Shaoshan. One question is: what do the standard routes look like? Stopping at the Comrade Mao Zedong Bronze Statue Square, Mao Zedong Bronze Statue, Former Residence of Mao Zedong, ancestral temple, Guanyin temple, where Wen Qimei, Mao’s mother used to pray, Mao’s parents’ tomb, Mao Zedong Memorial Garden, Shao Peak with the park of stone tablets with inscriptions of Mao’s calligraphy and his poems. An important part of the trip is a lunch at the local restaurant, offering Chairman’s favorite dishes. The aim of such a visit is to touch the greatness, perceive the very beginning of a great man.

In the main hall of the Mao family ancestral temple on the central altar there are tablets with names of the deceased family members, but the place is dominated by the bust of Mao Zedong. Tourists or pilgrims visiting the place show deep respect by bowing three times. The temple has also a souvenir shop, where all kinds of books, medallions, figurines of different size, post stamps, clocks, plaques, badges, shirts, pictures of Mao and revolutionary music, movies, documentaries are sold. Among the souvenirs that may be bought in Shaoshan, there are little comic books, which seem to be created as an element of socialization of the younger generation. They show a young boy, whom intelligence, diligence, noble character will lead to a great role in future. After buying a souvenir they may be “sacrificed” on the altar next to Chairman’s bust. Also cigarettes and alcohol are being offered to the deceased. In the same temple, just behind the main altar, a small shop sells amulets in a form that resembles amulets found in Buddhist or Taoist temples – it is believed that they increase possessors’ luck.

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and wealth. Tourists also visit the forest of steles and several stones, on which works of Chairman’s calligraphy are inscribed. On the route there is also a small temple dedicated to the Bodhisattva Guanyin, Goddess of Mercy, in which Mao’s mother used to pray. Although the temple was destroyed by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, it was later rebuilt. Another obligatory site of the pilgrimage is the tomb of Mao Zedong’s parents. Here visitors pay respect, offer flowers, and pour a glass of alcohol.

Finally, the highest point of the trip is to the family home of Mao, which was quite a rich peasant family homestead. The furniture placed in it is said to come from Mao’s era. Particularly noteworthy are signs describing rooms, as “the place where Mao Zedong, as a little boy, used to help his mother with the housework” or “The table at which the family gathered for talks. Mao Zedong exhorted them to dedicate themselves to the liberation of the Chinese people.” Mao’s childhood had all implications to show that he would grow up as an extraordinary person.

Shaoshan as a tourist destination reached a peak of popularity during the Cultural Revolution, and even nowadays the number of visitors is impressive. Entrance to all of the sites is free in order to popularize the “red tourism”. The media inform about official visits of the CPC leaders. The popularity creates many opportunities for the villagers to earn money. In order to protect their interests, they have already copyrighted the name “Shaoshan village”.

Shaoshan, like other places associated with Mao Zedong, become a kind of popular Mao-land. Thus, tourists may find plenty of souvenirs and also take a photo with a model of Mao. While visiting they may have some rest in one of the restaurants and have lunch containing Mao’s favorite dishes, typical of Hunan province. Eleven years after Mao’s death, one of his distant relatives, Tang Ruiren-founded the Mao Jia (Home of Mao) Restaurant, serving Great Helmsman’s favorite dishes. Twenty years later Mao Jia Restaurants operate not only in Shaoshan – in 2006 there were around 150 franchise restaurants in 20 provinces, and they had received tens of millions of Chinese and foreign guests, including party and state leaders. These restaurants serve dishes such as huobei yu, bitter-tasting fish baked with chili pepper, which Mao described as helping people think only of the revolution, or hongshao rou, red braised pork belly with sweet caramelized flavour, as Mao believed that only fatty pork provided enough nutrition to his brain to win the battle.

15 Authentic quotations from Shaoshan.
17 Li Li, A Red Capitalist, Beijing Review, 10 December 2006.
tion. Sometimes even a sort of small altar with symbolic offerings may be found.

There was a discussion whether the birthday of the “founding father” of the People’s Republic of China should be a national holiday. But even without official holiday status, annually the birth and death anniversaries of the Chairman has been celebrated by nostalgic Chinese, even if the anniversaries used to be ignored by the authorities. The queue to visit Chairman Mao Memorial Hall extends longer than usually, as people come to Beijing to pay respects. On December 26, 2008 the 115 anniversary of the birth of Mao was pompously celebrated in Shaoshan. Villagers there used to have birthday noodles on breakfast on Mao’s birthday every year. Because of the anniversary, the main square and the statue had been renovated.

Actually Mao is present everywhere in everyday China. His image is printed on each new RMB banknotes. In many cars there are talismans with the image of Mao, which serve a protective function – sometimes they are hung together with Buddha image. This custom is connected with a rumor circulating that during the road collision in Guangzhou a taxi driver had got away without a slightest injury, his car was also unharmed, and it was a Mao medallion which was supposed to protect him. New fashion also appears in karaoke clubs, where the revolutionary songs are sung, accompanied by videos of the Cultural Revolution.

Mao Zedong is a well recognized symbol of China. He is not only a historical figure, but also an icon of popular culture. He entered the pop-art in 1963, when Andy Warhol created oil paintings of Mao, and later, in 1973, used his image in a famous series of portraits “Mao Portfolio of 10”. In China alone the Communist leader appeared in modern art after his death. That was a kind of re-reading and deconstruction of the previous, mythical way of interpreting Mao. In 1979 Wang Keping carved the statue of Mao’s face in a style of the Buddha, giving him the title “Idol”. Since the eighties Mao’s figure was used by Chinese artists in an increasingly freer way – for example in 1986 Wang Guangyi placed the portrait behind bars, in Li Shan’s works Mao is depicted with makeup on his face, and a lotus flower in his mouth. Zhang Hongtu, who in 1982 left China for the United States, has focused on representations of Mao as the central element of his art. Among his works we can find the Mao’s image at the oatmeal tin or a series of stylized portraits of “Chairmen Mao” (1989), including Mao with pigtails or another with mustache a la Stalin and the inscription HIACS (He is a Chinese Stalin). His “Last Banquet” (1989), a version of the Leonardo da Vinci painting with Chinese characteristics (wall scrolls, rice bowls, chopsticks, spittoon under the table), where all figures were replaced by Mao, was criticized in the West. The same artist presented an installation “Material Mao”, consisting of the busts of Mao cut out of various materials like wood, stone, bricks, table tennis, lawn. Zhang gave

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18 That is a traditional Chinese food to celebrate birthday, because long noodles are believed to bring long life.
up painting Mao in the 1990s, but still, even today, the figure of Mao remains the inspiration for young Chinese artists. Probably the most politically provocative for many Chinese is the art of brothers Gao Qiang and Gao Zhen. They created a series of Miss Mao, large busts of Mao with big female breasts and long nose, a grotesque figures in vibrant colors. Between 1989 and 2003 Gao brothers were on the government’s black list and were barred from leaving the country as punishment, but nowadays their works are popular with foreign galleries. One of their foreign performances shown in Moscow in 2008 involved smashing golden statue of Miss Mao with a hammer, and inside of the statue a small figure of Lenin was hidden. In 2009 Gao brothers created a silver Miss Mao trying to pose herself balancing with a tightrope walking pole at the top of huge Lenin’s head. The Gao brothers are the authors of a controversial sculpture “Mao’s guilt”, picturing the Chairman on his knees, confessing, with facial expression indicate deep remorse. The head of this bronze sculpture is separated from the body and in order to avoid problems, it is usually hidden in separate location. The full sculpture is shown only during underground exhibitions.

Although in principle the state cult of Mao is buried in the past, some works using the Chairman Mao figure meet with the reaction of censorship. In April 2006 censors ordered closure of several galleries in the 798 Arts District in Beijing for showing works with a content that was found too sensitive politically. One of them was a picture by Gao Qiang (not related to the Gao brothers), showing a famous photo of Mao swimming across Yangtze river in 1966, but the colors were modified: Mao’s skin was sickly yellow, and he was swimming in Yangtze in the colour of blood. Another work removed from the exhibition was a one hundred yuan banknote bearing Mao’s portrait with a Cultural Revolution slogans printed on it, by Huang Rui.20 Gao brothers’ exhibitions “Ash Red” in 798 Arts District was also shut down. Their tree-house cafe and an artists’ studio was closed down in 201121.

Mao’s place in modern nationalism in China

When in 1978 Deng Xiaoping continued the process of modernization, China stood at the beginning of profound transformations of the economic and social system, and some limited political changes. These reforms, along with the influx of Western ideas, as well as the passing of the first generation of Communist leaders and the tragic legacy of the Cultural Revolution, led to erosion of the Maoist ideology. It has been left in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, and it was present during the great parade of the celebrations for 60th

anniversary of the founding of the PRC as the core of the national ideology. Nevertheless its real influence in social life is less significant. As a result, the legitimation of the Communist Party’s authority was endangered. To maintain the legitimacy, the Party had to seek an alternative ideology – and nationalism was an answer. In recent decades nationalism has been deliberately used by the CPC to conduct its internal and external policies. In domestic policy, the phenomenon of reconstructing the new Chinese nation can be noticed. That process may be understood in the spirit of constructivism, which recognizes a nation as a product of ideology that embraces nationalism. Nation-building is never completed – nations are subjects to continuous process of their reconstruction. Nations cannot exist without ideologues and leaders, realizing that by “social engineering” the ideological project of the nation continues. Particular values and norms are being inoculated into the community through repetitive sets of ritual practices of symbolic nature, such as strengthening a sense of community, territory, institutions, and legitimizing power.

Chinese nationalism never existed in one form. It adopted various forms, depending on who the “engineers of the nation” were. Nowadays there appears a powerful, top-down nationalism of the Communist Party of China, developed by the entire state apparatus, particularly through the education system and strictly controlled mass-media. Media are channels for promoting nationalism, despite their multiplicity, remain subject to the control of the Propaganda Department (responsible also for patriotic education), and self-censorship of journalists themselves. Nationalism is strongly supported by symbolism, traditions, national and state holidays and national heroes. This type of nationalism can be regarded as continuity of the early Communist Party’s nationalism, though from the beginning of the PRC it has changed. In the first period it was a highly chauvinistic class nationalism, which was not only against the external enemy, but it also ruled out many Chinese considered unworthy of being a part of the new Chinese nation. The right to belong to the nation was a result of identification with the communist revolution, and consequently, love for China was equal to love for the Party and Mao Zedong. That was a useful tool for political and class struggle. This nationalism recreated the proud Chinese nation, so called “New China”, reborn after “the century of humiliation” (from Opium Wars until 1949). Under the strong leadership this nation was able to compete against the world powers.

Nationalism was an instrument used by the Communist Party of China since its very beginning, but in the reform period it began to occupy a prominent place in the ideological frame of the country. The CPC is being depicted as the sole force capable of protecting Chinese honor and defend the Chinese interests in the international Arena. The Party, underscoring its contribution to the contemporary development of China, refers to the figure of Mao Zedong as the creator of the new state. Due to the popular sentiment for the old, idealized times, it was possible to strengthen the position of Mao Zedong not only as a
national hero, but also as a kind of a deity in the nationalist ‘religion’.

Chinese nationalism is not limited to the constructivist nationalism of Communist Party. That is also a popular nationalism with a slightly different characteristics. It is built on the strong sense of national humiliation and degradation. It is not so much about the “century of humiliation” that has passed, but about the contemporary humiliation experienced from the Japanese and Western politicians and organizations. According to these nationalists, the West refuse to recognize that China has changed and gained international importance and cannot be continuously depreciated. There are some books focused on such an angry nationalism, like “China Can Say No. Political and Emotional Choices in the post-Cold-War era”\(^\text{22}\), “China Still Can Say No”\(^\text{23}\) or “Unhappy China. The Great Time, Grand Vision and Our Challenges”\(^\text{24}\). In these intellectual visions, the hostile elements intend to split China and undermine national economic strength, using smokescreens of human rights or freedom of Tibet. Some of those sentiments are shared by young angry nationalists, who express themselves on the Internet. This approach may be seen as an extension of the “century of humiliation”, but because its radicalism does not always suit the Party. Popular nationalism is rich in a genuine sense of national pride, which can be defined as commonly understood patriotism, clearly visible especially among the Chinese during the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008. This nationalism interacts with the policy of the CPC. It includes a growing global network of angry young Chinese nationalist, not only in the PRC, but also among the Chinese diaspora outside the country. Their actions can be observed when the Mao Zedong’s image is tarnished. In addition to the official protection of Mao’s image, they undertake spontaneous actions on the Internet. Any attack on the Chairman is considered by the young nationalists as an attack on the whole China. In January 2008 the Citroen advertisement campaign in Spain used a distorted portrait of Mao with face contorted in a grimace and eyes squinted. The advertisement provoked unrest in the Chinese Internet forums, and was declared to be not only offensive to the Chairman, but also to the entire Chinese nation. Therefore Citroen was forced to withdraw controversial posters and to issue an apology and acknowledgment of respect for the representatives and symbols of China.\(^\text{25}\)

In recent years there appeared a shift in an official image of Mao Zedong. He has been shown as a human being, much closer to the common people than ever before. A new movie titled “Mao Zedong in Anyang” was produced. It re-

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\(^\text{23}\) Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang, Qiao Bian, Gu Qingsheng, Zhongguo haishi neng shuo bu, Zhongguo Wenlian Chubanshe, Beijing 1996.

\(^\text{24}\) Zhongguo bu gaoxing: da shidai, da mubiao ji women de neiyouweihuan, Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing 2009.

veals a history of a romance between Mao and his first wife, Yang Kaihui. The memoires of Mao’s bodyguard, Li Yinqiao, were printed entitled “Mao Zedong: Man, Not God”. The publishing house advertises it as: the “inside story of China’s dynamic leader and world statesman is told – the life and thought of Mao, the husband, father, comrade-in-arms, the peasant’s son”\(^ {26}\). Despite the title, Mao is presented as a superhuman, having a noble personality, extremely courageous, risking his life for the revolution and for other comrades, but also sensitive, altruist, with sense of humor. Even while loosing his temper, he was worth adoration, as that was a result of lack of sleep and his devotion and sacrifice for the Communist ideas. One of the stories in the book was about Mao seeing a child delirious with a fever. That provoked tears in Mao’s eyes, because as he explains “I can’t bear to see poor people cry. When I see their tears, I can’t hold back my own”. That is why he gave away last bottle of penicillin for the ill child, despite of his personal doctor’s objection. What is mother’s reaction? “She dropped to her knees, saying sobbingly to Mao, ‘You’re a Buddha, a life-saving Buddha!’”\(^ {27}\).

It seems that the Chinese Communist leaders may have abandoned or revised the Mao Zedong thought during the last three decades, but they did not and will not dare to fully renounce Mao and his ideology. There might be changes in the way of official showing the Chairman Mao, but it will not be possible to take him down from his pedestal. Even though the knowledge of Mao’s mistakes and faults is increasing in the Chinese society, the popular sentiment places him closer to supernatural power than a man in the street, laobaixing.

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Zhongguo bu gaoxing: da shidai, da mubiao ji women de neiyouwaihuan, Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing 2009.
Резиме

Циљ овог рада јесте да покаже како је у Кини, земљи која се бори против религиозних уверења, данас Мао Цедунг постао култ и како се склоност према "Великом Кормилару", често поред обожења, манифестује у садашњости ове земље. Током свог живота, Мао Цедунг је био централна личност политичке и друштвене сфере Народне Републике Кине. Дивећи се, и у неком облику и идентификујући, са првим кинеским царем, Мао је желео да постане његова савремена верзија. Култ личности је доживео свој врхунац током Културне револуције и био је манифестован масовним дивљењем председнику. Након његове смрти у упоређивања заслуга и грешки (у односу 7:3 за ове прве), Мао је израстао у сенку модернизације Кине. Маоисти су се борили против религије, феудалног сујеверја, али у последњим годинама, у официјално атеистичкој Кини, нека веровања у натприродна бића, моћ религиозних ритуала и духове су се поново појавила, као и интересовање за будизам, таоизам, синкретичке секте и хришћанство. Између осталих, појавио се и обоготворени Мао, као кратор моћне Кине. Места повезана са председником, лоцирана на рути која се зове "Црвени туризам", су посећена од великог броја Кинеза. Талисмани са његовом сликом би требало да осигурају сигурност, добру срећу па и просперитет. Мао постаје божанство у националистичком пантеону стицања моћи у Кини.

Кључне речи: Кина, Мао Цедунг, национализам, Комунистичка партија Кине, Мала црвена књига

Прихваћен: 5.10.2012.
BODHISATTVA COMES OUT OF CLOSET: CITY, SURVEILLANCE, AND DOING RELIGION

Abstract

The author is interested in looking at religious groups as a location for discussion and critique in a censorial society in China. This paper will take the approach of the “ecological model” in field research in a highly censorial and increasingly pluralistic city, Shanghai. Shanghai has experienced large scale social changes since the late 1980s. It is critical to understand how socio-structural challenges, such as immigration, affect faith-based groups within the frame of urban aspirations. In this paper, the adaptation of faith-based groups to their political environments will be the primarily focus. Due to governmental restriction in province-level municipalities, religious practices are invisible in public spaces but are revitalizing in private spaces in major Chinese cities. The roles urban religious institutions play in adapting to city regulations are especially pressing for faith groups. My research discovered, first, under the political surveillance in city, religious groups are not passively enduring the impact of political control, but also actively engaging in organizational development. Secondly, religious groups can be considered a location which creates a social space for grassroots education and, therefore, develops a more creative and fluid “popular politics” in society, which offers a critique to a highly regulated society.

Key words: Shanghai, immigration, Buddhism, ecological model, transnationalism

Prior to 1949, Shanghai was already the financial, trading, and economic center of Asia. With its international and semi-colonial image, it withdrew into the center of a socialist state-planned economy under Communist regime. Since 1990, Shanghai has experienced accelerated economic system reform and has been recreated as a cosmopolitan, world financial and commercial center. “Ac-
celerated urbanization,’ a term that signifies rapid progress in a short period,’ demonstrates the expansion of Shanghai’s city scale, including changes in population structure, improvement in the urban environment, and pronounced progress in municipal administration.

In 1980, the population of urban China was around 140 million and accounted for about 15 percent of the total population. Shanghai’s population has grown beyond the 23 million mark in the recent year. Of Shanghai’s population, only 13.5 million people are considered permanent residents. Most of the rest are domestic immigrants. The city, which is seen as the business capital of China, is drawing millions of domestic and transnational migrants. The increasing pressure on space and resources is progressively more apparent.

Shanghai’s primary economic activity is based on diversified industrial production, but the city is also proud of its port, a global financial market, and a high-tech sector, such as Lujiazu and Zhangjiang’s high-tech park in Pudong. In 1996, over 16,000 foreign-funded enterprises in the city employed nearly 600,000 people and produced 34 per cent of the city’s industrial output. By 2000, over half the world’s largest 500 companies had established operations in Shanghai. The magnetism of Shanghai in drawing high concentrations of transnational capital-linked migrants and transnational business professionals has also created a resource base that has a significant effect on the religious ecology of the city. There is a gap in the literature focusing on these transnational migrants and their religious reproduction which I will try to help fill in this paper.

What are the relations between immigrant and religion or immigrant religion and host societies? Immigration brings new dynamics to neighborhoods. Immigrants can generate religious organizational growth, competition, cooperation and adaptation even within the ecological limits of growth. When we consider religious ecology in a global context, immigrant faith groups create transnational changes as they establish new connections between host and sending countries. Herberg’s proposition that it is in and through religion that immigrants find an identifiable place in urban life would mean that religion really (or still) matters. As earlier research discovered, language and culture drew many of these newcomers together into ethnic neighborhoods, while racism and social-economic attraction ensured that many would live and worship in immigrant communities. We may not be able to find significant ethnic enclaves in Shanghai after 2009 World Expo since all forms of ethnic solidarities may be considered a

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5 For any scholar who is interested in learning more about the social-economic transition of Shanghai, Jos Gamble’s book, Shanghai in Transition, is extremely helpful. Gamble, 2003.
threat to the authorities, thus people tend to build up their networks in a latent way.

The narrative of this paper is planned as follows. I will start with an introduction of the ecological model. Then, I will briefly describe the political ecology of Shanghai. What makes Shanghai’s unspoken regulations so special? Thirdly, I will look at the scope of transnational networks, Taiwanese immigrants and their religious production, and how they encounter political regulations in their new social settings. I will explore the transnational characteristics of both the business and religious networks of Taiwanese immigrants. Then, I will try to understand how those characteristics interact with religious regulations at the municipal level. And, finally, I will discuss the implications of these cultural-political encounters in the concluding section.

**Research framework: strength and limitation**

By applying the ecological model to this new field, I would like to examine one major sociological indicator, immigration, that reveals how the urban religious development takes place under Shanghai’s regulations. In this brief paper, I will only look at Taiwanese transitional immigrants. This indicator represents important social, economic, and cultural changes in many other mega-cities. Immigration is also central in understanding the religious ecology, since these forces have transformed both the residential and commercial life of neighborhoods.

In Nancy Ammerman’s research on the religious ecologies of nine communities across the U.S., she found that congregational adaptation is assisted by local coalitions, member networks and even governmental partnerships as well by denominations and theological heritage. Through an analysis of a congregation’s demography, culture, and organizational structure, the context of the congregation becomes comprehensible. One of the strengths of this framework is that race, age, ethnicity, income, housing, and family structure (among other factors) of the area are taken into consideration when analyzing both the church and community. The change of the neighborhood, its shared practices, traditions, norms, and values are understood. Our previous research in New York follows similar steps to the ones I have undertaken in investigating the relations between faith-based groups and the city of Shanghai. As Nancy Eiesland and R. Stephen Warner write, the ecological frame...assumes that [any] congregation is one among many. other congregations have their place in the commu-

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nity, their own visions, and their particular constituents, and...they influence each other for good and for ill. Congregations can consciously cooperate and compete; they can hinder (and help) one another without intending to do so; they affect each other by their very presence...Understanding the local religious ecology includes examining the “scope” and “layers” of a community. Eiesland and Warner further explain, by wide scope, we mean the open-ended character of the congregation’s environment...a congregation is linked to networks and events across geographic and temporal space...they are also characterized by shared conversations, common practices, and structures that promote cooperation and exchange...Layers refers to the fact that the interaction between a congregation, or any institution, and its environment occurs at different levels.

The problem with this framework is: when everything belongs to the ecology, it is not possible to study everything in the field. Therefore, with limited research time and resources, I have sought to narrow down the variables. For example, Shanghai, as many other mega cities in the world, has been experiencing large scale social changes since the late 1980s. It is critical to understand how socio-structural challenges, such as immigration and increasing urbanization, have affected faith-based groups in Shanghai. Due to governmental restrictions in province-level municipalities, many religious practices may not be invisible in public spaces, but are they are reviving in private spaces in major Chinese cities. The process of urban religious institutions in adapting to city regulations is my main focus in the later discussion. The open-ended scope of an institution, through its networks and events across time and space, sheds light on how faith based institutions do not reside in a closed system, such as within one city. They are affected and influenced by their transnational networks that have been established beyond the urban geographic space.

The limitation of my research is that many questions I raised earlier will require much longer and thorough ethnographic efforts in these neighborhoods, while I just began this long-term project last year. Moreover, some governmental census data is not available to the public yet. More detail on the challenges of this framework in my current research will be elaborated later in this paper.

State discourse and municipal regulation

The post-Mao government has permitted limited freedom of religious belief and behavior, which is subject to legal and regulatory restrictions. Beginning in 1979, a limited number of Protestant and Catholic churches, Buddhist and Daoist temples, and Islamic mosques have opened or reopened for religious ser-

11 The fieldwork was conducted in March 2011 for four weeks in Shanghai.
vices. In 1982, religious toleration was formally reinstated. This basic viewpoint and the policy on religious affairs during the socialist period were documented in “Document No. 19th.” The official state discourse grants legal existence to Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism under the government-sanctioned “Patriotic” associations, but not to groups outside of the five religious associations, nor to other religions. The post-Mao regime adopted a more tolerant perspective on religion. “As a component of a new approach to build the regime’s legitimacy, the government accepted a trade-off of broader social and economic autonomy in exchange for continued political loyalty.”

Yet we must note that other forms of religious practices had been preserved through Cultural Revolution and revitalized in the Putian area of Fujian, as Kenneth Dean demonstrated in his study. While religion is still a sensitive issue in China, many scholars have contributed to the study of its revival and development, particularly that of Buddhism in urban areas, and that of Christianity in both rural and urban areas. Yet little literature touches on the issue of the development of religion in China through transnational networks. Mayfair Yang has discussed Mazu in the southern part of China and David Palmer and Vincent Goossaert have also dealt briefly with this subject in their recent book.

What makes the political ecology of Shanghai different from other places, such as rural areas in China? In my fieldwork, I found out that one important but unspoken regulation among house churches in Shanghai is the separation of “foreign” and “non-foreign” congregations or fellowships. For example, in the “Regulations on the Religious Affairs in Shanghai,” one learns that these regulations are formulated in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws for the purposes of ensuring citizens’ freedom of religious belief, maintaining harmony among and between religions, preserving social concord and regulating the administration of religious affairs. Yet this citizens’ freedom of religious belief is limited. In the name of “harmony,” there are many restrictions that have been set up for faith practices. Since it is “illegal” for citizens to practice religious rituals without religious clergy even at permitted religious sites, almost all religious rituals conducted outside of state-sponsored sites are “underground.” And these

16 For rural, see Hunter and Chan, 1993. For urban areas, see Gao, 2007 and F. Yang, 2005.
18 The original wordings are as follows. “第五条 持宗教不干 国家行政、司法、学校教育和社会公共教育的原。持 国家主和独立自主自办的原，宗教 体、宗教活动 所和宗教事
rules also apply to foreigners. Religious activities of aliens within Chinese territory includes the religious ceremonies that aliens conduct or participate in according to their own religious belief customs, their contacts with Chinese religious bodies, sites for religious activities, and religious personnel in respect to religion and other relevant activities. It reflects the government’s fear of foreign influence on domestic congregations. The Chinese government still treats Christianity as a foreign religion; yet, this regulation is not imposed on Buddhists in Shanghai. Despite all of the constraints of written and unwritten rules, local and foreign residents are still “doing religion” in Shanghai, with some political uncertainties. Therefore, it brings up some interesting questions. How do they manage to be accepted by the local regime while at the same time fulfilling their religious visions? How does the ecological approach help us understand the process of doing religion in a highly censorial and increasingly pluralistic city?

The second unspoken regulation I discovered is not only that “nationality” matters in Shanghai, but that the size of a group is also critical. Shanghai city government will be tolerant if each house church or religious groups has an attendance of lower than 50 people at a single event. Therefore, faith-based groups have to stay small in order to survive. The State does not take their small and submissive presence as a threat. This has to do with crowd control in order to prevent the outbreak of disorder and possible mobilization. This number is imposed by the municipal government to quarantine religious groups by isolating them into small groups. Yet it creates a lot of challenges for a researcher to study them or find the various connections among them.

Religious organizations are viewed as participatory actors that shape and are shaped by city life. Eiesland defines religious ecology as the “patterns of relations, status, and interaction among religious organizations within a locality… religious groups may not relate to those nearby, but they are nonetheless part of an ecology because of their physical proximity and by virtue of common environmental factors, for example, economic, educational, or infrastructural changes.” Yet since many religious practices in Shanghai remain underground, there are limited interactions among religious groups themselves or with other civil organizations. There are also limited interactions between underground groups and their neighborhoods. Yet by making this claim, it does not help in

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19 Article 3 in “Decree of the State Administration for Religious Affairs” No.1. Rules for the Implementation of the Provisions on the Administration of Religious Activities of Aliens within the Territory of the People’s Republic of China

20 The original wording is as follows. “第四十七条外国人在中国宗教活动，当遵守中国的法律、法，不得成立宗教、建立宗教办事机构、宗教活动所和宗教院校；不得在中国公民中发展宗教、委任宗教人工、散宗教宣传品以及行其他教活动,” in 上海市宗教事条例.

moving my research forward. If one takes the political constraints on religious groups as the biggest ecological obstacle in the city, one will then pay attention to the innovative practices of where and how people are doing religion to bypass censorship rather than only looking the relationship between states and faith based groups.

Transnational religious networks

Taiwan has served as an important source of emigration that has contributed to the religious revival in China since the latter nation’s opening to outside influences. The following discussion will focus on the reproduction of religious beliefs carried out by Taiwanese merchants in the intersection of transnational migration and the global division of labor in Shanghai. Most of the Taiwanese in Shanghai are economic migrants who are seeking better economic opportunities. According to Portes, transnational entrepreneurs are different from immigrant entrepreneurs since the immigrant entrepreneurs are those who “settled abroad and became progressively integrated into local ways,” while the transnational entrepreneurs cultivate their networks across space, and travel “back and forth in pursuit of their commercial ventures.”

In China after the post-June 4th period, the state began to encourage direct investment (FDI), which served as a driving force that occasioned the eventual demise of China’s state-owned enterprises. Foreign capital, technology, and management knowledge and techniques from the four East Asian newly industrialized countries (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea) have flowed into Shenzhen, transforming it into a free trade zone for multinational factories during the early years of economic reform. A few years later, the government expanded to four “special economic zones,” and then fourteen cities, all located along the eastern coast, for joint ventures between foreign companies and the Chinese government. In 1999 the prohibition on foreign-private economic cooperation in China was lifted. By 2000, the government stipulated required quotas of foreign investment that all areas had to fill. Foreign companies gained permission to establish wholly foreign-owned enterprises without joint Chinese state ownership.

There are numerous studies that contribute to the understanding of Taiwanese migrants in China by positioning them in the economic chain of the global division of labor. Scholars often characterize those entrepreneurs who have moved their businesses from Taiwan to China as adopting cost-reduction,


innovation, and quality enhancement strategies. Overall, we have learned that migrant networks and organization have emerged as development agents. In the institutional dimension, agents such as hometown associations, networks of merchant associations, and epistemic networks have emerged as collective actors. Yet in the current round of the migration–development nexus, just how the migrant networks interact with local adherents in flows of knowledge and religious ideas is still under-studied.

**Going underground**

When Sister Chiou first showed me the Bodhisattva statue hidden behind the bookshelves, I was surprised by the sophisticated design of this secret closet. “The first layer of bookshelves only opens when Tzu Chi members gather in the room. It remains closed on a daily basis, in case policemen inspect our office spaces unexpectedly,” Chiou said. As a pioneer in bringing Tzu Chi to Shanghai, Sister Chiou has faced harassment, interrogation, and short periods of detention by the government. At least, this was the story in 1998. Between 1998 and 2008, Tzu Chi Buddhist members worshipped as a group in the Jinshi Hall inside of their factories and companies. After they were harassed a few times by local police and “Taiban” officers when they had house gatherings, they decided to convene their events at companies and factories, as they were the respective bosses of those private firms. When religious groups cannot freely express their practices in the public sphere, they bring them into the private sector and private space.

Sister Chious’ office is in Putuo district. Brother M, in Jiading district, Brother W, in Jingan district, Sister M, in Baoshan district, Sister H, in Pudong district, and brother H, in Minhung district, have also employed their company spaces to shelter their religious events for years. They are all Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Shanghai. They started gathering at home, but somehow “Taiban” officers managed to discover and then ban their home events. They host Buddhist study groups and Buddhist festivals in the manufacturing and office spaces. My fieldwork on this transnational religious movement led me to discover how, firstly, immigrant entrepreneurs used their economic power to shadow religious practice before they gained legal status in 2008. People are doing religion under the risk of losing their businesses. Secondly, even after gaining “legal” status, they still have to practice their belief in a hidden way, within small groups. The increased indigenization of membership has been rapid. Most of the new con-

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26 Still Thought Hall.

27 台辦. Officers from Taiwan Affairs Office (台灣事務辦事處).
verts are Chinese. The religious teaching has translated into grassroots education among Chinese and street campaigns, as I will discuss later.

This Buddhist group I refer to is Tzu Chi Foundation. The Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation (Tzu Chi) is an international Buddhist relief organization founded in 1966 and based in Hualien, Taiwan, with millions of members in Taiwan and overseas. Tzu Chi is indeed the largest social group in Taiwan, with more than 300 Tzu Chi offices in more than forty countries, four supporting missions, and 300,000 certified commissioners (lay leaders) worldwide. Tzu Chi today has more new local Chinese than Taiwanese converts in Shanghai. The founder, Master Cheng Yen, was initiated as a Buddhist nun in 1963 and was influenced by her master, Yin Shun, who taught her to “Be committed to Buddhism and to all living beings.”28 Unusual among Buddhist organizations, Tzu Chi defines social service rather than religion as its primary goal, a change that dates back to the late 1960s. This reform is truly the Reverend Cheng Yen’s innovation.

The discourse of freedom or ultimate liberation usually serves as the primary source of religious cultivation. The ultimate goal of all schools of traditional Buddhism remains the same: to liberate people from suffering. The primary sources of human existence and the force that maintains and controls it are perceived in motivated action (karma). Positive and negative actions can be neutralized by each other or accumulated, and that brings the self-fulfilling result of a good or bad life in this world or the next life. Intentional actions always lead to retribution and consequently perpetuate existence, but they never bring complete freedom from suffering. For Buddhists, this liberation is an indication of freedom in another world. Therefore, there are few public religious discourses in the Buddhist history that have ever been put into practice.

What makes Tzu Chi’s teaching different from other traditional Mahayana Buddhism? “Relieve suffering, embrace all beings” is a core teaching of its founder Master Cheng Yen. The focuses on “this world” and on “physical practice” are central doctrines of Tzu Chi Buddhism, and are more potent than sutra chanting or meditation. Tzu Chi members believe that benevolent actions cultivate or repair their karma. Demonstrating the Tzu Chi spirit might include visiting the poor, providing disaster relief, or conducting community services. This doctrine provides the basis for mobilizing commissioners and volunteers into becoming involved in a variety of social service activities. Members repeatedly emphasize that it is “Buddhism of this world” that makes Tzu Chi different from other Buddhist organizations. This is Tzu Chi’s way of engaging in publics and societies.

What constitutes Tzu Chi’s grassroots education, if there is any? I will use the example of environmentalism and its actual practice in Shanghai.29 Sister

29 Why do Tzuchians promote environmentalism? They have to promote the value of a life of wisdom. Environmentalism provides the only possible field for cultivation. Thus, the master calls Tzuchians “Environmental Buddhas,” “Purified Buddhas,” or “Buddhas
Mei owns a construction company. She has converted her storefront space into a gathering space for all Tzu Chi activities in that district. After I was told there is no public religious display besides tourism sites in Shanghai, I walked into Mei’s office and was greeted by Tzu Chi posters as her storefront decoration. The office is completely converted into a Tzu Chi local center with clear Tzu Chi interior design elements. Every Tuesday, there is study group gathering in this commercial space. Members watch video clips and listen to senior commissioners’ lectures about environmentalism and Buddhism. Members are from neighboring housing communities and of all ages. Putting Buddhist ideas into action is something new to them. Many of them are former Jushi and enthusiastic about recycling education in their neighborhood and poverty relief in rural area. Senior members teach new members how to plan and implement organizational activities. New converts bring new ideas as to how to localize this transnational Buddhist teaching in housing communities. On the weekends, residents can also hear music and witness about 75 people singing and dancing to Tzu Chi music outside of Mei’s company. About 75 people dispersed into four residential communities for environmental protection campaigns, mainly promoting recycling. A team of 16-20 members will set up a booth in the plaza or another open space in the housing community (Xiaoqu) to maximize the visual impact. Volunteers start with singing songs and dancing to warm up and catch the attention of passersby. Of course, some residents will complain and report this activity to the housing community committee (Juwei), which also includes a party representative. The purpose of outdoor events is to promote the concept of recycling and environmentalism. Overall, I observed several very high-profile outdoor campaigns with only one complaint received during that day. Yet the complaint was quickly resolved after sister M made a few phone calls. Many other Tzuchians incorporated the concept of sustainable development in similar ways in their communities. Ceaseless efforts at communication and the skillful cultivation of personal relationships with housing community and party leaders are the keys for TC to develop in some residential neighborhoods.

As many informants mentioned to me, the interpretations of karma exchange are fairly common among businesspeople, yet they are expressed differently. The businesses are different and the discourse and implementations are different. Sustainable development and environmental protection have translated economically into the practice of thrift in the use of electricity and all other resources, as well as raw material conservation in manufacturing. Tzu Chi cultivation...
tion teaching has translated into the concept of self-management to control or re-direct the questionable excessiveness, if not greed, of employers, as well as to instruct or even discipline employees.31

After gaining their legal legitimacy in 2008, Tzuchians in China have also worked side-by-side with the local governments on relief efforts from time to time. Yet there is evidence of tension between spiritual teachings, censorship, and commercial logic. The municipal regulation has still forced Tzu Chi missions into the private sectors—the companies and manufacturers that are dominated by foreign investors, yet their practices are not categorized as illegal activities. Organizational works promote the idea of environmentalism instead of philosophical Buddhist teachings. This Buddhist belief created a link between religious valuation and moral action. Followers of these teachings could not isolate their good deeds to certain contexts; they had to reorganize their lives methodically and cultivate themselves through their work in daily life.

**Buddhist benevolent practices under this structure of restraint**

How are Tzuchian’s practices changed under this structure of restraint? For example, based on my previous research in the US, Tzu Chi conducts a wide array of social service work in New York City. The Mission of Charity commissioners visit the poor, nursing homes, and jails, and provide long-term and short-term assistance. Every Saturday, the team of commissioners offers free lunch to elderly people at a Buddhist Temple, which is owned and attended by Fuzhouese immigrants in Chinatown. Tzu Chi also distributes winter coats at another Buddhist Temple, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, and other locations in Brooklyn, with assistance from the Guan Ming and Guan Yin temples. In 2001, Tzu Chi New York extended its coat-distribution practice to a Latino neighborhood, the Charas/El Bohio Cultural and Community Center on Manhattan’s Lower East Side. These kinds of outdoor and interfaith and interracial endeavors may not be easily conducted in current Shanghai, although Tzu Chi received its legal status in 2008.

Another example will be the Tzu Chi Mission of Medicine, which provides volunteer services in hospitals and has established a medical clinic on wheels for Chinatown’s elderly, conducting blood-pressure tests and organizing global bone-marrow donation campaigns in New York. It also supports free clinics for Taiwan immigrants in Flushing with the help of the Flushing Chinese Business Association, as well as clinics and relief distribution in rural areas. In the last two years, Tzu Chi has been actively negotiating the possibilities of it medical mission in Suzhou city and is awaiting permits.

The Tzu Chi Mission of Education in USA has established the Tzu Chi

Humanities Schools to promote moral teaching, meditation, and Mandarin language instruction for the second generation. The establishment of Tzu Chi School was more difficult than it was for the hospitals in China. Some designated Tzuchians in Shanghai would visit elementary schools teachers or principles with the intention to integrate Tzu Chi Still Thoughts into their curriculums.

The Mission of Culture in New York carries out small programs such as a weekly street clean-up and occasional park beautification projects. Tzu Chi New York also organizes occasional lectures, tea parties, and charity bazaars to raise funds for the poor or for disaster relief. In Shanghai, voluntary street cleaning is not possible. Yet private tea parties and charity bazaars are organized at homes or at the Tzu Chi Center in Changfeng.

**Buddhist benevolent practices in Shanghai in 1920s**

The unique practice of Tzu Chi Buddhism is its emphasis on social services. The concept of benevolent Buddhist practices in China or Shanghai is not new, which has been part of Buddhist tradition. According to Zongmao Tang, “new” benevolent practices in 1920’s Shanghai revealed how Chinese Buddhism was socialized in modern China. It also illustrates the significant transition that Buddhism underwent under modernization in urban areas. Donations for medical treatment, tea, and congee are the ways of being a generous Buddhist in traditional society. Yet those benevolent practices are random and territorially based. Tang argues that the benevolent practices among Buddhist laity (called “householder Buddhism” by Jushi) in the 1920s were significantly different than those of the traditional laity in term of breaking out of the conventional boundaries of territoriality, kinship, and professions in practice.32

Shanghai laity in the 1920s were deeply influenced by Master Yinguang’s teaching on the Pure Land. “Belief, Vision, and Practice” were taught as the three major essences to achieve Western Heaven. Shanghai laity in the 1920s, unlike those holding to conventional practices, did not affiliate with temples or governmental officials. Therefore, the financial sources came from the general public and from some major merchants. The people who received the aid also included war refugees and children who needed education. Buddhist benevolent works also extended beyond their local adherents. Unlike “traditional” Buddhists who based their benevolent works around local temples, the laity in the 1920s systematically developed various programs in the city, which were expanded outside of Jiangshu province. Tang also uncovered how the leadership of benevolent works had shifted from federal landlords and traditional patrons to urban merchants. Those urban merchants, as Tang argued, usually utilize those benevolent works as, first, the presentation of prestige and social status, and secondly, as the mean

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to advance their businesses.\footnote{Tang, 2011.}

**A Reflection on the ecological model**

Unlike Nancy Ammerman’s research, I found it difficult to run an analysis of religious groups’ local or street-level demography since census data is not open to researchers. Thus the context of a group and its neighborhood becomes unclear. Race, age, ethnicity, income, housing, and family structure (among other factors) of the area ought to be taken into consideration when analyzing both the faith group and the community. Due to this unavailability, the alternative is to undertake an organizational study. The organizational hierarchy of the faith group, whether it is non-denominational, without a pastor, or governed by a hierarchical structure, may affect a group’s relationship and interaction with its community.

Here we can reflect on the importance of the ecological approach in Shanghai, which is an analysis of the political layer, including both written and unspoken rules. With all of the political constraints in Shanghai, people are still doing religion anyway. But they must do it in a very creative way in order to survive and grow. For example, there is evidence of a tension between spiritual teachings, censorship, and commercial logic. My paper discusses how the tension between Tzu Chi and the Chinese state has forced Tzu Chi missions into the private sector—namely the companies and manufacturers that are dominated by foreign investors.

Unlike my research in New York where we can start with the Chinese yellow pages, researchers will have to find the underground sites on a one-by-one basis. Since religious practices are not completely free in Shanghai/China, faith groups cannot really interact with other institutions, including religious and non-religious ones. Faith groups do not know the existence or activities of other faith groups in their neighborhoods or in the metropolitan sense. Since religious practices are not completely free in Shanghai it will be safer for faith groups to “not know other existing practices in Shanghai,” especially for large groups.

Spaces could be physical, mental, and social, so it is important to ask what kinds of space are occupied and employed by religions to adapt to municipal regulations? Urban spaces and the practice of religion are extremely transnationalized and many of these processes are conceptualized as parts or consequences of globalization, such as international migration. This question has encouraged us to look at the ways in which a set of issues relating to place establishes itself in the belief system that connects the relations of a given religious community to its past and to its future.\footnote{Danièle Hervieu-Léger, “Space and Religion: New Approaches to Religious Spatiality in Modernity.” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 26.1, March, Oxford, 2002, 99-105.}
Conclusion: something new from an old tradition

In C.K. Yang’s study, religion has been put in the center of daily life in Chinese society in his book, which is an innovative idea that stands in opposition to the idea of the importance of Chinese modern elites, such as Liang Qichao (1873-1929). We have also seen this attempt in Goossaert and Palmer’s brilliant scholarship.\(^{35}\)

In my case, I tried to study a transnational group in a highly controlled city. In my primary research, I discovered, first, under the political surveillance religious groups are not passively enduring the impact of political control, but also actively engaging in organizational development. Up to 2007, over 60 countries had accepted disaster relief from the Tzu Chi Foundation. Tzuchians in China also have worked side by side with the local governments on relief efforts from time to time. This Buddhist belief created a link between religious valuation and moral action. Followers of these teachings could not isolate their good deeds to certain contexts; they had to reorganize their lives methodically and cultivate themselves through their work in daily life. To live a simple life is to run one’s business wisely in an economical and pragmatic way. To practice diligence is to be prudent and sensible in business. Cherishing resources leads to recycling and reusing material in one’s business. Saving resources and energy are moral actions to save the earth. To control desire is a discipline of mind and body requiring methodical cultivation, such as being a vegetarian and practicing thrift. You are not supposed to spend the wealth you earn. The greater wealth is to be able to share your wealth.

Secondly, religious groups can be considered a location which creates a social space for grassroots education. A social space, which is strategically spatial arranged, allows to develop a more creative and fluid “popular politics” in a highly controlled society, which offers a critique to a highly regulated society. The discourse that I heard from many Tzuchi merchants is very similar. They apply the concept of Tzuchi teaching to their enterprises. Besides the routine donations to the poor, they are strongly encouraged to utilize their profession for the public interest. Enterprises should not limit their goal only to the pursuit of economic profit. Enterprises should focus on carbon emissions reduction to pursue sustainable development on Earth, and establish good models of enterprises based on shared responsibility.

As I mentioned earlier, putting Buddhist ideas into action is something new to local Chinese converts. Many of them are former Jushi and enthusiastic about recycling education in their neighborhood and poverty relief in rural area. Senior members teach new members how to plan and implement organizational activities. New converts bring new ideas as to how to localize this transnational

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35 Goossaert and Palmer, 2011.
Buddhist teaching in housing communities. The transnational flow of religious knowledge and practice has been localized in the neighborhood. What are the distinctive characters of Tzu Chi teaching comparing with the lay Buddhist history in Shanghai?

If we compare the Tzuchi merchants with the Buddhist laity in the 1920s, there are three major differences. First of all, Tzu Chi is affiliated with a foreign mother temple in Hualian Taiwan. It is registered as a non-governmental organization in China. The financial resources come from the general public and Taiwanese merchants in Shanghai. Tzu Chi Shanghai is not allowed to publicly solicit donations. The benevolence programs also extend beyond urban areas for two reasons. The extreme poverty in rural areas has provided a niche for many faith-based organizations, including Tzu Chi, to expand their missions. Tzu Chi’s transnational nature suggests it will not limit its vision for growth to one city. As for the leadership, Tzu Chi merchants have to blend in with other general followers as regular members. As one company’s president has told me, “We must shrink ourselves. There is no boss ego in the Tzuchian family.” Therefore, the intention of utilizing charitable works to build up their business reputation or their social status is prohibited. Tzu Chi merchants cannot use charitable works to advance their business, such as building up connections with local or remote governments. On the other hand, they will have to risk their business when they promote their faith.

What are the distinctive characters of Tzu Chi teaching compared with its practice in other countries? Tzu Chi practices do not encourage the mix of personal business interest and Tzu Chi organizational interest. Yet under the particular kind of political ecology in Shanghai, merchants will have to take Tzu Chi practice under their commercial wings. The merchants are usually named as the head of district religious shareholder. In the study of relations between spiritual teachings, censorship, and commercial logic, I discovered how the tension between Buddhist Tzu Chi and the Chinese state is different from that between house churches and the local state. Regulation has forced Tzu Chi missions into the private sectors—the companies and manufacturers that are dominated by foreign investors, yet the practices are not categorized as illegal activities.

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Веишан Хуанг

БОДИСАТВА СТИЖЕ ИЗ ПЛАКАРА: ГРАД, ПРИСМОТРА И ПРАКТИКОВАЊЕ РЕЛИГИЈЕ

Резиме

Аутор посматра религиозне заједнице као место за дискусију и критику цензуре у кинеском друштву. Овај рад се користи "еколошком методом" у истраживању у високо цензурисаном и све више плуралистичком граду, Шангају. Шангај је искусио велике друштвене промене од касних 80-десетих година. Важно је да се разуме како су друштвено – структурални изазови, као што су имиграција, утицаји на верске групе у оквиру њихових урбаних аспирација. У овом раду, примарни фокус ће бити на адаптацији верских група на политичку околну. У складу са владиним рестрикцијама на нивоу општина у провинцијама, религиозна пракса је невидљива у јавној сфери али јача у приватној сфери у свим већим градовима у Кини. Улога коју религиозне институције играју у усклађивању са градским регулативама утиче највише на верске групе. Ово истраживање открива да, прво, иако под политичком присмотром у граду, верске групе не подносе пасивно утицај политичке контроле, већ се активно ангажују у смислу развоја организације. Друго, верске групе могу бити посматране као место које ствара друштвени простор за образовање провинције и да као такве, развијају креативније и флуидније "популистичке политике" у друштву, које служе као критика високо контролисаном друштву.

Кључне речи: Шангај, имиграција, будизам, еколошки модел, транснационализам

Примљен: 5.11.2011.
THE SECURITISATION OF TIBETAN BUDDHISM IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Abstract

This article examines the troubled relationship between Tibetan Buddhism and the Chinese state since 1949. In the history of this relationship, a cyclical pattern of Chinese attempts, both violently assimilative and subtly corrosive, to control Tibetan Buddhism and a multifaceted Tibetan resistance to defend their religious heritage, will be revealed. The article will develop a security-based logic for that cyclical dynamic. For these purposes, a two-level analytical framework will be applied. First, the framework of the insecurity dilemma will be used to draw the broad outlines of the historical cycles of repression and resistance. However, the insecurity dilemma does not look inside the concept of security and it is not helpful to establish how Tibetan Buddhism became a security issue in the first place and continues to retain that status. The theory of securitisation is best suited to perform this analytical task. As such, the cycles of Chinese repression and Tibetan resistance fundamentally originate from the incessant securitisation of Tibetan Buddhism by the Chinese state and its apparatchiks. The paper also considers the why, how, and who of this securitisation, setting the stage for a future research project taking up the analytical effort to study the why, how and who of a potential desecuritisation of all things Tibetan, including Tibetan Buddhism, and its benefits for resolving the protracted Sino-Tibetan conflict.

Key words: Sino-Tibetan conflict, Tibetan Buddhism, religion, securitisation, and insecurity dilemma.

This article examines the troubled relationship between Tibetan Buddhism and the Chinese state since 1949. In the history of this relationship, a cyclical pattern of Chinese attempts, both violently assimilative and subtly corrosive, to control Tibetan Buddhism and a multifaceted Tibetan resistance to defend their religious heritage, will be revealed. This article will develop a security-based logic for that cyclical dynamic, hinging on this central argument: the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese government see a rival in Tibetan Buddhism with local and national dimensions, prompting its repression at the slightest sign of...
threat to the Party-State. The fate of Tibetan language education is also examined briefly to demonstrate that the same argument holds across a range of cultural fields. For these purposes, a two-level analytical framework will be applied. First, the framework of the insecurity dilemma will be used to draw the broad outlines of the historical cycles of repression and resistance. However, the insecurity dilemma does not look inside the concept of security and it is not helpful to establish how Tibetan Buddhism became a security issue and continues to retain that status. The theory of securitisation is best suited to perform this analytical task.

Accordingly, this article is organised into four key sections. First, the theoretical framework will be introduced in the following section. The next section gives a brief overview of Tibetan Buddhism. Then, the historical cycles of the insecurity dilemma surrounding Tibetan Buddhism from 1949 to the present day will be chronicled. The fourth section examines how Tibetan Buddhism has been constructed and reconstructed as a security issue by the Chinese Party-State, before concluding the article.

The Insecurity Dilemma and Securitisation: two-level analytical framework

The insecurity dilemma begins when an insecure state, owing to a sense of state weakness, engages in state-building to increase its security in terms of nation-building, institutional integration and infrastructural development. However, other groups—ethno-national, racial, religious, linguistic and ideological—within that state interprets the state’s policies and practices [state-building] as threatening their identities, and resist in ways that are almost as multi-faceted as the arsenal of statecraft, and unwittingly enhances the state’s sense of weakness and insecurity. A caveat: while the possibilities in terms of the adversarial non-state groups are legion, this article will use the Tibetans as an ethno-religious group living within the frontiers of a multi-national imperial state. Paradoxically, while the state and its adversarial groups begin with the motive of improving their respective security conditions, both ends up having less security, locking them into perverse cycles of state-building and resistance.

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While the insecurity dilemma is helpful to set-up the cyclical interplay of the security competition between the state and its internal rivals, it does not look into the concept of security and fails to help us understand how something treated as a security issue becomes one in the first place and gets perpetuated over time. The theory of securitisation, developed by the Copenhagen School of security studies, serves this purpose the best.  

The Copenhagen School differentiates itself from the treatment of security issues as objectively or subjectively present by traditional and constructivist security theories by treating all public issues as lying on a spectrum ranging from non-political (not on the state’s agenda) through political (statist agenda) to securitised (extra-legal and beyond politics, i.e. presenting an issue as an existential threat requiring emergency or extraordinary counter-measures). Hence, security is a special kind of politics. The Copenhagen School’s distinctive trade-mark is the treatment of security as a “speech act” or discursive construction of security. Speech acts “bring into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as such.” As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde wrote:

“For the analyst to grasp this act [securitisation], the task is not to assess some objective threats that ‘really’ endanger some object to be defended or secured; rather, it is to understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. The process of securitisation is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship).”

Any issue (not just political and military issues) can be placed in the security realm when a securitising actor (state as well as non-state) defines to an audience that there is an existential threat to one or more values (referent objects

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6 Williams 2003: 513.

that include national defence, regimes, sovereignty, state institutions, ideology, economy, identity, environment, and so on) and recommends counter-measures that violate the normal social rules, legal strictures and political relations. What differentiates successful securitisation from an unsuccessful one (a mere securitising move) is the audience’s acceptance or rejection of the securitising actor’s presentation of an issue as existentially threatened and its recommendation of emergency defensive measures. A successful securitisation therefore contains three features: “existential threats, emergency action and effects on inter-unit [political] relations by breaking free of rules.” There are two facilitating conditions for a successful securitisation: “(1) the internal, linguistic-grammatical [the grammar and vocabulary of security and constructing ‘a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out’]…and (2) the external, contextual and social” i.e. the social standing or capital of the securitising actor and the nature of the threat.

It is necessary to clarify here that it is neither necessary to utter the specific word “security” nor is its utterance more facilitating of securitisation. As the Copenhagen School writes:

“It is important to note that the security speech act is not defined by uttering the word security. What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience.”

Another caveat is that securitisations can become sedimented “rhetorically and discursively, culturally, and institutionally” to make them subject to probabilistic analysis. This is especially relevant when we are dealing with socially constructed “objects” like identity. Because it is beyond the scope of this article to develop the theory or engage in a comprehensive critical review, these basic insights of securitisation theory will inform the examination of how the Chinese have securitised Tibetan Buddhism later on. Before that, a short overview of the Tibetan Buddhist tradition is in order.

8 Ibid.
12 Ibid: 27.
Tibetan Buddhism: an overview

Buddhism first came to Tibet in the 7th century during the reign of the Tibetan emperor Songtsen Gampo (617/18-649/50). One of his descendants Emperor Trisong Detsen (A.D. 756-797) declared Buddhism as the state religion and showered imperial patronage to Buddhist practitioners and institutions, including appointing monks to the most important ministerial positions. By inviting renowned Indian Buddhist masters, principally Shantarakshita, Kamalashila and Padmasambhava, Trison Detsen laid a strong foundation for the propagation of Buddhism in Tibet. The first Tibetan monastery of Samye was constructed and a set of seven Tibetans became the first Tibetans to come fully ordained monks. Additionally, Trisong Detsen also presided over a spiritual debate between the Chan Chinese monks and Indian Buddhists, which the latter won with great religious-historical significance for the development of Tibetan Buddhism. Trisong’s great grandson, Tri-ralpachen (806-841) further expanded this state-patronage to the Buddhist clergy, to the great displeasure of the practitioners of Bon, the original religion of Tibet, and arguably also some secular minded personalities in his court. Tri-ralpachen was assassinated in 841, after which, his elder brother Udum Tsenpo, more popularly known as Lang Dharma (A.D. 803-46), ascended to the throne. Depending on which source one is using, Lang Dharma was either a rabid anti-Buddhist ruler, who destroyed Buddhism in favour of Bon, or a secular reform-minded emperor who was concerned about the fact that patronage towards Buddhism was taking away resources from the considerable administrative and military requirements of an empire stretching from Eastern Afghanistan in the West to China in the East and parts of present day South Asia in the South to the Tarim basin (Central Asia) in the North. Whatever the reasons, Lang Dharma himself was assassinated by a Buddhist monk around 846. His death was followed by a divisive power-struggle between two of his queens, each of whom claimed to have a son fathered by the emperor.

18 Ibid: 143.
19 Red Annals 40-41, like most Buddhist sources, claims that Lang Dharma “destroyed the Buddha’s dharma”. On the contrary Karmay argues that Lang Dharma merely reduced the level of state patronage towards monastic Buddhism in light of the pressures for material resources for administering a sprawling empire and man power for administrative and war-fighting capacity. See Royal History of the Divine Prince Dharma and the Aftermath, Dharamsala, 1986.
Lang Dharma’s death spelt the breakup of the Tibetan empire. Tibetans call this the “time of fragmentation” (གསིལ་བ་འི་དུས་མཆེད) or “fragmentation” (གསིལ་བ་མཆེད). In the next one hundred years, for reasons that even historians have still not ascertained, Buddhism disappeared from much of Tibet. Tibetans refer to the spread of Buddhism in Tibet up to this point as the “Early Propagation of the Faith” (བསྟན་པ་སྔ་དར). Starting from the Eastern and Western peripheries of the erstwhile empire, Buddhism began to be revived in what Tibetans call “resuscitating the embers of the faith” (བསྟན་པའི་མེ་རོ་གསོས་པ) or the “Latter Propagation of the Faith” (བསྟན་པ་ཕྱི་དར). It was during this period, roughly starting in the later part of the 10th Century, when the four sects of Tibetan Buddhism began to take shape. Those who remained faithful to or traced their tradition to the Buddhist masters of the above-mentioned imperial period came to be known as Nyingma-pa (རྨྱིང་མ་པ་), or the Ancient Ones. Around 1073, an ancient noble family founded the Sakya sect of Tibetan Buddhism.20 The various sub-sects of Kagyu (བཀའ་རི་དགེ་སྤྲུག་) also originated in the 12th century.21 Building upon an order, which originated as Kadampa in the 11th century, Tsongkhapa founded the Geluk (དགེ་ལུགས) sect in 14th-15th centuries. In the 11th century, the followers of Bon, the indigenous religion of Tibet, had also organised themselves doctrinally and institutionally along similar lines as the rival Buddhist sects. In fact, the Bonpos and the Buddhists had borrowed from each other extensively in terms of philosophy, rituals and institutions that they have become almost indistinguishable from each other. It is not without reason that Bon teachers in the West promote their religion as “Bon Buddhism”.22 Especially among the Buddhist sects, they differ from each other only ritually and on the emphasis that they put on certain practices, but they share the same fundamental tenets. This has been the case down to the modern times. Therefore, any analysis dealing with religion in Tibet has to be sensitive to this diversity amidst uniformity. Any analysis of the politics of Tibetan Buddhism also has to take account of what it means for the Tibetans.

Buddhism is at the core of Tibetan culture, society and national identity. It is the chief source of national pride. As Goldstein wrote, “Tibetan Buddhism… exemplified for Tibetans the value and worth of their culture and way of life and the essence of their national identity. It is what they felt made their society unique and without equal”.23 This is why the Tibetans have always resisted foreign rulers when they were seen as threats to Tibetan Buddhism, even when they have tolerated violations of Tibetan independence or autonomy. This presents a

20 གཞི་ཐོ་ཅེ་རིང་གི་རྩོམ་སྒྲིག་བྱས། [Phuntsok Tsering (Ed.)] ཤིག་ལོ་ངེར་སྤྲོད་ཐེག་བཅོས་[A Chronology of Key Events in Tibetan History], བོད་ཀྱི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་དོན་ཆེན་རེའུ་མིག། (Beijing: People’s Printing Press), 1991: 17; Stein 1972: 75.
21 Ibid.
22 See the website of Ligmincha Institute, based in America, for instance, available at https://www.ligmincha.org/.
dilemma for the Chinese, which captures Beijing’s policy dilemma:

By suppressing Tibetan Buddhism, Tibetan resentment and hence the longing for freedom are increased; but by adopting a liberal policy, the very cultural system that most encourages the Tibetans to identify themselves apart from China continues to flourish.24

From the Tibetan perspective, even during the more liberal era of the 1980s, the Chinese have been hostile towards Tibetan Buddhism, albeit with more subtle measures. The following historical analysis shows that repressive Chinese policies in an area that the Tibetans hold so dear to their hearts would only lead to confrontation.

**Tibetan Buddhism under Communist China: Cycles of Repression and Resistance**

After 1949, when the Communist Party of China (CCP) led by Mao Zedong took over power in China and began to “liberate” the Tibetan regions, Tibetan Buddhism went through a number of phases ranging from the apparent tolerance in the first few years to the most cataclysmic periods of the so-called Democratic Reforms and the Cultural Revolution to a short but intense moment of revival in the 1980s to the increasingly repressive policies beginning in the 1990s and lasting to these days. Within these broad phases, there were regional variations operating across the legal demarcations of the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), or Central and Western Tibet (CWT) which corresponds roughly to the Tibetan areas formerly under the rule of the Dalai Lama’s government in Lhasa, and the Tibetan regions to the east which have been incorporated into Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces—The Tibetans refer to these eastern regions as Kham and Amdo provinces. This section charts these developments in the last six decades since 1949.

**Repression in the East, Gradualism in CWT (1949-1959)**

As soon as the CCP won the Chinese civil war, they immediately began the task of “liberating” the Eastern Tibetan regions, which had been under Chinese rule since the 18th century. Central and Western Tibet (CWT), ruled by the Dalai Lama’s government in Lhasa, had been exercising de facto independence since at least the Tibetans drove out the Qing officials and soldiers after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Not only did the Chinese lack any physical presence there, CWT also possessed a level of international personality. Therefore, CWT had to be “liberated” very differently: either through an agreement with the Tibetan government or through invasion. Accordingly, the Chinese gov-

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ernment told Lhasa to send representatives to discuss the “peaceful liberation” of Tibet, but when the Tibetan delegation did not reach Beijing in time, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attacked and occupied Chamdo, the Tibetan town closest to the border between CWT and the nominally Chinese-controlled Kham.25 After demonstrating its military power and threats of further use of force, the Chinese compelled the Tibetans to sign the so-called “17-Point Agreement” for the “liberation of Tibet” on 23 March, 1951.26 The Agreement required the Tibetans to accept Tibet as a part of China and the stationing of Chinese soldiers in CWT and the ceding of the powers foreign and defence relations to Beijing. However, the Agreement also assured the Tibetans of regional autonomy, preservation of the existing socio-political system in Tibet, including the powers and privileges of the Dalai Lama and the aristocratic and monastic elite. The agreement also promised to respect and protect Tibetan religious, linguistic and cultural freedoms. Reforms would only be conducted by the Tibetan authorities if demanded by the Tibetan people. It should be pointed out straightaway that this Agreement only applied to the Tibetans in CWT and not the Eastern Tibetans of Kham and Amdo on the legality that these regions were not under the rule of the Lhasa government since the 18th century.27

Treating the Eastern Tibetans as no different from the Chinese, the Communist authorities subjected them to radical communist reforms beginning around 1954.28 Immediately after the Communists overran eastern Tibet in 1949, they started building the administrative and Party structures there. By 1956, Eastern Tibet was organised into Tibetan autonomous districts.29 By 1953, the Communists started land reforms targeting the monasteries and local elites, classifying people into different class groups, confiscating weapons and forcibly settling nomads, beginning in Gyalthang, Kham (Yunnan).30 The officials and PLA travelled from village to village confiscating land and property from landlords and traditional leaders and redistributing these with great ‘propaganda and fanfare’ to the poor, albeit after taking the best of everything for themselves, including land and livestock.31 Land and property redistribution was accompanied by persecution of landowners and traditional leaders through “struggle sessions” (འཐབ་འཛིང་), public humiliations, and arrests in order to eliminate any potential leadership for resistance. However, many of these social, political, and religious leaders

29 Shakya 1999: 137.
31 Ibid: 37.
were not regarded as class exploiters even by the lower-class Tibetans, but as respected and revered figures representing Tibetan cultural, religious and national identity. The communist reforms went beyond taking away the autonomy of the local elite to humiliating and persecuting them in public.

The Chinese call these “Democratic Reforms” to “abolish serfdom, a grim and backward feudal system” and claim that it was the “yearning of the overwhelming majority of the Tibetan people”. However, they were also a ruse to expose and eliminate all Tibetan opponents to Chinese rule...“facilitating not only Chinese control over Tibet but social control as well”. The Chinese pushed on with the reforms despite popular opposition and the appeals of the Dalai Lama and local Tibetan elites like Geshe Sherab Gyatso. The Eastern Tibetans saw the reforms first and foremost as an attack on their value system and identity.

Tibetans of all classes and regions were united by a common culture and their faith in Buddhism and deeply resented the reforms that threatened the existence of their religious institutions. Consequently, the Tibetan regions of Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan rose up in violent rebellions attacking Chinese civilian and military personnel in their localities. When Tibetan villagers resisted land reforms, the ensuing fighting forced them to seek sanctuary in local monasteries, which the PLA besieged and bombed from the air. Hundreds of Khampas and Amdowas fled to central Tibet bringing news of the persecution of monks and religion in their homelands. As the fighting continued in the east, the number of refugees in and around Lhasa increased to about 58,000 families, according to one estimate.

Far from winning over the lower classes, Democratic Reforms ignited a broad-based Tibetan resistance. The persecution of the local elites was more successful in creating resistance to the Chinese than it was in creating “proletarian class consciousness”. While the United Front was able to co-opt some members of the upper class, they failed to anticipate the nationalistic reaction engendered by their persecution of the non-cooperative elements. The Tibetans simply saw the collaborators as traitors and the rebellious ones as national heroes. In retrospect, treating more than half the Tibetan population that lived outside Lhasa’s rule as

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33 Smith 2008: 36.
34 Shakya 1999: 143-44.
36 Ibid: 143.
37 Ibid: 139.
38 Ibid: 140-41.
40 Ibid: 38.
Chinese and conducting radical communist reforms was a fundamentally flawed policy. It added more fuel to the powder-keg that the Chinese-Tibetan relations were fast turning into in Lhasa. Sure enough, Lhasa erupted in a massive uprising on 10th March, 1959, which led to a violent Chinese suppression, the flight of the Dalai Lama to India and the dissolution of the traditional Tibetan government.

The Lhasa Uprising (10th March) and Democratic Reforms Everywhere (1959-1966)

This epochal event of the 10th March uprising in Lhasa, which the Tibetans commemorate every year as the Tibetan National Uprising Day, cleared the way for the Chinese to impose the above-mentioned Democratic Reforms in all Tibetan regions, including the destruction of most aspects of Tibetan Buddhism. The Panchen Lama’s Petition submitted to the Central Chinese authorities in 1962 was most scathing and detailed in its criticism of the Chinese brutalisation of Tibetan religion during the so-called Democratic Reforms:

“Before democratic reform, there were more than 2,500 large, medium and small monasteries in Tibet. After democratic reform, only 70-odd monasteries were kept in existence by the government. This was a reduction of more than 97%... In the whole of Tibet in the past, there was a total of about 110,000 monks and nuns. Of those possibly 10,000 fled abroad, leaving about 100,000. After democratic reform was concluded, the number of monks and nuns living in the monasteries was about 7,000 people, which is a reduction of 93%....”

By “Tibet” here, the Panchen Lama, means TAR, but in Eastern Tibet “the level of seriousness, the length of time and the scale [of the destruction and suppression of religion] are a great deal worse than in Tibet”. Another Tibetan Lama, Arjia Rinpoche, who rose to the highest echelons of the religious bureaucracy in China and subsequently escaped to America writes about the suppression of Buddhism in his monastery, Kumbum, in Qinghai:

43 TIN, A Poisoned Arrow: The Secret Report of the 10th Panchen Lama, London, 1997: 52. This contains both the Chinese original and TIN’s English translation. The Panchen Lamas are considered the second most important Tibetan spiritual leaders after the Dalai Lamas. The 10th Panchen Lama chose to stay in Tibet and work with the Chinese rather than escape to exile. For this petition, the Panchen Lama was labelled an enemy of the party, people and socialism in 1964, persecuted with violent public ‘struggle-sessions’ and incarcerated for 14 years in prisons and house-detentions. However, the Panchen Lama was not the only Tibetan to criticise Chinese policies in those days. Geshe Sherap Gyatso, another Tibetan lama who supported the CCP from the beginning also attacked the policy towards Tibetan Buddhism and the disproportionate manner of the suppression of the rebellion in Tibetan regions. Shakya 1999: 270-1.
44 TIN 1997: 104.
“By now [late 1950s] the fervor of the Communist Religious Reform Movement had led to the total suppression of all religion. Kumbum has been closed as a working monastery for several months, and monks were longer allowed to wear robes. Classified by the Communist Chinese as members of the exploiting class, they were forced to perform slave labor.”

This punctures the widespread belief that the destruction of religion in Tibet began only during the Cultural Revolution. If Tibetan Buddhists felt that Democratic Reforms were repressive, worse was to come during the Cultural Revolution.

*The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976): Destroy the Four Olds*

Under Chairman Mao’s injunction to eliminate the Four Olds (old ideas, old culture, old customs and old habits) or the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Chinese and Tibetan Red Guards rampaged against Tibetan culture, religion and customs. Whatever the nature of the Cultural Revolution in China itself and whatever the original intentions of the authorities, every aspect of Tibetan culture was destroyed, ‘reformed’ or banned. As Shakya contends, “The effect was to destroy Tibet’s separate identity. The Chinese now propagated a policy of total assimilation and Tibetan identity was reduced to the language alone, although...even this had come under attack”. Goldstein concurs: “The Chinese Communist Party....placed Tibetan traditional culture and religion under severe attack”. Since Buddhism permeated every aspect of Tibetan life and culture, it was a special target of the Red Guard. Any expression of religion was prohibited and eradicated. The Tibetans were indoctrinated into believing that Buddhism, Bon and their folk expressions were backward superstitions. As Goldstein wrote,

“The leaders of Tibet’s great monasteries were incarcerated...and most other monks were sent home or to other work units.... Private religious activities, including altars, were forbidden; religious structures, monasteries and prayer walls were torn down; and thousands of religious texts and icons were burned or desecrated.”

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47  Shakya 1999: 322.
The fate of one specific monastery, Drepung, is illustrative. Drepung escaped the wholesale physical destruction, which could not be said about most other monasteries in Tibet, but the monks were prohibited from wearing their robes or exhibiting any signs of monkhood, indeed of Tibetanness, keep religious altars in their personal quarters. Religious beliefs and practices and spiritual leaders and practitioners were attacked in mass study sessions and struggle sessions. 51

However, consistent with the cyclical logic of repression and resistance, even at the height of the Cultural Revolution, many Tibetans attempted to defend their religion, culture and identity, which went beyond the widespread phenomenon of concealing sacred objects to avoid destruction. For most of the Cultural Revolution in all parts of China, the Party Central had lost control of the campaign, which had dissolved into brutal factional in-fighting between rival groups of Red Guards divided along class lines. 52 In Tibet, the factional conflict played out between the Nyam-drel or United Front (ཉམ་འབྲེལ་) and Gyen-log or Rebel (གྱེན་ལོག་) groups. The Tibetans in many parts of Central Tibet took advantage of this factional disarray to defend their religious culture.

The most well-known example is the Nyemo Revolt of 1969. 53 Beginning in 1968, Tibetans in Nyemo County (west of Lhasa), led by Trinley Chodon, a nun claiming to be possessed by the spirit of Gongmey Gyalmo [གོང་མའི་རྒྱལ་མོ།], the celestial aunt and advisor of Gesar, the mythical king in the Tibetan epic, Gesar of Ling [གླིང་གེ་སྤྲ་], rose up in a violent rebellion that spread to eighteen counties. 54 Her fame spread far and wide because of her presumed prophetic and healing powers. Trinley and her supporters allied with Gyenlog because of its anti-establishment crusade against the Nyamdrel faction. Nyamdrel were associated with the destruction of Tibetan culture, the brutal suppression of the


52 Fairbank and Goldman 1999: 392.

53 Shakya 1999: 343–47; 2002: 39–40; Smith 2008: 128; Goldstein 2009; Wang 2002: 98. There is a debate about whether it was primarily a nationalist revolt or an economic struggle against the introduction of the commune system in central Tibet, with Goldstein and Wang privileging the economic rationale and others espousing the nationalist argument, but all of them agree that there was, at least, an ethnic dimension to the brutal conflicts of 1969. Goldstein 2009: 170.

54 Goldstein 2009: 1 and 82; Shakya 1999: 345. Gesar is believed to be the longest epic in the world. In the epic, Gesar descends from heaven to subdue the demons that were destroying Buddhism in Tibet. Gongmey Gyalmo stays in heaven, but helps Gesar in his mission in Tibet through prophecies. Although there is little information on how the rebellion manifested in the other counties, Goldstein provides an account of what happened in the nomadic area of Phala, Ngamring County. There, achieving religious and economic freedoms were the main agenda of the nomads who took part in the rebellion. Goldstein 2009: 174–81.
1959 uprising and the enforcement of democratic reforms and most recently the commune system. With her charismatic leadership, she inspired the rural Tibetans to attack the Chinese officials and Tibetan collaborators, often with extreme brutality.55 Her success inspired other Tibetans to claim to be mediums of one or another of Gesar’s warrior-ministers, all claiming to be working for the restoration of Buddhism in Tibet.56 The revolt culminated in attacks on the PLA in a village named Bagor, where twenty PLA soldiers and cadres were killed, and attacks on the headquarters of Nyemo County.57 A huge contingent of PLA soldiers with reinforcements from other counties had to be deployed to subdue the rebels. The operation resulted in the death of many of the rebels and the arrest of the nun and her colleagues including a Lama who had performed the ritual, Opening the Nerve Door (རྩ་སྒོ་ཕྱེད་) to spiritually prepare her for possession by Gongmey Gyalmo.58 They were all executed in Lhasa in 1970.59 Although economic reasons definitely played some role and it was entwined with the tumultuous factionalism of the Cultural Revolution, the Nyemo Revolt was primarily a “cultural response” inspired by the Tibetan’s desire to regain some measure of social, psychological and cultural freedom.60 It was provoked by “the constant attack on their culture by the Chinese.... The total negation of traditional Tibetan cultural and religious authority elicited an extreme response from the Tibetans”.61 The violent and relentless socialist nation-building met an equally violent millenarian cultural response. Ultimately, the rebellion was brutally put down and the offensive against the Four Olds resumed unimpeded.

Consequently, what was left of Tibetan Buddhism after Democratic Reform had been completely destroyed by the time the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976. The death of Mao Zedong and the arrest of the Gang of Four, headed by his wife Qiang Qing, paved the way for the ascension of Deng Xiaoping as the paramount leader of China in 1977. Deng initiated a series of economic and political reforms in China, which also led to a period of political liberalisation in Tibet.

55 Shakya 1999: 345. Gyenlog and Trinley Chodon had a symbiotic relationship. While Gyenlog acquired thousands of rural Tibetan members because of her charismatic authority, the nun and her entourage found increasing space, at least temporarily, to revive some of Tibet’s traditions and to fight for the restoration of Buddhism in Tibet.
56 Goldstein 2009: 98-99. Of course, occasionally, they asserted rhetorical affiliation with Mao’s leadership, which was a tactical ploy given the broader political state of affairs.
58 Ibid: 144-161.
59 Ibid: 154. In total, 34 members of her group including herself were executed.
60 Shakya 1999: 346.
61 Ibid.
Liberalisation, Revival and Reversal (1979-1989)

Deng’s liberalisation, including the initiation of dialogue with the exiled Dalai Lama gave a sense of optimism to the bewildered Tibetans. Chinese-Tibetan relations in the post-Mao era began on a cautiously positive note. China began by releasing and rehabilitating a number of Tibetans who had taken part in the March 1959 rebellion and some officials of the former Tibetan government who had been imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution. The 10th Panchen Lama was also released on 10 October, 1977 and politically rehabilitated in 1978, followed by Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal. Over 2300 Tibetans who were wrongly accused and incarcerated during the Cultural Revolution were also given monetary compensation. Travel restrictions were relaxed, enabling some Tibetans in exile to visit Tibet and those in Tibet to travel to India and Nepal for family visits, pilgrimage and religious teachings. Beijing also initiated contact with the Hong Kong-based elder brother of the Dalai Lama, Gyalo Dhondup, resulting in his meeting with Deng in Beijing in 1979. Deng reportedly told Dhondup:

“The basic question is whether Tibet is part of China or not. This should be kept as the criteria for testing the truth…. So long as it is not accepted that Tibet is an integral part of China, there is nothing else to talk about.”

Tibetan exile officials and western scholars have interpreted this as meaning that apart from independence, all other issues could be discussed. This rather ambivalent statement became the basis of a dialogue process that lasted until 1993. Deng also invited the Dalai Lama to send fact-finding delegations to inspect the local situation inside Tibet, leading to four fact-finding delegations and two exploratory talks between 1979 and 1985. A mix of objective realities, pragmatic imperatives and confidence in the Tibetans’ ideological loyalty to Beijing accounted for the relaxation of policy and initiation of dialogue, including allowing the exile fact-finding missions.

The CCP abandoned the Cultural Revolution-era policy of violent assimilation and returned to the traditional Chinese belief that the frontier-barbarians would voluntarily adopt the “superior” and “advanced” culture of the Chinese. This was also compatible with the Marxist idea of the eventual withering away of national and religious identities in favour of proletarian identity in the course
of revolution.\textsuperscript{67} However, conditions should be created conducive for such a process of “acculturation” to work even if that meant giving ground temporarily. This opened up some space for the revival of Buddhism and other aspects of Tibetan culture.\textsuperscript{68}

To be sure, relaxation in the religious sphere was sensitive and cautious. Despite the initial opening, considerable restrictions remained on religious freedom since the monasteries were seen as the nerve-centres of Tibetan nationalism and the biggest challenge to Chinese rule.\textsuperscript{69} Although the Party was resigned to allowing some role for religion in Tibet, albeit wary of inflaming separatism,\textsuperscript{70} it could not hide its true agenda with regard to religion in Tibet. In 1983, the Party had reiterated the ultimate withering away of religion as a matter of ideological and policy objectives.\textsuperscript{71} As some scholars put it, the limited official tolerance of religion in Tibet was “purely strategic”.\textsuperscript{72} Yet, it was not entirely up to the CCP. The spurt of religious revival in the early 1980s took everyone by surprise, rattling the Chinese officials.\textsuperscript{73} Arjia Rinpoche wrote that much of this revival, including the renovation of monasteries and recognition of reincarnations happened largely outside the official framework.\textsuperscript{74} Only when the scale of the revival became obvious, and the religious bureaucracy risked becoming irrelevant did the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) bring in regulations for monastic restoration and the recognition of reincarnate Lamas.\textsuperscript{75} The CCP’s loss of control in Tibet, if not of China’s, was genuinely feared as an outcome of a separatist movement organised along ethnic, religious and linguistic lines. State and regime security were seen to be at stake.

The revival of Tibetan Buddhism was particularly dramatic in Kham and Amdo, where, as parts of neighbouring Chinese provinces, Tibetans also enjoyed more religious freedom there.\textsuperscript{76} Many monasteries and temples that survived the Cultural Revolution were renovated and opened for worship and many that sus-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{67} Liu Xianzhao and Wei Shiming, ‘On the protracted nature of the nationalities problem in the Socialist period,’ \textit{People’s Daily}, 6 April, 1979. For English translation, see SWB, 1979: FE/6099/B/10.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Goldstein 1997: 85; Shakya 1999: 419.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Ibid: 419.
\item \textsuperscript{71} This was outlined in an important document published in the Party’s theoretical journal \textit{Red Flag}, 16 June, 1983. English translation is available in \textit{Missiology: An International Review}, 1983, Vo. XI, No. 3: 267-89.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Blondeau, in Blondeau and Buffetrille 2008: 161; Kapstein 2004: 242
\item \textsuperscript{73} Ibid: 164; Shakya 1999: 402-4.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Kapstein 2004: 239-45.
\end{itemize}
tained damage were rebuilt.\textsuperscript{77} Most of the renovation and rebuilding was made possible by “the vigorous” faith of the Tibetans who “gave their time and money, and also with the funds collected by Tibetans in exile”.\textsuperscript{78} However, some tour-isty sites like Potala and Norbu Lingka Palaces and Jokhang Temple in Lhasa received substantial state funding for renovation.\textsuperscript{79} Rituals and various devotional activities such as pilgrimage, prostrations and prayer flags were permitted and religious scriptures were printed and openly circulated. Some lamas from exile travelled to Tibet to teach or direct renovation work, while others like the 10\textsuperscript{th} Panchen Lama, who stayed in Tibet and became victims during the Cultural Rev-
olution, were rehabilitated and resumed some of their traditional roles.\textsuperscript{80}

However, “liberalisation was intended to provide an opportunity for the last vestiges of superstitious belief to quietly wither away”.\textsuperscript{81} As Blondeau puts it, liberalisation was ‘purely strategic’. As mentioned earlier, in 1983, the Party esti-
lished ‘the natural withering of religion’ through socio-economic transforma-
tion as the long term goal of its religious policy, since ideology and coercion had failed during the Maoist era.\textsuperscript{82} Such a sanguine view was ill-advised as the speed with which Tibetan Buddhism was revived in the 1980s unnerved the Chinese, and revealed the intense devotion that most Tibetans still felt towards the Dalai Lama. Between 1987 and 1993, monks and nuns led many pro-independence demonstrations in Lhasa in support of the Dalai Lama, requiring the Chinese to impose martial law in 1989 and implement harsh new policies.\textsuperscript{83}

\textit{Marshal Law and Hard-Line Shift in Policy (1989-2008)}

The confluence of a number of internal and external events in Tibet and China in the late 1980s brought about a hard-line shift in Beijing’s Tibet policy,
particularly in the religious sphere. In response to the pro-independence demonstrations and riots in Tibet, Wu Jinghua, the Yi minority Party Secretary of TAR, was replaced by Hu Jintao on 12 January, 1989. The central authorities ordered the imposition of martial law in Lhasa on 7 March, 1989, effective from 8 March. During a Politburo meeting, Beijing unveiled on 19 October, 1989, the hard-line policy of rejecting political liberalisation, repressive enforcement of stability and rapid economic development inside Tibet and the side-lining of the Dalai Lama. It reflected a loss of faith in the liberal policies of the Hu Yaobang and Wu Jinghua to win Tibetan loyalty. In fact, they were seen as increasing nationalistic sentiments, leading to ethnic riots. It was also indicative of the loss of faith in the Dalai Lama to “play a constructive role in Tibet”. In broad terms, the new policy came to be known as “grasping with both hands”, involving accelerated economic development through massive state subsidies and investment and ruthless enforcement of stability in Tibet through the use of the police, military and other security agencies. A third element of the hard-line policy was a continuation of the Maoist-style political campaigns of mass mobilisation and ideological indoctrination.

Especially after the failure of the Dalai Lama and Beijing to work together to choose the reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama in 1995, Beijing unleashed a series of campaigns against the Dalai Lama, banning his photographs and requiring monks, nuns and lay Tibetans to criticise him, which continues to foment unrest in various Tibetan regions. Since the 1990s, China has put increasing restrictions on Tibetan Buddhism in all Tibetan regions.

Several instances show the fall-out of the vice-like control on religion that Chen Kuiyen and his subordinates and successors oversaw in the Tibetan regions. Two high ranking lamas, Arjia Rinpoche and the Karmapa, escaped into exile due to the continuing restrictions on religious study and practice and the requirements to criticise the Dalai Lama and legitimise the Chinese-appointed Panchen Lama. In February 1998, Arjia Rinpoche, who held high offices in the Chinese Buddhist Association and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee, escaped “the repressive climate” which included being “coerced into publicly supporting China’s increasingly anti-Tibet agenda, including taking part

85 Rabgey and Sharlho 2004: 15.
86 Ibid.
88 Shakya 1999: 433; 196.
89 Chen Kuiyen, 'The Situation of Tibet and the Problems We Request the Central Authorities to Solve', Xizang de Jiaobu (Tibet Steps), February 1994: 134-136.
90 Ibid: 244. Karmapa is the highest Lama of the Kagyu sect and considered the third most important Lama in Tibetan Buddhism after the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. His defection gained added significance because he is the only Lama to be recognised by both the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government.
in carefully orchestrated rituals engineered to undermine the authority of the Dalai Lama.\textsuperscript{91} The Karmapa escaped in 2000 citing restrictions on religion and the fear of being used by the Chinese to serve their anti-Tibetan agenda.\textsuperscript{92} The demolitions in 2007 of the statues of an eighth century Indian saint Padmasambhava in Samye (funded by Chinese Buddhists from the Mainland) and Ngari testify to the continuing restrictions on Tibetan Buddhism.\textsuperscript{93} On 18 July, 2007, Beijing announced “Order No. 5”, a regulation essentially prohibiting Tibetan lamas from reincarnating without prior approval from the Chinese government.\textsuperscript{94} Clearly, Beijing has the selection of the next Dalai Lama in mind, inflaming Tibetan resentment. Eastern Tibet has also come under increasing restrictions since the 1990s, exemplified by the fates of Serta Larung Institute and Yachen Institute.

Serta Institute in Kham (Sichuan), started by the charismatic abbot Jigme Phuntsok in 1980 with 100 Tibetan students, grew into a monastic town with 9300 resident disciples, including about 1000 Mainland and overseas Chinese.\textsuperscript{95} In June 2001, officials from Beijing came to Serta to reduce the number of monks and nuns to 1000 and 400 respectively, which led to the demolition of some 2000 dwellings.\textsuperscript{96} The same fate befell Yachen Institute in Sichuan, just months after the crackdown in Serta.\textsuperscript{97} A Chinese student, a middle-aged medical doctor, who joined Yachen after expulsion from Serta, summed up the rationale of fear behind the patriotic education campaign in Tibetan Buddhist institutes:

> “The [Chinese] authorities told teachers from Larung Gar and Yachen that they were forbidden to teach Vajrayana [referring to Tibetan Buddhism] to Chinese or to travel to China to teach. And they said that Chinese are forbidden to follow or receive Buddhist talks from Tibetan lamas. So many Chinese are coming to these areas where Tibetans usually live, but really the authorities don’t want us

\textsuperscript{91} Arjia Rinpoche 2010.


\textsuperscript{93} ICT, ‘Demolition of giant Buddha statue at Tibetan monastery confirmed by China’ 14 June, 2007; ICT, ‘Rare Protest as Tibetans Attempt to Save Buddhist Statue from Demolition,’ 1 November, 2007.


\textsuperscript{96} ICT, ‘When the Sky Fell to Earth: The New Crackdown on Buddhism in Tibet,’ 2004: 66. There is clear evidence from Western scholars who visited these Centres that large numbers of disciples had indeed congregated there. David Germano (University of Virginia) and Mathew Kapstein (University of Chicago) spent time doing research at Serta.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid: 69.
to have connections with any lamas here. The Chinese government knows that the more people believe in the Buddha the more those people will respect the Dalai Lama. So it is a threat to the government’s idea of unity if either Tibetans or Chinese believe in the Buddha.98

The death sentence later commuted to life in prison of Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche, another popular reincarnate Lama, on allegations of masterminding a series of bomb-blasts in Chengdu is another illustration. The common thread in all these cases is that the CCP and the government sensed rival power-centres with local and national dimensions. Such fear has prompted the repression of Tibetan Buddhism at the slightest sign of threat to the Party-State.

Therefore, after the Cultural Revolution, Beijing has adopted a policy of allowing limited religious practice but undermining the whole edifice of Buddhism by promoting materialism and atheism, as expounded by the Party’s racial theoretician Li Dezhu, who until recently was the director of the State Nationality Affairs Commission.99 Addressing the ideological and political threats from Tibetan Buddhism is a major concern for Chinese leaders. Initiated by Chen Kuiyen, Tibetan Buddhism has been a special target for his successors, not the least for Zhang Qingli, who described the Central Party Committee as the real Buddha for the Tibetans and enforced existing restrictions on religion ever more strongly.100

Predictably, the cumulative effect of these repressive policies and practices provoked the most serious and widespread Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule in Spring 2008.101 Although, the uprising was overwhelmingly peaceful, it turned violent on a couple of instances, especially in Lhasa on 14th March, 2008. The Chinese government claimed that 18 civilians and one policeman died and 382 civilians were injured on 14 March 2008.102 The Tibetan Government-in-exile (TGIE) and rights groups claim that 220 Tibetans were killed, 5,600 arrested or detained, 1,294 injured, 290 sentenced and over 1,000 disappeared in the ensuing crackdown.103 Not surprisingly, the protests all over the Tibetan plateau were mostly led by monks, which is why monasteries again became the key targets of the Chinese efforts to quell the uprising.

Monasteries were blockaded and Patriotic Education Campaign (PEC)
was stepped up in all Tibetan regions. Leading an official delegation to Lhasa in 23-24 March, the Chinese Minister of Public Security, Meng Jianzhu, told members of the management committees of the Lhasa monasteries that the Dalai Lama is ‘unfit to be a true follower of Buddhism, and called for broader “patriotic education” in TAR.’

In a Regulation publicised on 18 July, 2008 by the government of Kartze (Sichuan), “Order No. 2 of the People’s Government of Kartze TAP” threatened the entire monastic hierarchy with reprisals for anti-Chinese disturbances: monks and nuns who protest and refuse to ‘conform’ and submit to PEC will be expelled and their residence demolished; Tulkus and senior monks could be “stripped of the right to hold the reincarnation lineage” for communicating with foreigners or engaging in anti-China protests; monasteries/nunneries where a specific percentage of monks/nuns have engaged in dissident activities will be banned from performing Buddhist rituals; and senior Buddhist teachers could face public ‘rectification’ or imprisonment if they ‘tolerated’ any protest activity, peaceful or otherwise.

In fact, some of the protests were direct responses to Chinese attempts to conduct PEC in monasteries and nunneries, which was demeaning and extremely provocative for the monks and nuns, not the least because of the requirement to denounce the Dalai Lama. On 1 April, the authorities conducted PEC inside Dza Wonpo Monastery, Dzachukha County, Kartze, ordering the monks to criticize and denounce the Dalai Lama and provoked a monk-led protest.

On 2 April, PEC was initiated in Ba Chode Monastery, Batang County, Kartze, resulting in clashes and arrests of monks, including the abbot and disciplinarian. On 3 April, PAP and a PEC work unit ransacked Tongkor monastery, Kartze, confiscating mobile phones and throwing the photographs of the Dalai Lama and the monastery’s abbot to the ground, and ordered the monks to “curse” the Dalai Lama. The monks started a protest joined by lay Tibetans from that area, reportedly resulting in many fatalities.

Monks of Pada Sangdruling Monastery in Zachukha, Kartze, refused to cooperate in a PEC session on 26 April.

To be sure, PEC was intensified in other Tibetan regions and the cross-section of the lay population, including students, officials, farmers and nomads were


106  Woeser, “Tibet Update (2).”

107  Ibid.

108  Ibid.

109  Woeser, “Tibet Update (May 1-6, 2008).”
also subjected to PEC, fomenting great resentment. On top of these practices towards the monastic community, the Chinese have been busy promulgating measures to gain greater control over Tibetan Buddhism.

In 2007, the Chinese State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA) passed “Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas [reincarnates] in Tibetan Buddhism” or “Order No. 5”, which requires all Tibetan Lamas to petition the State for permission to “reincarnate” and be approved by the appropriate state bodies. In 2010, China passed “Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhism” barring any foreign forces from interfering in Tibetan monasteries, temples and other religious sites. Beijing has undoubtedly put these measures in place to undercut the Dalai Lama’s influence and crucially in anticipation of the selection of his reincarnation, but for both ecclesiastical and lay Tibetans, these are deeply offensive, striking at the very heart of Tibetan being. The cycle of Chinese repression and the Tibetan resistance, principally by the religious community, did not end there.

Unable to tolerate the general lack of freedom in Tibet, exacerbated by the repressive tactics adopted by the Chinese authorities to quell the Tibetan uprising since 2008, 42 Tibetans (35 men and 7 women) have self-immolated inside Tibet since February 27, 2009. Of these, 18 were monks and nuns or former monks, mostly in Ngawa T&QAP, Sichuan. Self-immolation constitute the extreme end of what is a broad spectrum of resistance efforts on the Tibetan plateau ranging all the way to what Barnett called ‘strategic deception’ or Kapstein termed “dimorphism of values”—working within the Chinese system to work for Tibetan rights and protect Tibetan identity. In between these ends, the Tibetans engage in street demonstrations and protests, clashes with security forces, putting up posters on walls and subtle cultural regeneration campaigns such as the Lhakar movement, singing songs of protest, writing poetry and essays of protest and producing artwork containing social and political satire and criticism. In most of these protests, Chinese suppression and efforts to control Tibetan Buddhism feature as a central subject. This is not surprising as Buddhism is central


113  ICT, “Self-Immolation Fact Sheet,” Last Updated: June 21, 2012. There have been at least 4 self-immolations among exile Tibetans in India and Nepal. Now, number of self-immolations is 85, (73 man, 12 women)

to life and society in Tibet. The upshot is that the Chinese and the Tibetans are caught in a cyclical process of Chinese attempts to control, if not undermine, Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetan resistance to defend it. This cycle appears set to continue for the foreseeable future. However, what is driving this cycle at a fundamental level? The next and final section takes a stab at this important question.

**Securitisation of Tibetan Buddhism**

The securitisation of Buddhism is of course embedded in the broader securitisation of most things Tibetan by the Chinese. Indeed, as this author critiqued in his doctoral thesis, most Tibetologists writing on the Chinese-Tibetan conflict tend to see Chinese policies and practices in Tibet as security-driven while treating the Tibetan struggle as ethno-nationalistic. The security-salience of Tibet in Chinese perceptions can be discussed in terms of the three overlapping categories of political security (threats to CCP/regime security and legitimacy and territorial integrity, challenges to sovereignty and legitimacy of Chinese rule over Tibet, ideology, state institutions and international image), military security (loss of strategic advantage of the Tibetan plateau and the consequent vulnerability of the Chinese heartland on top of the above-mentioned political security concerns inasmuch as the PLA is still very much the Party’s army) and societal/identity security (threats to national identity and nationalism, both state-led and Han supremacist). Even one of the most liberal Mainland Chinese intellectuals, Wang Lixiong, once viewed Tibet solely through the lens of Tibet and warned Chinese leaders that Tibet is China’s “fatal ‘underbelly’”. As pervasive as this perception is within contemporary Chinese officialdom, such views dates back to early 20th century: ‘Tibet is a buttress on our national frontiers—the hand, as it were, which protects the face—and its prosperity or otherwise is of the most vital importance to China.’ Issues ranging from Tibetan language education to economic development in Tibet are seen in security terms by the central and/or local Chinese authorities.

By now the securitisation of Tibet is discursively (and rhetorically) well-sedimented and deeply institutionalised. Discursively, “local nationalism”, “separatism” or “splittism”, “feudalism”, “theocracy” and “religious extremism” are perceived to threaten “social and political stability”, “national unity”, “national securi-

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115 Topgyal 2012: 8-11.
116 For details, see Ibid: 160-71.
117 SWB, 18 May, 1999: FE/D3537/G. Emphasis mine. Again, Wang has moved on from such worst-case, zero-sum thinking, but much of the Chinese officialdom is stuck in this hyper-realist worldview.
118 Quoted in Tuttle, 2005: 44.
ty”, “state power”, “unified leadership of the Communist Party” (regime security), “sovereignty”, “territorial integrity”, “socialism”, “Chinese constitution”, “regional national/ethnic autonomy” and “economic development.” Once an issue becomes associated with open-ended threats like “local nationalism”, “separatism” or extremism and gets defined as a threat to any of the referent objects, it allows the Chinese officials at any level of the government to deal with that issue with harsh measures that could be interpreted as violating even the provisions of the Chinese Constitution and Autonomy Law. Tibetan language education and use in public is a case in point.

The right to use and develop the spoken and written languages of the nationalities is provided for in the Constitution and Autonomy Law. Yet, Tibetan medium instruction is available only up to primary schools in TAR and as well as in the other provinces now. In 2010, authorities in Qinghai province, where the freedom and quality of Tibetan language education has been greater, proposed using Chinese as the medium of instruction in all schools, provoking thousands of Tibetan students in a number of different places to protest openly. One Western scholar lamented that “maintaining and improving Tibetan language education is proving to be a difficult uphill struggle” This represents a worsening situation even in comparison to the 1980s.

The hostility towards Tibetan medium instruction arises from its association with “separatism”. As Bass observed, the strong connection between the Tibetan language and national identity has invited violent attacks during leftist periods in the past. Even today, merely talking about Tibetan language education could get one into political trouble. As the veteran Tibetan Communist revolutionary, Phuntsok Wangyal, wrote to President Hu Jintao:

“In light of the political phenomenon that “stability overrides all”, the horrible words “Free Tibet” have become a “phobia” to some people for whom even “Tibetans demanding to study the Tibetan

120 Of course, this is only a partial list of the more frequently recurring identification of threats and security referent objects in the Chinese discourses on Tibet.
122 Ibid; Heller and Blondeau in Blondeau and Buffetrille 2008: 235.
126 Ibid: 229.
language, to use the Tibetan language, would lead to Tibetan independence activities”. On the other side, these words have become a “money-earning tree” for some departments to keep on asking for funds from the Central Government…”128

More recently, at the height of Tibetan student protests against the introduction of Chinese-language text books in Tibetan schools in Qinghai Province in 2010, a Tibetan teacher wrote on Weibo:

“[N]obody, no nationality should politicise their mother tongue, it is the natural heritage of humans’ cultural ecology. Natural phenomena like this should not be used as an ideological vehicle. But there are still some departments and leaders that push these matters on to an ideological level of confrontation to deal with them.”129

This quote effectively shows how [association with splittism or separatism], why [to attract government funding, to protect institutional turf, and in the context of the rampant corruption to protect one’s own powers and privileges] and who [various departments within the Party-State apparatus and the officials] are securitising Tibetan language. A popular saying in Tibet brings out even more clearly why Tibetan issues in general are securitised: “These people [local officials and cadres working for some central State and Party departments] live on anti-separatism, are promoted due to anti-separatism, and they hit the jackpot by anti-separatism”.130 The argument made by some Tibetan officials and scholars that the neglect and hostility towards Tibetan language instruction actually exacerbated separatist sentiments appears to have fallen on deaf ears.131

In short, the centrality of language and Buddhism in Tibetan national identity, which sits uncomfortably with Beijing’s security and state-led, Han-supremacist nationalism, invites the hostility of regional and central authorities. In this surfeit of securitisation, Tibetan Buddhism occupies an unenviable place. Tibetan Buddhism, as we saw earlier, is central to Tibetan national identity and traditionally a key rallying point for an otherwise fragmented people. No wonder, monks and nuns have been at the fore-front of the Tibetan struggle inside Tibet. Beyond the visible sight of maroon-clad monks and nuns, Tibetan Buddhism posed an ideological challenge to Chinese communism when it was the key state and popular ideology in China and still constitutes a formidable

128 Phunwang 2007: 78.
129 Woeser 13/06/2012
130 Phunwang 2007: 78.
challenge to the nationalist ideology that the CCP has been fostering and counting on as a source of legitimacy and an instrument of mobilisation when Communism does not excite the popular imagination anymore. Moreover, as keen students of history, the Chinese leaders should be aware of the Tibetan record of converting foreign rulers to Tibetan Buddhism, i.e. Mongol and Manchu emperors. Seen through that history, the growing interest in Tibetan Buddhism among the educated Han Chinese middle class should be a matter of some concern for the Chinese officials. The almost cult-like loyalty that Buddhism inculcates in the Tibetan hearts towards the Dalai Lama is not the least of the apprehension that it generates in the Chinese mind. These are some of the reasons why Tibetan Buddhism has been securitised in the Communist era, which leaves us with the important question of how Tibetan Buddhism is being securitised.

Of course, the Chinese officials have rarely, if at all, explicitly and publicly said the words “Tibetan Buddhism poses an existential threat to China” or that extraordinary (extra-legal and extra-political) measures should be used to counter that threat, but the official language pertaining to Tibetan Buddhism is consistent with the “grammar of security” and the practices towards it violative of the laws and rules governing culture and religion in contemporary China. As mentioned above, the Chinese Constitution and the Autonomy Law provides the freedom of religion to the Tibetans and adherents of other religions. The Constitution protects “normal religious activities.”\(^\text{132}\) The keyword here is “normal” and the Chinese state and its apparatchiks determine what “normal” is—whatever serves the interests of the CCP and the Chinese state—not the Tibetan Buddhists themselves, leaving ample scope for the former to associate various aspects of Tibetan Buddhism with “narrow nationalism”, splittism/separatism, extremism and superstition in order to securitise the Tibetan religion. Chen Kuiyen, the former TAR Party Secretary, was most clear when he petitioned Beijing in 1994 for tougher measures against Tibetan Buddhists:

“The continuous expansion of temples and Buddhist monks and nuns should be contained. We shall not allow religion to be used by the Dalai clique as a tool for their splittist activities. This is an outstanding and key issue concerning party construction in Tibet. Under the precondition that we shall rely on education, we shall also take some forceful measures to stop this perverse trend.”\(^\text{133}\)

This sort of attitude has led to the policy measures and the consequent cycles of repression and resistance that I have outlined in the immediately preceding sections of this paper. However, official utterances and writings are not

\(^{132}\) PRC Constitution, Article 36.

\(^{133}\) Chen Kuiyen, ‘The Situation of Tibet and the Problems We Request the Central Authorities to Solve’, Xizang de Jiaobu (Tibet Steps), February 1994: 134-136.
the only means of securitising Tibetan Buddhism, and indeed the Tibetans as a
group. Other forms of political communication, notably images, as pointed out
by Williams, are used to no small end.\textsuperscript{134} For instance, after the 2008 Tibetan up-
rising, The Chinese government went on the offensive against “the Dalai clique”
by controlling the domestic media coverage of the protests and riots and keep-
ing out foreign journalists,\textsuperscript{135} shutting down the communication infrastructure
in the Tibetan regions and playing round the clock clips of the Tibetan rioters, 
especially Tibetan monks, burning and destroying Chinese and state properties
and attacking Chinese civilians on national TV and filling up the pages of print
media with the same stories. These stories were relayed on overseas Chinese
media outlets. As Barnett wrote, “For most people in China, the story of the Ti-
bet uprising starts and ends with what is now called “the 3/14 incident”—what
has been portrayed there as the brutal beating and killing of Chinese civilians by
rabid Tibetan nationalists”.\textsuperscript{136} CCTV, the official Chinese TV network quickly made
a documentary called “Records of the Lhasa Riots”, which as Woeser pointed out,
was “ceremoniously released during prime time and broadcast over and over
again; it even became available on DVD.”\textsuperscript{137}

The application of the theory of securitisation entails an important corol-
lary: desecuritisation could render a problem more amenable to resolution than
securitising it mindlessly. This is a policy issue that the Chinese leaders would do
well to ponder, but beyond the scope of this paper to develop. The key lesson
from this historical and analytical account is that the Chinese securitisation of
Tibetan Buddhism has helped neither the Chinese desire to win the hearts and
minds of the Tibetan people nor the Tibetan efforts to protect their treasured
religious heritage. They are locked in paradoxical cycles of repression and resist-
ance.

\section*{Conclusion}

This article explicated the six-decade conflict between the Chinese state
and Tibetan Buddhism since the Chinese incorporation of Tibet. To make sense
of the cyclical process of Chinese attempts to annihilate or control Tibetan Bud-
dhism through various forms of repression and the equally determined Tibetan
resistance, this article applied a two-level theoretical framework, consisting of the
insecurity dilemma and securitisation. The paper traversed the complex period
of the 1950s, when Eastern Tibet was subjected to radical communist reforms in

\textsuperscript{134} Williams 2003: 511–31.

\textsuperscript{135} James Miles of The Economist was in Lhasa since 12 March. Since he was expelled on 19 March, no other foreign, including Hong
Kong, journalists were allowed into Tibetan areas.


which the religious estates and personalities were key targets, leading to a widespread armed rebellion, while Central and Western Tibet was treated with more gradualist, but subtle measures, ultimately leading to the fateful Lhasa uprising of 1959, to the contemporary period of hard-line assimilationist policies. This history is characterised by cycles of Chinese efforts to undermine Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan resistance, which fundamentally originate from the incessant securitisation of Tibetan Buddhism by the Chinese state and its apparatchiks. At the heart of this struggle is the Chinese state’s tendency to view Tibetan monasteries and Lamas as rival power centres that require elimination. The paper also considered the why, how, and who of this securitisation before concluding with a pointer to a future research project taking up the analytical effort to study the why, how and who of a potential desecuritisation of all things Tibetan, including Tibetan Buddhism.

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Tsering Topgyal: THE SECURITISATION OF TIBETAN BUDDHISM IN COMMUNIST CHINA • (pp217-249)

Тсеринг Топгиал

КОНТРОЛА ТИБЕТАНСКОГ БУДИЗМА У КОМУНИСТИЧКОЈ КИНИ

Резиме

Овај чланак истражује однос између тибетанског будизма и кинеске државе од 1949. У историји овог односа, цикличан образац, кинеских покушаја, да насилно асимилирају, суптилно растачу и контролишу тибетански будизам и вишеструки тибетански отпор, који брани своје религиозно наслеђе, ће бити приказан. Овај чланак ће развићи безбедносну логику за ову цикличну динамику. У ту сврху, аналитички оквир на два нивоа ће бити коришћен. Прво, дилема несигурности ће бити коришћена да укаже на историјске циклусе репресије и отпора. Али, дилема несигурности не даје увид у концепт безбедности и није корисна за утврђивање како је тибетански будизам постао безбедноносно питање на почетку и како наставља да задржава тај статус. Теорија сигурности је најбоље оспособљена да обави овај аналитички задатак. Као такви, циклуси кинеске репресије и тибетанског отпора настају као последица непрекидног контролисања тибетанског будизма од стране кинеске државе. Овај рад се такође бави питањима зашто, како и ко у процесу контролисања тибетанског будизма, може да постави сцену за будући истраживачки пројекат који ће се аналитички бавити зашто, како и ко у евентуалном укидању контроле свега тибетанског, укључујући тибетански будизам може да допринесе у решавању продуженог Сино – тибетанског конфликта.

Кључне речи: Сино – тибетански конфликт, тибетански будизам, религија, сигурносни процес, дилема несигурности

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ISLAM IN CHINA

Abstract

Unlike other Muslim minorities in the world, the one in China is: a. Divided between two large ethnic groups: Hui in China Proper, who are concentrated in major urban agglomerations; and Uighurs, of Turkish stock, who used to make up the majority in North-Western China, but are now outnumbered by Han Chinese, via a policy of settlement and dilution of the minority. b. Except for Xinjiang, the Muslims of China are not attached to any particular territory (like the Mongols in Mongolia or the Tibetans in Tibet), but are spread all over the country, something which dilutes them into an insignificant minority (1-2%) in spite of their large absolute numbers (25-30 million). The vast distribution of the Muslims all over that vast country has made for a huge diversification in their creed and customs, beyond the division between Hui and Uighurs. This great variety has created many sects and sub-sects, some of which are very special to China.

Key words: Hui, Uighurs, Xinjiang, New Sect (xin-jiao), Sectarianism, separatism, secession

Introduction

As a rule, Muslims are required to live in Muslim lands for only there can the Law of Allah be brought to bear in daily life. Failing that, the believer who dwells in non-Islamic-ruled countries could either regard their stay as temporary and in the meantime do his best to live his Muslim life, or whenever possible return to the Abode of Islam (dar-al-Islam), or else when all other alternatives fail, try to turn his country into a Muslim one either through seizing power at its helm or seceding from it and establishing his own Islamic government. The existence of Muslim minorities under non-Islamic rule has always alternately pursued these trajectories and driven the Muslim guest culture into a state of mind varying from a quietist acceptance of its minority fate to violent rebellion. The response of the Muslim minority depended to no small extent on the perceived threat posed to it by the majority host culture. Whenever co-existence with it seemed feasible,
however uneasy, the Muslims could always say that as long as they can perform the obligations of their faith without much inhibition they could consider themselves as living in virtual enclaves of the Abode of Islam, a state of affairs they could bear indefinitely. But as soon as perceived oppression made their lives as Muslims untenable, and they diagnosed their position in consequence as dwellers of Dar-al Harb, they were set on a collision course with their hosts, and conflict ensued.

This condition of minority-majority relations, which has been replicated in many countries where Islam found itself as a minority, is perhaps more acute in China due to the extraordinary convergence of several major factors:

1. Chinese society and culture which has a long tradition of assimilating foreign cultures, had to contend in this case with a self-confident guest culture which hardly lends itself to acculturation;

2. Unlike in other areas of the world where Muslim minorities may be attached to a certain territory (Arakan in Burma, Mindanao in the Philippines, Patani in Thailand), where their concentration lends them power and influence, in China they are dispersed in all major urban agglomerations, thereby diluting their presence;

3. In spite of their large numbers in China (some 30 million), their rate in a population of 1.3 billion comes down to almost an insignificant 2.5%.

4. The remoteness and isolation of China throughout most of its history, had rendered, until recently the links of the Muslim centers with the Chinese periphery very flimsy and intermittent. Hence the lack of intellectual and other modes of interaction of Chinese Islam with world currents of the faith;

5. Chinese Islam is not uniform. According to Chinese classification today, about half of it is labeled as Hui, spread in the eastern part of the country, what is called China Proper, who are Chinese for all intents and purposes, speak Chinese, look Chinese and are thoroughly acculturated, save for the core of their Muslim creed; the other half, which is dispersed in the vast and arid heartland of the Northwest and Southwest, is of Turkic stock, versed in Turkic languages and culture and itself subdivided into many ethnic groups, who still preserve tribal structures in part, and in part are settled in the oases of that desert half of the country. Foremost among them are the Uighurs, with lesser groups, like the Kazakh, the Kirghiz and others constituting the rest.

6. While in the East the minority situation of the Muslims had almost never inspired them to realistically aspire to autonomy of any sort, the Uighurs in the West, who have constituted the majority on their turf until the policy of Han settlement by the government reversed that Muslim predominance into a fragile demographic balance, were and remained more restive and striving to some sort of separatism.
A Brief Historical Overview

As early as the Tang period (7th-10th Centuries), probably during the 8th Century, the first Muslim settlers in China were Arab and Persian merchants who traveled via the sea routes around India and soon found the Chinese trade remunerative enough to justify their permanent presence in China’s coastal cities. In those days, the Muslim newcomers dwelled apart in separate quarters and actually maintained the Muslim mode of life which they had imported with them, and this seclusion was facilitated by the almost extra-territorial rights they enjoyed. They preserved their Arabic or Persian names, their original dress, their Persian and Arabic tongues, and conducted their religious and social life independently of the Chinese. Moreover, many of them married Chinese women or bought Chinese children in times of famine, thus not only consciously contributing to the numerical growth of the Muslim community, but also unwittingly injecting into their midst the first germ of their ultimate ethnic assimilation.

During the Song period (Northern Song, 960-1127, Southern Song, 1127-1279) we again hear in the Chinese annals of Muslim mercenaries. In 1070, the Song emperor, Shenzong invited a group of 5,300 young Arabs, under the leadership of Amīr Sayyid So-fei-er (this name being as mentioned in the Chinese source) of Bukhārā, to settle in China. This group had helped the emperor in his war with the newly-established Liao empire (Khitan) in northeastern China, who gave their name to China in Slavic languages (Kitai in Russian). Shenzong gave the prince an honorary title, and his men were encouraged to settle in the war-devastated areas in northeastern China between Kaifeng, the capital of the Song, and Yanjing (today’s Beijing) in order to create a buffer zone between the weaker Chinese and the aggressive Liao. In 1080, another group of more than 10,000 Arab men and women on horseback are said to have arrived in China to join So-fei-er. These people settled in all the provinces of the north and northeast, mainly in Shandong, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Shanxi and Shaanxi. As settlers in the area between the Chinese and the northern nomads, these Muslims became an important local element in the 11th and 12th centuries, being involved in the land commercial traffic along the Silk Road with the support of the Chinese, the Khitan, and the Tibetan and Tangut authorities.

So-fei-er was not only the leader of the Muslims in his province, but he acquired the reputation also of being the founder and “father” of the Muslim community in China. Sayyid So-fei-er discovered that Arabia and Islam were misnamed by the Tang and Song Chinese as Dashi guo (“the land of the Arabs”) or as Dashi fa (“the religion, or law, of the Arabs”). This was derived from the ancient Chinese name for Arabia, Dashi which remained unchanged even after the great developments in Islamic history since that time. He then introduced Huihi guo to substitute for Dashi guo, and then replaced Dashi fa with Huihui jiao. “The Religion of Double Return” meant to “submit and return to Allāh”. Thus, in Chinese,
Hui-hui (Hu ihui) was universally accepted and adopted for Islam by the Chinese, Khitan, Mongols and Turks of the Chinese border lands before the end of the 11th century.

The appearance of the Mongols in China meant a new phase in the development of Islam there. Their Yüan Dynasty was founded by Kubilay Khan (r. 1260-94), a grandson of the Great Khan, Čingiz Khan (1206-27). His military forces, used for the overrunning of both North and South China, were built largely upon the thousands of Muslim soldiers which he brought with him from the Middle Eastern and Central Asian campaigns. At least two of the commanders-in-chief of the three Mongol war zones were Arabs: Amīr Sayyid Bayan (Po-yen, Boyan) (1235-94) and Amīr Sayyid-i Adjall Shams Din Umar (1211-79). They fought in the war against the Song, and helped to establish Mongol power in China, with many thousands of Muslims serving as high officials in the central and provincial governments. Because large numbers of the Mongol soldiers were Muslims, the Khan decreed them to be second in rank citizens of the Mongol empire (after the Mongols themselves in Yüan China). One of Kubilay’s Muslim commanders was a Bukhāran, who claimed to be a sayyid, i.e. descendant of the Prophet, Shams Din Umar, called Sayyid-i Adjall. He was Kubilay’s governor of the southwestern Chinese province of Yunnan for the period 1273 till his death in 1279. He was buried there, and his tomb, with its inscriptions, was subsequently discovered at the opening of the 20th century by the French Mission d’Ollone; a second grave also exists at Xi’an, also with an inscription, this being a cenotaph which only contained the dead governor’s ceremonial court dress. Sayyid-i Adjall probably did much for the spread of Islam in Yunnan, but it is his son Nasır al-Dīn who is given the main credit for its diffusion there. The latter had been governor of Shaanxi, and when he died in Yunnan as governor there in 1292, he was succeeded by his brother Hūsayn. Other sons of Sayyid-i Adjall and their sons in turn held high office under the Yüan emperors, and the family remained famous in Chinese life. Thus the famous scholar Ma Zhu (ca. 1630-1710) supervised the renovation of the tomb and shrine of his ancestor Sayyid-i Adjall, as attested by an inscription. It is certain that the dominant position of Islam in Yunnan dates from the Yüan period, being accomplished through land contacts and not maritime ones, and the Muslims of Yunnan must have remained in constant contact with the Hui Muslims of the northern provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu, especially as Muslims became famous as traders and hirers of animals for transport.

The tolerant, or rather, indifferent Great Khaans thus encouraged the Muslims, as they did other religious groups within their empire. Under such conditions, the Muslim community in China made great strides, and the evidence of such Muslim travelers as Ibn Battuta shows that there were also flourishing
mercantile colonies in the coastal cities along the China Sea Muslims became prominent in occupations such as engineering, medicine, technology, transportation and overseas trade, agriculture and handicraft work. Under the Yüan, there was a significant change in religious life as well; mosques and schools were built, and a network of Muslim hostels was established for traveling Muslim merchants. In the 14th century, by the end of the Mongol rule in China, the Muslims totaled about 4,000,000, more than any other minority in China. They took their place in all aspects of Chinese life: political, economic, administrative and military; yet they were still confined to their own communities, somewhat isolated from the vast Chinese population surrounding them. Most of their large communities were still located in areas distant from “China Proper”.

The high profile of some Muslims under the Yüan inevitably provoked a backlash. Many Muslim officials and commanders behaved arrogantly and oppressively, lording it over the native Chinese majority, with its own, much more ancient, Confucian ethos and traditions, very much at variance with many Muslim attitudes (e.g. in regard to taboos on food and to ritual cleanliness). Already in Kubilay’s reign, Marco Polo noted the tyranny of a certain Ahmad, who secured an ascendancy of the Khān and used it to further the interests of his own family, until after suffering 22 years of oppression, a Chinese revolt took place in which Ahmad was killed. 3

Hence the situation changed for the Muslims under the following indigenous Chinese Ming dynasty (1368-1644), during whose period the Hui-hui evolved from being Muslims in China to becoming Chinese Muslims but for whom the golden age under the Yüan was now over. At the beginning, Muslims were granted political, economic, social and religious freedom, but later this attitude changed. The new régime forced many Chinese immigrants to settle in the border zones, such as the northwest and the southwest where the Muslims had established their communities, and the majority of the people in these areas became Chinese. Moreover, the Muslims were prohibited from upholding their dietary, marriage, dress and speech customs. Under these circumstances, they adopted Chinese names, wore Chinese dress and often married Chinese spouses. This process of acculturation into Chinese culture continued steadily, and the Muslims in China came to consider themselves Chinese.

But with the increase of Sinicisation, they also insisted on retaining many customs and traditions attesting to their origin. Many Arabic and Persian words were preserved, particularly in religious life. This syncretisation of the two cultures created the Hui as we know them today, namely, not merely “Chinese with

Islamic faith”, but a minority with various ethnic distinctions from the Chinese. Towards the end of the Ming rule, in the late 16th century, the first Chinese translations of Arabic and Persian books concerning Islamic history, ritual and philosophy appeared in China. This was probably the most obvious sign of the culmination of the process of Sinicisation. By the end of the Ming, in the year 1644, the total Chinese Muslim population had increased considerably. But then, the almost 1,000 years of Islamic existence in China were undergoing a violent form. The new Manchu rulers, who conquered China and established the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), would act adversely as far as the Hui minority was concerned.

The Muslims greeted the new dynasty with a series of rebellions. Muslim “Ming loyalists” led uprisings against the Manchus in various locations where large Muslim populations resided. Such was the Ding Guodong rebellion (1648) in Gansu. This ill-prepared uprising lasted one year and resulted in many cities destroyed and hundreds of thousands of Chinese and Muslims killed. The Qing rule in China was characterized by many Muslim rebellions, and an uneasy coexistence between Chinese and Muslims. Intercultural and inter-religious violence usually triggered significant rebellions of the Muslims in mid-19th century China, when Muslim leaders established ephemeral Muslim states and threw all northwestern and southwestern China into chaos. A case in point was Du Wenxiu, who took over much of Yunnan and styled himself “Sultan Sulaymān”. After 17 years of struggle, in 1872, he was defeated by the Manchu forces with more than one million Muslims killed. The remnants of those Muslims, who now dwell in Northern Thailand (Chiang-mai) are now known as Panthay Muslims. This was probably the last significant chapter in the history of Islam in Imperial China. In Gansu, Ma Hualong and in Xinjiang, Yaḳūb Beg of Kāshghar attempted also to throw off the Manchu rule, but they were likewise suppressed.

**Religious Aspects of Islam in China**

Some scholars tend to divide the development of Islamic religion in China into three tides of influence or movements which entered China from without, thus relating the changes in Chinese Islam to developments in the Islamic world. Not surprisingly, it was the maltreatment of the Muslims in China by the Manchus which conditioned much of their predisposition to rebel, when their oppression under the Qing coincided with the new winds of reform and change which blew from the core of the Islamic world. All this while, they stuck to their Ḣanafi school of law allegiance with moderation and without raising much antagonism or suspicion in their environment. They paid lip-service to the Imperial Calendar, but they lived by their own Muslim one. They built their mosques often without a minaret, in order not to give any prominence to their houses of prayer in comparison with Chinese temples. They behaved as Chinese outwardly,
but as Muslims indoors. They spoke Chinese outdoors, but inside the mosque they used Arabic script and ornaments, and sprinkled their speech with Arabic or Persian words. These Muslims are referred to today as gedimu (“the Ancients”) (Ar. Qadim).

A second phase set in after the 13th century, when Sufi orders penetrated into China. The Sufi wave intensified and widened the roots of Islam, and it generated the spread of Islamic learning as well as the construction of new mosques. Of several Sufi orders, the Nakshbandiyya brought from Central Asia via Xinjiang, became the most deeply and widely rooted in China. The next stage was connected with a movement of renewal (tajdid) generated by a prominent 18th century scholar, Ma Mingxin. His group was known as the Xinjiao (“New Teaching”). When he returned to China in 1761 from his trip to the Middle East and Central Asia, Ma Mingxin was imbued with revivalist ideas which generated much of the unrest in 18th and 19th-century China. He introduced new variants of ritual, for example, the reading out loud and declamation of the dhikr and the Qur’an (hence the name, the Djahriyya sect, compared with khufya, the silent reciting of before). There is reason to believe that many of the leaders of the rebellions, notably Ma Hualong and Du Wenxiu, were related to this revivalist trend.

**Pathological Sectarianism**

Sectarianism has been a characteristic of Islam even after the four Sunni schools of law (madhahib) were canonized and none could be added to them. For while in Sunni Islam a madhab usually prevailed in an entire country or region, where the central authority of the state or the personal prestige of the ‘ulama’ of that school dominated scholarship and jurisprudence thus preventing further splits, in Shi’ite and Sufi Islam there was always a propensity for endless sectarianism. In the Shi’a, due to the doctrine of the Divine Light which was inherited from Ali, the first Imam, by his descendents, controversy arose in each generation as to who of the progeny of the Imam was bequeathed that light, and factions tended to form around various contenders to that charisma. Sufi Islam, which as a rule insisted on its Sunni affiliation, in China under its Hanafi School, a multiplicity or orders developed over the generations, with a founder-Saint who claimed affiliation to the Prophet or one of his Companions establishing his own hereditary silsila (chain of transmission), building his own system of propagation, spreading in specific areas of the Islamic world and giving his own name to his following (Qadiriyya, Bektashiyya, Sanusiyya, Naqshbandiyya etc.). At times, orders split up on matters of rituals or of inheritance, like the rift within the Naqshbandiyya, between the Khufya and Jahriyya sub-orders over the
invocation of the name of Allah (dhikr) silently (the former) or loudly (the latter). However, uniformity and homogeneity were valued over schisms and splits, and attempts were often made to bring back into the fold schismatic elements like the Shi’ites. The fact that close to 90% of all Muslims remained within the Sunna, that all four schools of law remain inclusive of each other, and that no boycotts or excommunications against other Muslims were usually approved, goes a long way to illustrate these remarkable cohesion, unity and ecumenical spirit that kept Islam universal and open to others.

All that is applicable to the lands where Islam constitutes the majority or the ruling culture, because though devoid of clerical hierarchy, wherever it prevails it also entertain central authorities that enforce normative Islam to which the masses conform, and splits are thus usually averted. However, when Muslims are the minority guest culture, atomized splittism becomes the norm, because there is no central Muslim authority to enforce a “standard” creed and personal and theological struggles tear Muslim unity apart and are bound to create many divisions in its midst. In modern times, if one observes the multitude of organizations and tendencies among the Muslim immigrant populations in the West, who recently have become a living and fascinating laboratory for such developments, one finds a large variety of streams and inclinations, much larger than what one expects in a Muslim majority country. Consider for example, the difficulties the French government has been encountering in creating an umbrella organization for all Muslim trends among its Muslim new citizens. But these splits reflect for the most part various shades of Islam imported from the native countries of the immigrants and only seldom does one encounter new brands of Islam that are created locally. Fear of innovation (bid’a) and from accusations of heresy (takfir) by their original countries where they keep their loyalties and family ties, prevent them from sliding beyond the pale or expressly parting ways with established schools or orders. China is a salient exception to this rule inasmuch as it has harbored in its midst such an amazing succession of schisms and splits, often exclusive of each other and inimical to one another, as to make Chinese Islam, especially the Hui part of it, an almost unique phenomenon in Islandom. This millennial Islam has been cut off long enough from the core-lands of Islam as to develop distinctly Chinese traits that were not duplicated elsewhere, in spite of the occasional injections of theological vigor and organizational renewal that came from the outside, notably from Central Asia.

Only in recent decades did Western, and especially Chinese, including many Muslims among them, scholars begin to catalogue the multifarious splits in Chinese Islam, to sort out the confused and confusing terminology that has been adopted by Chinese and Muslims alike in the process, in order to map

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5 For details of these processes, see Muslims in China, op. cit.
out the vast array of these “sects” (jiaopai) that enrich the Chinese-Muslim Hui landscape across China. “Sect” will be used here not in the derogatory sense of slipping into heterodoxy (save in a few exceptions), for in Islam, even across the major Sunni-Shi’ite divide, there remains sufficient commonality in theology and worship style to permit ecumenical prayer in a way difficult to conceive in Christianity. This is particularly true in Sufi orders where followers are frequently initiates of more than one-order or sub-order. Thus, while enmity is often their way, they all insist on their Muslim commonality. It is moreover somewhat anomalous that within the generally tolerant religious atmosphere of China (unless militant Islam was conceived as a threat to the regime, of course), Islam should take on a more rigid, factional character. Unlike other Muslims elsewhere, Chinese Sufi Muslims seldom if ever belong to more than one order at a time, even less so to sub orders, a special Chinese creation called menhuan. Similarly, Wahhabi – or salafi-inspired groups are organizationally discreet, drawing something from the clandestine, exclusive and strict character of the Chinese Secret Societies, something that justifiably bestows on them the attribute of “sects”.

There have been many attempts by Western scholars to map the complex array or sects within the Chinese Muslim community. Broomhall and D’Ollone were perhaps the first to recognize the existence of that atomized division about one century ago. Broomhall wrote of the white and black hats worn by the various sects while D’Ollone described in his travelogue the “tomb-worshipping cult” in Gansu and Northern Sichuan. Later, several missionary scholars attempted to analyze in greater depth the Sufi orders in northwestern China. Perkins and Broomhall identified the importance of tombs and saints to these orders and realized that there were several, often feuding, orders within China that were, almost invariably, dubbed as New Sect (Jiao-pai, Xinjiao) or New New Sect (Jiao Jia Pai, Xin xin jiao) when they run out of more finely-defining terminology. In recent years other western authors turned their attention to sectarian movements within Chinese Islam. This author’s work was an attempt to analyze the origins and practices of the sects within Chinese Islam, drawing on a number of Chinese and western sources. Dru Gladney’s more recent work touches on some of the historical issues in the development of Chinese Muslim sects. Lipman too has done considerable work in this field. But it was not until recent decades of greater openness of the People’s Republic that foreign scholars and tourists had again the opportunity to live and travel in China, including to the inland Hui communities. Their knowledge of the Chinese language and of the rudiments

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6 See Muslims in China, op.cit., the Chapter on the New Sect.
8 R. Israeli, Muslims in China, op.cit.
of Islam permitted them to collect valuable data of Chinese sectarianism. These developments have also facilitated journeys of outside Muslims to China and awareness by Chinese Muslims of other Muslim communities worldwide. In 1995, for example, a well-attended conference was hosted by the Fujian Academy of Science in Quanzhou on the theme of the introduction of Islam via the maritime silk road, where delegations from the entire Muslim world participated and met for the first time with their Chinese co-religionists, and subsequently the conference presentations were published. Though the quality and accuracy of subsequent publications vary, this has meant that for the first time since the medieval journeys of Arab and Persian Muslims to China, a large body of publications on Muslims in China by other Muslims now exists, and new light has been thrown on the intricate and intriguing issue of sectarianism among Chinese Muslims.

Finally, since the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) a growing body of scholarship written by Chinese academics, many of them Muslim themselves, has become available, and as the educational system has been gradually restored, the quality of the research also improved. Chief among these scholars has been Ma Tong, followed by Feng Jinyuan, Gao Zhangfu and others whose contributions appear regularly in several journals like Huizu yanjiu (Researches on the Hui) and Xibei Minzu yanjiu (Research into Minorities in the Northwest). A very complex picture emerges of the vast array of sects and teachings that developed in China over the generations, partly as an evolutionary organic process within Chinese Islam, partly as a result of interaction with Chinese society, culture and religion, notably following the model of secret societies and sectarian movements, and partly as a reaction to the oppression the Muslims in China had to endure. At any rate, with very few exceptions, all these sects remained solidly within the pale of Islam, much as some authors have argued that Chinese Islam, just like African or Asian Islam, was corrupted in its margins and broke with the Faith. It is also noteworthy that divisions along sectarian lines as well as the existence of Sufism in China are a much earlier phenomenon than has been generally believed, and that though no Shi’ism is extant in China in any organized form, there is enough evidence to suggest that since Yuan times (1279-1368) some form of Shi’a did manifest itself.

Islam in Communist China

Under the Republic (1911-49), and then under Communist rule (since 1949), the Muslims have been recognized as a “national” minority, but under the PRC they are kept atomized under their various ethnic appellations (Hui, Uighur, Dongxiang, Kazakh, etc.) Generally speaking, because of the régime’s necessity

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11 Ma Tong’s twin works that marked the post-cultural revolution scholarship were Zhongguo Yisilanjiao jiaopai yu menhuan zhidu shilu (A History of the Islamic Sects and menhuan in China, 1981) and Zhongguo Yisilan jiaopai menhuan suyuan (The Origins of Chinese Islamic Sects and Menhuan, 1986).

to have relations with Muslim countries on the international arena, it attempted
to avoid any overt and brutal oppression of the Muslims domestically. But dur-
ning the harsh periods of ideological oppression (the Great Leap in the 1950s,
and the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s), Muslims were grossly mistreated, as
were members of other religious groups. Wakf lands were confiscated, mosques
destroyed (only one remained open in the capital Beijing) and Muslims forced
to undergo Marxist education. On some occasions, even physical attacks were
launched by Chinese troops against Muslim villages. However, since the advent
of Deng Xiaoping (1979) and the opening up of China to the outside world, there
has been a considerable relenting regarding these policies. More Chinese Mus-
lims than ever are allowed to go on the Ḥadj. Muslim delegations are allowed
in from outside. There are at present several mosques open in the capital to serve
its considerable Hui population, the largest and oldest of which, that in Niujie
or Ox Street, has six Ahongs (Imams) on its staff. Scattered manifestations of Islamic
revival are again in evidence in many a Chinese Muslim locality. Whether these
emergences of Islam amongst the Hui will follow the path of fundamentalism, as
has been the case amongst the Turks of Xinjiang since the early 1990s, or will set-
tle into a pattern of mild protest and peaceful religious re-emergence, remains
to be seen.

The Muslim-Turkic unrest of the Uighurs in Chinese Turkestan, triggered
by the liberation of formerly Soviet Turkestan (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kirgiz-
stan which are bordering on China) at the onset of the 1990’s, opened the door
to widespread violence in practically all areas of Xinjiang, the northwest and the
far west of China. Admittedly, some of the violence was engendered by printed
insults to the Muslims, but it escalated after the military intervention of the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army, as in Xining in the Fall of 1993. In some areas, as in Kashgar,
Islamikaze bombing was perpetrated (October, 1993), resulting in the ominous
war cries of jihad, associated with a local “Hizbullah” (the Party of Allah,) being
voiced.

This whole series of manifestations of Muslim violence began in 1989
with what has come to be known as the “Chinese Rushdie Affair”, when multi-
tudes of Muslims, first in Beijing and then elsewhere, went out to the streets to
demonstrate against the blasphemous depiction of their faith by Chinese writ-
ers. Although initially the Beijing demonstrations by representatives of all Mus-
lim “nationalities” were supported and allowed to be reported by the Chinese
authorities, these demonstrations later spilled onto Turkestan. By 1990, and cer-
tainly thereafter, these sentiments which had at the outset just generated demon-
strations, were later woven into a powerful fabric of rebellion, supported by
cries “Free East Turkestan!!” by the Muslim minorities who lived there, notably
the Uighurs. Unlike the Beijing demonstrations which were a plea to the authori-
ties to deal with the blasphemous writers, this uprising was directed against the Chinese authorities and was aided from the outside, mainly by the Mujahideen of Afghanistan and the adjoining Kirghiz, Tajik and Kazakh Republics. These riots broke out in an atmosphere which viewed Islam as a victor (in adjoining Afghanistan) and godless Communism (namely the Soviet Union) as the routed enemy. Once the Soviet Communist giant had foundered, the other Communist Superpower - China was eyed as the next target.

Since then, China has been waging a propaganda and security battle to guarantee its control over Xinjiang (=old land newly returned) its name for that vast area, where its nuclear and space industries dwell, and which is rich in minerals and strategic supplies of oil and gas which are vital to the expanding Chinese economy. China claims that Al-Qa’ida has trained more than 1,000 members of the (Uighur) East Turkestan Islamic Movement, classified as a terrorist group by America and the United Nations. The group took its name from the short-lived Republic of East Turkestan that was declared in Xinjiang in 1933 during the Republican era, then crushed by the Hui warlord Ma Zhongying. China has persuaded Pakistan and Kazakhstan to hand over captured militants for interrogation, secret trials and execution, a policy that may have helped fuel the fundamentalist rage now gripping Pakistan. Chinese security services have also created a pervasive apparatus of informers and deployed new units of black-clad anti-terrorist police to patrol around mosques and markets in the cities of Xinjiang. But the iron-fisted security policy has made more enemies than friends. Extensive travel and interviews in Xinjiang by western journalists has unveiled a society segregated by religion and ethnicity, divided by reciprocal distrust, living in separate sections of tightly policed cities. The same human rights abuses that exist across China - forced labor for peasants, children trafficked to slave as beggars, girls lured into sweatshops - deepen political tensions and turn young men to violence. Western intelligence officers have indicated that the Chinese consistently exaggerated Uighur terrorist links with Al-Qa’ida to exploit any opportunity to strike at their home-grown opponents. Chinese information was unreliable and no western intelligence service has handed back Muslim citizens to China, they said. One of the officers said the real concern was that Chinese repression was creating recruits for terrorism.¹³

Summary and Present-day Developments

Events in early 2007 have come proof that 60 years of Chinese military “occupation” have crushed significant opposition but failed to win loyalty. Officials have confiscated the passports of thousands of Muslims in a crackdown

to break the growing influence of militant Islam. Police ordered the Muslims to hand in their passports and told them that the documents would be returned only for travel approved by the authorities. The aim is to stop Chinese Muslims slipping away to join militants in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Conversely, China has invested billions of yuan to modernize Kashgar, renovating the square in front of its principal mosque and building new hotels to accommodate backpackers and up-market western tourists. It has also imported thousands of ethnic Han Chinese to populate new apartments, a pattern of mass immigration used across Xinjiang. They dwell in effective segregation from the Muslims, who keep to their old quarters of mud-brick houses, mosques and reeking alleys where freshly killed sheep hang up for sale. The “Communist Party does its best to achieve integration through politics. In 1949 the Uighurs were 90% of the population of Xinjiang. Today they account for less than half. It is the classic colonialist model”, said Nicholas Bequelin of Human Rights Watch, author of a critical report on Xinjiang. In Urumqi, the industrialized capital city of Xinjiang, there was evidence that repression had united Uighurs with other Muslim ethnic groups such as the Hui, who constitute the mainstay of Islam in China Proper. Chinese intelligence woke up late to the fact that Hui Muslims were being financed by extremists from the Middle East. Their clerics, influenced by Saudi Arabia’s purist salafi doctrine, often fulminated against Israel and the West. The Hui are much more radical than the Uighurs, said Bequelin. Such radicalization is fuelled by injustices endured by many Chinese but all the more potent when suffered by an angry minority.14

The price for the remarkable economic development driven by the government, say the Uighurs, is the slow extinction of their identity. Their children take compulsory Chinese lessons. Teaching in Uighur is banned at the main university. Their fabled literature, poetry and music are fading under the assault of karaoke culture. Their history is being rewritten. For western tourists, who come to Xinjiang to roam the ruins of the Silk Road, the Chinese have erected a new museum in Urumqi. It portrays the final Chinese conquest of this harsh territory, first claimed by the Han emperors in the era before Christ. Qinghai and Xinjiang, which are closer to the Islamic world than the rest of China and have been drawing support from some of it, have advanced demands for, and used violence in pursuance of, some sort of slipping out of Chinese dominance. Thus, due to both the lax policy of the Chinese government, which permits links and visits between its Muslims and the Muslim world, and the pressing interests of the radical elements in Islamdom, more and more outbursts of this sort can be anticipated which may culminate, if the circumstances so allow, in concrete demands for outright secession from China, not unlike the process that brought the Soviet Union to its demise. On the other hand, however, in view of the unitarian concept of

14 Ibid.
government in China, which has never acknowledged the existence of “federated republics” in its midst (like in the Soviet Union), nor tolerated secession (for example the unfortunate Tibetan example), it is hard to conceive a China that would sit idly by while its borders are permeated by rebellion and chaos.

Conclusion

The historical growth of sectarianism in Chinese Islam is a captivating story in itself and was dealt with elsewhere. Here suffice it to list the major splinter groups that emerged in Chinese Islam and are still active, for the sake of making the point of the unusual schisms in its midst. As a base one must take the oldest traditional Islam that came to China over a millennium ago, and is known there as the gedimu (Arabic Qadim = old, ancient), a self-proclamation that insists that it has nothing to do with the various reform movements of the past two centuries. Indeed the gedimu mosques remain prevalent in eastern China, where the first Muslim settlers via the Maritime Silk Road led them. In fact, these Muslims, that we may term “traditionists”, are only vaguely aware of the deep rifts that separate their co-religionists on the Northwestern heartland. These are also the usually inoffensive Muslims that were identified as the “Old Sect” (Laojiao) by the Chinese authorities during the Muslim rebellions that tore apart northwestern and southwestern China during the latter part of the 19th Century, and were often synonymous with “Good Muslims” (Liang Hui), as opposed to the rebellious Muslims (Huifei) that were identified as the New Sect (Xinjiao), and will be discussed below.

A second category of Muslims are those affiliated with four major Sufi orders and their sub-orders (menhuan). They are: the Naqshbandiyya, the Qaderiyya, and to a lesser extent the Kubrawiyya (reputed to have absorbed some accretions of Shi’ism) and the Yasawiyya. The most prevalent however remain the two sub-divisions of the Naqshbandiyya: the Khufya and the Jahriyya, which were bitterly inimical to each other on the basis of their invocation of the name of Allah in silence (by the former), loudly (by the latter). The late Joseph Fletcher, who was a pioneer in tracing the coming of Sufi Islam to China, also made the major blunder of falsely identifying the separation between Old Sect and New Sect under the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) as the Khufya and the Jahriyya, respectively. He must have been misled by the reports of Old-Sect people joining the government in crushing the rebellions triggered by New Sect adherents, which corresponded to the same splits in taking sides with or against the rebellions by new trends of reformed Islam as compared with the old established and quietist Islam, namely the gedimu. This is perhaps the explanation for the diffusion of the new trends of Islam only in the rebellious Northwest while the East and northeastern coast remained solidly traditionist and peaceful. The khufya-Jahriyya di-

chotomy has been the most prolific in atomizing these two rival sub-orders of the same Naqabhendiyya into more than a dozen *menhuan*. Menhuan have been created around charismatic leaders, who claimed descent from the forefathers of the Order or Sub-order much like the logic of fragmentation in the Shi’a which followed the various claimants to the Divine light of the Imams and the factions that clustered around them. No less than 12 *menhuan* were identified as claiming affiliation to the Kuhfiyya and another half-dozen to the Jahriyya. No kind words are reserved by members of a *menhuan* towards the others, the followers on one founder deeming the others as imposters. It was this process of fragmentation which brought confusion into the literature, because once you termed one of them “New Sect” (*Xinjiao*) when it appeared, and a more recent one “New New Sect” (*Xinxinjiao*), you ran out of terminology and started to confound one with the other. The Qaderiya boasts four *menhuan* and the Kubrawiyya a single one.

Another category consists of the new modern trends which are somehow linked with modernist or “fundamentalist” movements, and in China are known as the *Ikhwan* (Brothers, not necessarily the Muslim Brothers of Egypt), *salafiyya* (followers of the example of the predecessors (*aslaf*). These groups which claim inspiration from the Wahhabi movement of Arabia, wish to return Islam to its pristine form and accuse conservatives (the *gedimu* in the Chinese scene) of distorting and corrupting Islam with their accretions over the centuries, instead of strictly abiding by the Qur’an and the *Hadith*. Some of those “radical” groups, which are “accredited” with stirring trouble and rebellion in China, and even with attempts to establish independent Muslim states in the Northwest and Southwest in the 19th Century, were also termed New Sects by the Chinese authorities or by their rivals within Islam, thus compounding the existing confusion between these various sects. Yet another category relates to modernist influences that were imported to China at the end of the 19th Century by Muslim activists within the New Culture Movement (*Xin wenhua Yundong*) and implemented mainly in the large urban agglomerations of the east coast, such as Beijing, Nanjing, Shandong and Manchuria, where the *gedimu* Muslims have been traditionally entrenched. This trend sought to reopen the channels of interpretation long closed to conservatives, and has had a definite impact on the China Islamic Association (*Zhongguo Yisilanjiao XIehui*), which is paradoxically dominated by the puritanical *ikhwan*. Whether the latter have been transformed from a radical to a modernist-reformist movement, or otherwise, remains to be investigated. And finally, there is a tiny totally sinicized grouping dubbed the *Xidaotang* (Western Path) which apparently blends forms of Chinese Sufism with modernist Islamic concepts and indigenous Chinese philosophies. It is important in spite of its limited numbers inasmuch as it is the only sect that was founded without direct influence from the outside and seems to be the outgrowth of a thoroughly syncretized Islam. However it may be important academically, its influence outside the township of Lintao in Gansu has remained very insignificant.
The confusion in the terminology used for this wide array of groups does not stem only from how one group dubbed the others and inspired the government to differentiate between the good-obedient vs. the bad-rebellious ones, but also by the deliberate attempts of those Muslim groups to cover up their activities, for which they were persecuted by the regime (for example xinjiao), by taking up appellations that were more palatable (like laojiao) and afforded them the opportunity to escape retaliation. Thus, while some Khufya followers who feared persecution called themselves laojiao, it is also certain, contrary to Fletcher’s belief, that not all laojiao were khufya. Conversely, Wahhabi-inspired groups have since early 20th Century tended to lump the Sufi menhuan and the gedimu together and describe them as laojiao. The xinjiao appellation, which in all probability pre-dates the coming of the Jahriyya to China, has been given to many new menhuan, Khufyi and Jahri alike, and was not restricted, as Fletcher had posited, to the Jahriyya only. This term was also occasionally used by ikhwan who wished to distinguish themselves from other groupings, say the gedimu. But it appears that the term xinjinjiao was mainly used for the Xidaotang and the Salafiyya, either as a self-descriptor or when they appeared to other Chinese Muslims to have placed themselves at the two edges of the sectarian gamut, somewhat akin to the ghulat in Shi’ite Islam. All in all, it is estimated that about half of Chinese Muslims today are followers of the gedimu, or “normative-traditional” Hanafi Islam which dwells in the East; while Islam in the northwestern heartland of Gansu-Ningxia and Qinghai would rather tend to the various Sufi menhuan, or to a salafi-Wahhabi trend.

Though the unrest in Northwestern and southwestern China has been related to sectarianism, mainly the Jahriyya and other brands of Xinjiao, the existence of quietist Sufism in China proper means that Sufism does not necessarily have to evolve into sectarianism and unrest, as was the case in the outlying areas on 19th Century China. This indicates that it takes perhaps something more than sectarianism to provoke rebellion. IF the major sectarian-motivated uprisings unfolded in the areas where Islam constituted sizeable minorities or strong local majorities (in China proper the Hui of the large cities were always more or less insignificant minorities) they were still vastly outnumbered by the huge Han populations around them. Thus, it was not enough to have a restive and hard-driven sectarian leadership in order for the Muslims to take the course of rebellion. The rebels had to control a heartland populated by like-minded sectarians in order to have the chance of success in establishing themselves. At the same time, since it took a Sufi outsider or a Chinese Muslim who returned from the Hajj with new ideas to create a new menhuan or a new trend like the modernists, and there was no strong charismatic local leadership recognized across its county and province, that would command unity and absorb the new trends rather than letting them break their own path, the propensity for fractures and dissents accentuated the process of sectarianism.
Reference


Рафаел Израели

ИСЛАМ У КИНИ

Резиме

За разлику од осталих муслиманских мањина у свету, ова мањина у Кини је: а.) подељена између две велике етничке групе: Хуи у унутрашњости Кине, који су концентрисани у главним урбаним англомерацијама, и Ујгури, турског порекла, који су чинили већину у северно – западној Кини, али су сада бројчано надјачани од стране Хан Кинеза, преко политике насељавања и разблаживањем мањине. б.) Осим Сикјанга, муслимани у Кини нису везани ни за једну посебну територију (као рекимо Монголи у Монголији или Тибетанци у Тибету) већ су расути по целој земљи, што их чини неприметном мањином (1 – 2%) имајући у виду њихов укупан број (25 – 30 милиона). Огромна дистрибуција муслимана широм земље је учинила да се направи велика диверсификација њихове вере и обичаја, изнад поделе на Хуи и Ујгури. Та велика варијабилност је направила велики број секти, од којих су неке посебно специфичне за Кину.

Кључне речи: Хуи, Ујгури, нове секте (xin-jiao), сепаратизам, сецесија

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OLD SAGE FOR NEW AGE?
THE REVIVAL OF RELIGIOUS CONFUCIANISM IN CHINA

Abstract

In recent years, Confucianism has been once again identified as the essence of Chinese civilization and a religion that was central to the Chinese people throughout China’s long history. Scholars are appealing to the Communist Party to make Confucianism the State religion (guojiao). What are the political implications of the phenomena? Can these claims stand to intellectual scrutiny? Conducting a brief historical survey of religious Confucianism in Chinese politics, in addition to an analysis of shared principles essential to various Confucianist positions today, this paper argues that religious Confucianism presented by its contemporary promoters is a constructed myth originated mainly from the Qing times (1644-1911). The supposed Confucian teaching does not carry religious meaningfulness associated to either individual existence or social life in contemporary China. It remains powerful primarily in connection to the State, or a collective nation (Zhonghua), vis-à-vis the world outside ethnic Han communities. Despite this - or precisely because of this - a revived religious Confucianism may have the greatest potential to become a political force in China in our globalizing age, more so than any other major world religions, even if others may have larger Chinese following than Confucianism.

Key words: Religious Confucianism, Daoism, All-under-Heaven, filial piety, contemporary China, nationalism

In early 2011, a series of mass protests in Egypt toppled the thirty-year old Mubarak dictatorship. However, the Revolution failed to generate its own political parties of strong platform and solid social foundations. With much uncertainty for more than a year, the Muslim Brotherhood, a religious organization that was persecuted under Mubarak but did not take front lines in the Revolution, eventually won both parliament majority and presidential election, seizing the fruit of the popular democratization movement. Suppose that an Egyptian style revolution takes place in China and a democratic election is to be held. Will there...
be any contenders put forward by religious societies and winning political power to rule the future China, as the Muslim Brotherhood is doing in Egypt now?

The Communist Party of China (CPC) has ruled the mainland as an atheist regime for more than sixty years. Its religious policy went through many changes, causing great turmoil in the practice of people’s religious life. Nonetheless, there is a general recognition that recent economic growth and the relative liberalization in private sphere have brought about flourishing religious activities to the country. What divides observers is how to explain the phenomena. Does it indicate a post-secular turn of leniency in the CPC’s religion policy or a sophisticated manipulation by the Party? Most cases, for the Paris-based scholar Ji Zhe, it is the latter rather than the former. Looking at the Party’s selective flexibility towards various religious groups and the government’s greedy involvement in sharing the profit of religious tourism, he singles out religious autonomy as the key factor that is missing, resulting in a state of “secularization without secularism”. More specifically, we may add, for reasons of survival under potential persecution, none of the major religions, be it Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, or other Evangelic Christianity, has aspired to representing a collective future for “China;” nor have they formulated political positions other than demanding freedom of worship. There are good reasons to think that burgeoning religious life in the mainland today may not be able to produce its political party with strong ideological positions, even though its continuing growth may help to bring democratization to China. The only exception is Confucianism.

Confucius and Confucianism in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have had dramatic experiences. When Mao Zedong (1893-1976) died and the decade-long Cultural Revolution came to an end, most people younger than thirty at the time would know Confucius in a negative light only. That they had some knowledge about the ancient sage at all was largely thanks to political campaigns launched by Mao, in particular when he targeted Confucius as the root cause for reactionary thought in China. Partly due to this background, when critical reflections surged in the early 1980s against the Cultural Revolution, Confucianism became once again the culprit, along with China’s long tradition of “feudal culture”, for what went wrong under Mao and his personal cult. Yet, the Reform Era of Opening Up in the 1980s also invited a starkly different image of Confucianism to the PRC.

Cultural exchange with the outside world brought a stream of overseas scholars to visit China for the first time since 1949, who used to be blocked out by the Cold War barriers. Their interpretations of China’s tradition were vastly different from what people in the mainland had hitherto been used to. Starting from then, Confucius and Confucianism gradually gained positive foothold in academic world. A new phenomenon in the twenty-first century is that the so-

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2 See Ji Zhe’s discussion in “Secularization without Secularism: The Political-Religious Configuration of Post-89 China,” 2011.
cial prestige of Confucius and Confucianism has been growing rapidly in the past decade. Nowadays, all provinces and many cities and counties in China are offering sacrifices at local Confucian temples annually. The most elaborate ones are held at Confucius’ hometown in Shandong Province twice a year. State television stations have been broadcasting live from there since 2004. High-rank officials from Beijing and the provincial capital have participated annually as well. Also in 2004, the central government launched the global project of Confucius Institute, which has more than 300 branches in more than 100 countries around the world today. The office in charge of the project is aiming to increase the total number up to 500 by 2020.

To be sure, not all efforts of promoting Confucianism are sponsored or supported by the State. The central government often appears ambiguous or trying to be discreet. In January 2011, a nearly ten-meter (about 30 feet) tall bronze statue of Confucius was erected next to Tiananmen Square in central Beijing, facing the portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate across the Chang'an Avenue. It caused all kinds of reactions on the Internet and many commentaries in foreign media and, 100 days later, was removed quietly overnight, in a very non-ceremonial fashion. But, this has not subdued the widespread enthusiasm. Local officials still participated in various sacrificing ceremonies around the country, from Confucius’ hometown to the supposed burying ground of the mystic Yellow Emperor, considered to be the ancestor of every single “Chinese” around the world in human history.

Of all the advocates today, the loudest are some self-claimed Confucian intellectuals; and the most enthusiastic ones are often young students from high ranking universities, who often take the initiative in local worshiping ceremonies. Both groups have appealed for official support on the ground that Confucianism is the tradition that every responsible Chinese must carry on. They have set up various private academies for adults and children around the country to study the Confucian Classics and imbue the teaching into daily practice. Some intellectuals focus more on Confucianism as political philosophy than as religious practice. Others have been forthright in advocating State sanctions to make Confucianism China’s national religion (guojiao). Noticeable differences notwithstanding, these people do not argue against each other, as if observing tacitly a “united front” among themselves against critics and non-followers. What bounds them together are claims that Confucianism representing “China” or “Chineseness” in our globalizing era. The multi-faceted united front seems to provide the Confu-

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4 E.g. “The government [should] recognize the mainstream value position of Confucius and Confucianism, in order to strengthen the chance of constructing a modern state in China”; “Confucianism is none other than China’s life or Chinese civilization itself.” Yao Zhongqiu, “Confucianist Revival and China’s intellectual-political future,” Sixiang20, p. 156; 169. Also see Jiang Qing and Daniel A. Bell, “A Confucian Constitution for China.”
cianist revival great potential to affect future socio-political life in China.

However, can the claims stand intellectual scrutiny? We shall now turn to a brief survey of historical Confucianism, to demonstrate that Confucianism was never exclusively dominant in the religious life of Chinese society. Moreover, this paper contends that contemporary presentations of “Confucianism” have been largely shaped by practices in the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), a relatively recent period. This will be followed by a brief comparison of Confucianist advocates today and their predecessors since the late nineteenth century. A final part will consider the implications of their major claims about the importance of Confucianism for China, today and tomorrow.

**Religious Confucianism in History**

To consider “religious Confucianism” in Chinese history, we must be clear that terms like “religion”, “belief”, or “faith”, are used here only in a loose sense, without always corresponding strictly to their Christian connotations in conventional English expression. Furthermore, the term “Confucianism” itself represents a number of different conceptual constructions over more than two thousand years. The kind of “Confucianism” that still affects modern Chinese thinking and cultural life is, in one way or another, largely the product of the second millennium of Christian history, especially that of the 16th-19th centuries, although the scriptures it depends on are preserved from a thousand years earlier. We need to look at both periods but also distinguish them carefully. Meanwhile, major religions always coexisted in Chinese history, mutually influencing each other in mixed practices. We need to look at religious life in general, to assess Confucianism as part of the whole picture of each historical period. In addition, socio-economic development contributes to changes in politico-cultural life, which means that, when examining sweeping claims about a religious or intellectual school in connection to a country’s cultural history, it may not be enough to rely on the classic scriptures alone. While keeping these points in mind, it is beyond the scope of this paper to give a thorough survey of religious Confucianism in history. Below we will focus on several important issues that are highly relevant to today’s Confucian revival phenomena.

**Guardian of Hierarchical Unity**

Some basic features in Confucian belief existed long before Confucius’s (551-479 BC) time. “Confucianism” is known in Chinese as the 諸 tradition (rujia for “ru school”; rujiao for “ru teaching,” or ruxue for “ru - learning”). In ancient China the ru, a title for people belonging to the lower-rank noble class of shi, were usually

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in charge of ritual performance, record keeping, and document interpretation, among other duties. The English term, taken from Confucius’s name, reflects the general belief that Confucius was responsible for putting the Classics into how they have appeared ever since. But in reality, “Confucian Classics” are not works all written by Confucius or his disciples. The core texts of the Classics are ancient scriptures. The general belief in China, particularly since the thirteenth century, went further. Having Compiled the Classics, Confucius also transmitted the invaluable knowledge about Dao, the Way of the Sage-kings who ruled in the Golden Age of a mystic antiquity. Thereupon, Confucius himself becomes a sage figure, for he is the one who knows best how an ideal world should be, despite the contradictory fact that he himself was never an actual ruler. The Confucian ideal, in a nutshell, derives its legitimacy from the Heaven and Earth (tian-di) and manifests itself in a hierarchical social order, which stipulates that a ruler commands unconditional authority over his subject, as does father over son, and husband over wife. In addition, the ruler also derives his legitimacy from his ancestral line. By first sight, Confucianism does not appear particularly religious, in contrast to concerns in other world great religions over gods, spirits, death, or the prime driver of the universe. But colored in political philosophy notwithstanding, three concepts with religious implications stand out here: the Dao; the Heaven-and-Earth; and ancestral worshipping. All the three have their origins in an earlier time, aptly presented in the Classics that Confucius worked on. Except ancestral worshipping, Dao and Heaven-and-Earth are equally important for thinkers of other schools, such as Legalism and Mohism in the Warring States period (5th c. – 221, BC). Similarly, Daoism in both its philosophical and religious traditions takes its name from the Dao, as shown in the earliest Daoist text, the Dao De Jing (Tao te ching). These different schools all attended to political philosophy extensively. They might focus on the ruler viewing his subjects indiscriminately (e.g. Legalism), or on the individual being (e.g. Daoism). In contrast, Confucianism was the only one with a very strong position in the socio hierarchy, from the ruler in his court to a male-dominating family setting.

Ideas change over time. Firstly, the philosophically charged concept Dao had its turns of ebbing and rising within the Confucian tradition. Secondly, the significance of Earth diminished rapidly in a unified empire since the Qin (221-206 BC) and the Han (206 BC – 220 AD), leaving the idea of Heaven standing alone to

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6 The wujing (five Classics), Yi-jing (Book of change), Shi-jing (The Odes), Shangshu (The Book), Yili (Rites), and Chunqiu (Annuals of Spring and Autumn), all preceded Confucius’ time. Of these titles, the Rites is often grouped with two other books on rites, Zhouli (Rites of the Zhou) and Liji (Book of rites) that came much later. The Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism added sishu (four books) as the must for education, which included Confucius’s Analects (see discussions below).

7 See Zhang Hao’s (Hao Chang) insightful discussion in “Politics and Teaching — Unified or in Duality?” in Reflexion20.

8 The rujia Confucianism of the Warring States period already developed into major branches, some leaning to Legalism and others, such as Mencius, who was regarded by later generations as sagely as second to Confucius only, emphasized the individual’s independence.
issue prophecy and divinize political legitimacy. Following this, the active concern of Confucianism experienced an important shift from the Heaven (tian) to all-under-Heaven (tianxia), from worshipping the former to explicating the best for the latter. The emphases were to be on grand unity, centralized rule, and family-based patriarchal hierarchy. And thirdly, ancestral worshipping had its own trajectory, from coupled with filial piety for the top ruling classes in the Han dynasty, to a split there after, retaining ancestral worshipping for rulers when filial piety spread out, before the two aspects merged once again among commoner classes many centuries later.

Historically speaking, and perhaps related to its social origins in ru, “Confucianism” is a text-based, ritual-centered tradition. Also related to this origin, for about a thousand years (3rd c. BC – 8th c. AD), when education was accessible to privileged classes only, most Confucianists were administrative officials, either under noble lords or appointed directly by a central government. Socially speaking, the number of Confucian official grew steadily in the long process of bureaucratization from early on. Determined by its basic ideas and its social bases, Confucianism tended to be a stabilizing ideology for an established empire in China’s successive dynasties.

Convergence of “Three Teachings”

Religious Daoism and Confucianism influenced each other from early on. The concept Dao in Daoism, like filial piety in Confucianism, existed long before these schools came to be known. For both schools, Dao represents the essence of things, or the whole universe. Scholars usually regard the Qin dynasty (221-207 BC) as Legalistic and the Han (202 BC-220 AD) to be initially Daoist and turned to Confucianism after the 130s BC. But this view is to look at politics or political philosophies only. If we take religion into consideration, Daoist teaching was prominent for the Qin-Han period as a whole. The Daoist guidance was regarded indispensable, assisting the throne to achieve immortality (e.g. Qin Shihuang, 259-210 BC) or divinize a ruler’s mandate to power (e.g. Han Wudi, 156-87 BC). Even after Han Wudi adopted Dong Zhongshu’s (179-104 BC) proposal to uphold “Confucianism” alone and dismiss all other teachings, Daoism was welcomed at the Han court by successive emperors, including Han Wudi himself. Determined by its basic ideas and its social bases, Confucianism tended to be a stabilizing ideology for an established empire in China’s successive dynasties.

Disciples of both Daoism and Confucianism were called shi or fangshi, interchangeably at this time in contrast to later times when the former would be reserved for Confucians only and the latter referring to religious Daoist priests. During the Han, the two teachings permeated into each other’s practices. Dong Zhongshu’s version of “Confucianism” shares with Daoism many mystical ele-

10 Lü Xichen, Daoism, Fangshi, and Dynastic Politics, pp. 75-83; 105-33.
ments, primarily responsible for linking divine intention of the Heaven to ruling legitimacy of the Han court. A key difference between the two teachings is that Confucians depended on the Classics scriptures and mainly interpreted events and phenomena, even though their explanation may be full of wildly stretched free-associations. Daoists, on the other hand, positively conducted sessions to get in touch with divine spirit. However, even in this regard, the two pervaded each other. After the court issued exclusive sanction to Confucianism, many Daoist fangshi asserting their special techniques or recipes would extend their divinizing claims to the Confucian Classics, in the exact manner as Dong Zhongshu did with his version of Confucian studies.

If “Confucianism” up to this moment did not have an exclusively clear image, the introduction of Buddhism into China in the first century AD made the situation only more complicated for today’s advocates. The three religions – Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism – started to take-n’-give between each other in very little time. By the end of the Han dynasty, phrases like “san jiao (three teachings)” already appeared. Inspired by Buddhist practice, Daoist followers designated the mystic figure Laozi as its top founding sage and constructed temples to conduct their worshipping. Those fangshi of alchemists, astrologers, diviners, exorcists, and geomancers, gradually stopped their free-citing of Confucian Classics and started transforming themselves into Daoist priests. After the fall of the Han, Daoism and Buddhism kept competing in charming China’s cultural elite and royal rulers for another six centuries, whereas Confucianism grew steadily through its institutional bases within the State. During the Tang times (618-904), the three, while holding distinctive positions and attacking each other fiercely, served alternately as the top official discourses legitimating mandate to power for rulers.

All three “teachings” kept on playing legitimating functions in a mixed fashion for ruling houses throughout imperial China, up to the 1911 Republican Revolution. But overall, Confucianism became more and more dominant in mainstream politics. Buddhism encountered sustained persecution by the end of the Tang period. As for Daoism, previously blending together philosophy and religion, its two components fell apart after the Tang, with Daoist philosophy being endorsed and treasured by Confucian literati, and Daoist religion serving

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11 Scholars of Confucianism may think Dong Zhongshu took in Daoist elements and further developed Confucianism; e.g. Zhang Hao, “Politics and Teaching — Unified or in Duality?”, pp. 120-23. However, scholars of Daoism may see Dong Zhongshu and his New Text Confucianism as essentially Daoism with a thin Confucianist disguise. See, for instance, Lü Xichen, Daoism, Fangshi, and Dynastic Politics, pp. 94-106.

12 Lü Xichen, Daoism, Fangshi, and Dynastic Politics, pp. 134-57. Dong Zhongshu’s Confucianism is based on “New Text” version of the Classics, written in a relatively recent script; it fashioned extensive mystic interpretations of the Classics, in contrast to the “Old text” Confucian school that studied the Classics written in an earlier script and emphasized philological approach.

13 The Tang emperors, the first two in particular, held Daoism to be the top legitimating doctrine for their dynasty. See Lü Xichen, Taoism, Fangshi, and Dynastic Politics, pp. 158-75. In mid Tang under Empress Wu (624-705; rein 690-705), Buddhism replaced Daoism for the same function. In mid eighth century, Xuanzong (rein 712-756) promoted meritocratic Confucianism.
the court at one end and layman communities at the other. When Confucianism lost its prestige during the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368) under the Mongol rule, Buddhism and Daoism would have another round of intense competition, with Buddhism holding the upper hand. However, viewed in longer term, neither of the two managed to establish a country-wide institutional base. In contrast, a well-organized base within the State’s bureaucratic institution is one of the most important factors in Confucianism’s continued expansion, even when it was not yet as dominant or prominent – or not yet exclusively so – in politics, culture, or elite intellectual life as the Han policy’s turn might have suggested. It would be a myth to say that religious Confucianism had always dominated Chinese civilization before the twentieth century.

A Sage not a Deity, Mediated via State Apparatus

Throughout some two thousand years, imperial dynasties in China worshiped Heaven as the source of their ruling mandate. Nonetheless, how the Heavenly Mandate may be mediated to a ruling house went through many changes, as the “three teachings” of Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism coexisted and competed for royal favor since the later Han. Roughly speaking, except for the Qing (1644-1911), all the dynasties that lasted more than a hundred years relied explicitly on Daoism to establish legitimacy when setting up a new ruling house. In contrast, Confucianism was emphasized mostly for consolidating worldly order thereafter. Many emperors ordered the construction of temples for one or the other of the “three teachings”. Both Daoism and Buddhism retained their own gods and deities, but Confucianism was peculiar in this regard. While insisting on the order of Heaven, Earth, and ancestral hierarchy as the end in life, it does not have a reserved spot in this order for Confucius himself. He was regarded not as a deity but a sage.

The secondary place Confucius occupied in the eyes of religiously observant emperors can be seen in numerous examples. For instance, when the Confucius’s shrine in his hometown received royal offerings during the Han, the Daoist deity Laozi was worshipped by emperors in ceremonies devoted to the Heaven at royal altar in the capital. When the Tang emperor Xuanzong (685-762) ordered dozens of Confucius’ disciples to be included in Confucian temple, it was done to counter the influence of Buddhism, a top favor for several royal rulers prior to Xuanzong. Over time, Confucius received many glorifying titles from various emperors. But we need to remember that similar titles were also given to monarchs and their worthy aids. For earlier dynasties and from time to time, Daoist deities would receive even grander titles than Confucius. In fact, worshippers rites

14 Hymes examines different patterns in the relationship between the court and Daoist priests from outside the capitals in Northern and Southern Song; He also studies how Daoist deities being perceived in local society. Hymes, Way and Byway, pp. 175-82.
15 Lü Xichen, Daoism, Fangshi, and Dynastic Politics.
designated to Confucius were never ranked the highest in imperial China and Confucianists did never fight for that treatment, either, until the very end of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{16}

If weak in legitimating ability, Confucianism nonetheless took to itself the duty of safeguarding the “Heavenly” (in reality, the earthly) order. It held social hierarchy as the most sacred in ritual arrangements as well. A Confucian temple, therefore, could not be opened to the public in the same way as Daoist or Buddhist temples. It would open to the educated literati for sacrificial ceremonies only, held twice annually and usually presided over by top officials in a given locality. Its servitude nature can be seen in the fact that the emperor rarely followed this rule to preside the annual events personally in the capital. Unlike Daoism or Buddhism, Confucian worship in imperial China could not be turned into a community-based religious practice, either. Its “public-ness” was intrinsically linked to the bureaucratic state. For community welfare or individual fulfillment, a commoner or even a local official would have to locate Daoist deities to present her or his sincere offering.\textsuperscript{17} It would be a myth to claim Confucius as a popular deity in imperial China.

On the other hand, ancestral worship and filial piety, two values upheld dearly by Confucianism, went a long way to re-converge. Filial piety tales from the post-Han period already absorbed religious influence from Daoism and Buddhism, especially in punitive terms in a terrifying hell for offenders.\textsuperscript{18} Daoists and Buddhists, arguing with lixue Confucianists (see below) in the Song times, would freely acknowledge the importance for common mortals to be filial to parents and loyal to emperor. Following the Song and along with economic commercialization, a downward spreading “secularization” effect took place in valuing these ideas. Wealthy commoners started to set up their own kinship shrines. The trend was eventually recognized by the imperial center in the sixteenth century, when bans forbidding commoners from worshipping their own ancestors were eventually lifted.\textsuperscript{19} Confucianism played an important role in the process. In addition to persuasion, however, it was also armed with legal weapons. Qu Tongzu argues that China’s legal system experienced a Confucianization process. Following scattered practices for several centuries, legal codes adapted patriarchal principles explicitly for the first time during the Tang. Later dynasties followed suit. Eventually, law-sanctioned patriarchal priority reached its culmination under the Ming and Qing.\textsuperscript{20} Confucian bureaucrats were the executor of the law through-

\textsuperscript{16} The sacrificial rank for Confucius was raised from secondary to primary in 1906 only, obviously a modernizing attempt instead of part of long-held tradition. Yu Benyuan, Religion Policy of the Qing Dynasty, pp. 101-5, 112-4.


\textsuperscript{18} Lü Miaw-fen, Ruling All-under-Heaven with Filial Piety, p. 77; pp. 42-51, 150-58.

\textsuperscript{19} Lü Miaw-fen, Ruling All-under-Heaven with Filial Piety, pp. 21-24.

out the centuries. Here we encounter another constructed myth that claims Confucianism as the backbone of Chinese culture and at the same time conceals its bureaucratic roots in the legal and administrative apparatuses of the State.

Reviving Amid “Secularization”

Confucianism did not occupy a predominantly mainstream position in Chinese society until the Song times (Northern, 960-1127; Southern, 1127-1279). Its rise came together with fundamental changes in society and was accompanied by a proto-secularization of socio-cultural life in general. It went through its own reincarnation as well, adapting into a new form that was known primarily as “Daoxue” (the learning of Dao) before the 16th century and as the “Song-Ming lixue” (the learning of [Heavenly] pattern-principle) thereafter. In English, it is known as the Song-Ming “neo-Confucianism.” As we can see, an obvious split in its reference is between “teaching” (jiao) and “learning-studying” (xue). Secularizing strands of the neo-Confucianism coexisted and struggled with its religious aspects for a long time, a fact that has often been overlooked by Confucian advocates today.

The Tang-Song dynastic transition (roughly the 9th to 10th century) saw the decline of hereditary aristocracy, when a landed gentry class rose in number and influence. Institutional reforms consolidated the trend. Following the steps of the Tang, the Song further centralized the State, experimented taxation reforms, and expanded existing civil service examinations considerably. For the first time, the examinations became the core instrument for governmental recruitment. Also for the first time, examination contents prioritized the Five Classics of ancient scriptures for all candidates.21 While opening up opportunities for commoners to climb up, the examination system also became the backbone of the State’s bureaucratization. Educated literati-bureaucrats of the late Tang already started pondering about the nature of being a ru and its connection to Dao – the Way that gives meaning to the world.22 By the Song times, Daoxue thinkers argued for their positions through intense debates not only against Buddhism but also among themselves, such as those between Zhu Xi’s (1130-1200) lixue (learning of [Heavenly] pattern-principle) and Lu Jiuyuan’s (1139-1193) xinxue (learning of mind-heart).

The vigorous debates indicate an ongoing negotiation of the neo-Confucianism with its immediate environment that conditioned its ascendancy historically. In fact, it was not until after Zhu Xi’s death that his lixue version of Confucianism

21 Fu Xuancong, Tangdai keju yu wenxue (Civil examination and literature in Tang Dynasty), Shaanxi renmin chubanshe, 1986.
Miyazaki Ichisada, China’s Examination Hell.
22 Peter K. Bol, This Culture of Ours, Stanford University Press, 1992, pp. 123-47.
was eventually sanctioned by the Southern Song court. The succeeding Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1279-1366) recognized its influence among Han ethnic communities, and so did the following Ming (1366-1644) and Qing (1644-1911). Its orthodoxy position lasted for seven centuries in the late imperial China. On the other hand and from a religious perspective, the Song debates represent the need for Confucian promoters to exercise intellectual persuasion intensively, a marker of the secularizing character in the new development. Despite varied positions or arguments within the doctrine, therefore, many modern scholars regard the “neo-Confucianism” collectively as the ideology of a rising gentry class of landowning shumin (commoners).

In debating with Buddhism, the Song neo-Confucianism explicated its secular leaning and at the same time developed its own sophisticated answer to challenging issues in human life. On one hand, neo-Confucians attacked Buddhism for preaching individual salvation at all costs, withdrawing from not only earthly desires but also worldly duties. This is to be indifferent to one’s father, against filial piety; and is to disregard one’s ruler, against the virtue of loyalty. In contrast to Buddhism, Zhu Xi’s theoretical elucidation placed tianli (Heavenly pattern-principle) behind existing social order of centralized imperial rule and patriarchal kinship. Thus, the reason to control earthly desires has to be for the purpose to uphold the Heavenly pattern-principle (cun tianli, mie renyu). If the concept of tian (Heaven) represents an absolute authority that is omnipresent while unpredictable, tianli (Heavenly pattern-principle) points to Reason and rationality in tian’s connection to our world.

On the other hand, the Song neo-Confucianists granted increasing importance to human agency. In Zhu Xi’s theory, Heavenly pattern-principle bestows essence to everyone and everything in the world. But it does so in varied ways according to circumstances. To uncover the somewhat buried essence, one must follow the guidance of Confucius the Sage, to study in sincerity and engage in continuous self-cultivation. Pushing the absolute imperial order to the background, this construction opened up theoretical space for active interventions by the individual, the non-aristocratic kinship, and the village-community, in an ideal moral world. The leading figures of the Song neo-Confucianism almost all devised their own household instruction manuals as a way to lead a ritualized moral life, away from their service to the State. Some in the Southern Song (1127-1279) also worked out village agreement for local communities.

To support his position, Zhu Xi promoted the Four Books as the primary Con-

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23 Cf., Hoyt Tillman, Conucian Discourse and Zhu Xi’s Ascendency.
24 Bol, This Culture of Ours, pp. 301-342; Miyazaki Ichisada, “The Modern of East Asia;” Yu Ying-shih, The Historical World of Zhu Xi.
25 Araki Kengo (Huangmu Jianwu), Buddhism and Confucianism, pp. 132-257, esp. 177-87.
26 The Northern and Southern Song differ in their social orientations, as the former being centered in the capital whereas the latter in local communities. This could be one of the socio-historical conditions that supported Zhu Xi’s position. E.g., Hymes, Way and Byway, pp. 15-18; 114-46.
fucian reader. Unlike the Five Classics that were ancient texts before Confucius’s time, the Four Books were understood to be Confucius’s own teaching and by some of his earliest disciples. And, unlike the Five Classics that are about Sage-kings of the Golden Antiquity, the Four Books represented the best example and guideline for later generations to follow the footsteps of Confucius as a Sage-teacher. In this intellectualizing action, Zhu Xi interpreted the concept Heavenly Mandate (tianming) with a focus on individual self-cultivation. By grasping the essence of Heavenly pattern-principle, one will be able to perfect the self and recognize one’s own Heavenly Mandate, just as Confucius once did. While moving the concept of Heavenly Mandate away from imperial sovereignty, neo-Confucianism elevated the idea of all-under-Heaven (tianxia) in political sphere. A main feature of these shifts was to skip those questions directly linking to the divine (Heaven) and issues concerning imperial legitimacy (Heavenly Mandate). Instead, the focus was on harmonizing the human realm (Heavenly pattern-principle and all-under-Heaven).27

This does not mean that the concept of Heavenly Mandate disappeared from Chinese political life. On the contrary, it was picked up repeatedly by peasant uprisings challenging the ruling court. Rebels’ claims to Heavenly Mandate were often supported by Daoism, Buddhism, sometimes by mixtures of the two, and in one case even by Christianity (the Taiping Rebellion of the mid nineteenth century). Neo-Confucianism played little role in these uprisings. The Song-Ming conceptual shifts did not make it a real threat to the imperial State.

Ascending to Orthodoxy

Neo-Confucianism eventually ascended to become the orthodoxy in late imperial China in the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties. Its position was almost guaranteed by the civil service examination system, but its actual path was loaded with conflicts. Initially the ruling house and the Confucian scholar-officials worked together against Buddhism and Daoism. But soon contradictions internal to the neo-Confucianism came to the surface. By the end, the Ming witnessed one of the rockiest relationships between a royal house and its educated scholar-officials in Chinese history. A new balance was reached only in the Qing dynasty.

Crucial but often overlooked, Confucianism’s orthodoxy position since the fourteenth century was secured through legal instruments of the State. The Great Ming Code (Da Ming lilü), issued in 1397 and modeled after by the Qing three centuries later, was the hitherto most comprehensively Confucianized

27 Zhu Xi’s philosophy is far more sophisticated than what is summarized here, rather crudely. The purpose of this paper’s summary is to figure out the religious implications of Zhu Xi’s formulation of “Heaven” related concepts. For more comprehensive studies on Zhu Xi, the reader may consult, for example, works by Tillman and Yu Ying-shih, cited earlier, and Julia Ching’s The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi, Oxford University Press, 2000.
statute document, especially on two central issues - human connection to *tian* the Heaven; and patriarchal order within the family. On both issues, the code targeted Daoism and Buddhism for political reasons, benefitting Confucianism at the same time. In establishing his new dynasty, the founding emperor of the Ming appealed to both Buddhism and Daoism to claim the Heavenly Mandate.\(^{28}\) However, to stop others from repeating his victorious story, the *Great Ming Code* granted the emperor exclusive rights to holding sacrificial ceremonies to Heaven and Earth, prohibiting Buddhist and Daoist priests from divinizing activities that would appeal directly to Heaven the transcendental authority. Number and location of monasteries were to be controlled by the State; and so was ordination of priests and nuns, to be regulated in ways parallel to the Confucianist civil service examinations.\(^ {29}\)

Another battlefront was over the mind-heart of the masses, where the Ming rulers once again found Confucian position to be more favorable than either Buddhism or Daoism. The founding emperor, Zhu Yuanzhang (1328–1398) penned treaties personally on the “three teachings” (*san jiao*), emphasizing similarities between the three, especially in terms of filial piety. The *Great Ming Code* specified punishment for Buddhist and Daoist converts who would disregard their filial duties because of their religious faith. Meanwhile, although Zhu Yuanzhang trusted Daoist priests for his own fortune, when it came to questions of guiding his subjects, he recognized the usefulness of the Confucian method - to indoctrinate the masses with moral teaching. Soon after taking the throne, he issued a Sacred Edict, to be publicized in towns across the country on regular basis. Using plain, simple language, the edit delivered six moral admonitions, all based on Confucian positions: filial to parents; deferent to older generations; friendly with neighbors; dutiful in guiding children; content with one’s own lot; and avoiding troublemaking.\(^ {30}\)

The emperor’s active intervention in “teaching” the masses exposed the awkward position of Confucian “learning” and that of the moral authority of Confucius as a Sage-teacher, both emphasized by Zhu Xi’s theory. Following Confucius, the Song neo-Confucianism adhered to the idea that a mystic “Three Dynasties” of a distant Antiquity represented the golden model for all later generations. The lineage coming from this ideal past was one of Sage-kings. A Sage-king was to stand for unified authority in morality and politics and occupies the central spot of all-under-Heaven, radiating his energy to every corner of the world. In this understanding, it would be difficult for any living Confucian scholars to actually claim moral authority over the throne. However, once the Four Books were elevated to scripture position, the semi-sacred lineage was extended to the Sage-


teachers of Confucius himself and his most favored followers, who were never political rulers. The extension created a *Daotong*, a genealogy of Dao that was related to Confucian “learning”. In contrast, the Ming founder emphasized a genealogy of rulers, *zhitong*. He set up a Temple of Historical Rulers (*Lidai diwang miao*) that worshipped not only the mythical Sage-kings revered by Confucius, as previous dynasties used to do, but also the founding emperors of all major dynasties in history after Confucius’s time.

The two genealogies were in obvious conflict. Yet, they both remained within the neo-Confucian tradition, lending imperial power opportunities to manipulate. As Zhang Hao points out, by conferring super-moralistic power to “emperor” in its abstract sense, the Song-Ming neo-Confucianism retained its religious side that often went to contradict its secularizing side of intellectual reasoning. The internal contradiction can be seen clearly in the dispute over granting honorary titles to Confucius. Along with Confucianism’s ascending, imperial rulers since the mid Tang granted Confucius various titles, often including the designator for “king” (*wang*). However, as ideological conflict escalated between ruler and “scholar-master” over moral authority in the mid Ming, the emperor at the time stripped the maker of “king” from Confucius’s official title for sacrificial ceremony, on the ground that, since Confucius was never a king in his life time, to grant him the title would be an action of usurp. Those who argued for retaining the marker were promptly removed from their official posts. Contentions lasted throughout the dynasty, often intermingled with bloody political struggles.

Despite the lasting conflict, most of the Ming emperors were not as vigilant over religious matters as their dynastic founding father. Many detailed statutes in the *Great Ming Code* were not carefully observed by the end of the dynasty. Socio-economic development came together with growing liveliness in cultural life, especially along the wealthy southeast coast, speeding up downward flow of cultural norms into local communities and encouraging dissent thinking within Confucian traditions. On one hand, as mentioned earlier, scholar-officials petitioned the court successfully to lift the traditional ban on commoners to set up private altar for their ancestors. A related phenomenon is to pray at family altar to five spiritual authorities: Heaven, Earth, Ruler-sovereign, Parents, and Master-teacher (*tian-di-jun-qin-shi*). The list has its ancient origins in both Confucianism

32 Yu Benyuan, *Religion Policy of the Qing Dynasty*, p. 79. The Ming omitted most short-lived dynasties, as well as dynasties under supposedly non-Han ethnic rulers, such as the Yuan that was ruled by Mongols.
33 Zhang Hao, “Politics and Teaching - In Unity or Duality?”, pp. 132-38.
34 See, for example, Benjamin Elman, “Where is King Ch’eng: Confucian Civil Examinations and Imperial Ideology During the Early Ming Dynasty, 1368-1415,” *T’oung Pao* 74, no. 1 (1993): 23-68; Ray Huang, *1587, a Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline*, Yale University Press, 1981; and Mizoguchi Yuzo, *Transformation of Ideas in Early Modern China*. 
and Daoism. Local religious groups, such as peasant uprising, often appropriate it for their own purpose. But mainstream opinions always took it to be part of Confucian teaching.\textsuperscript{35}

On the other hand, internal challengers to Zhu Xi’s doctrine of the neo-Confucianism became more outspoken than before, sometimes even commanding massive following from cross-regional areas. Wang Yangming (1472-1529), Li Zhi (1527-1602), and Huang Zongxi (1610-1695) were the outstanding examples in this regard. Their ideas started to break the emperor-centered position of Zhu Xi’s political philosophy; to further explore the potential of individual human agency, in connection to the origin of truth and knowledge; and to imagine a bottom-up, community-based socio-political ideal. These thinkers provided invaluable resources of dissenting, within while enriching the tradition of Confucianism. However, their efforts were not strong enough to change the general trends that the neo-Confucianism would take under the Qing.\textsuperscript{36}

The Qing that Shaped Modern Confucianism

The Qing ruled the “China proper” by adapting to a political framework left by the Ming (1368-1644).\textsuperscript{37} Despite violent conquest and forced change of identity, such as in dressing code, socio-political continuity remained strong in the dynastic transition. In fact, major institutions under the Qing - the legal code and the civil service examinations in particular - were all further consolidated based on Confucian principles of grand unity, centralized rule, and patriarchal hierarchy.\textsuperscript{38} As a result, both Daoism and Chinese Buddhism (not to be mixed with Tibetan Buddhism) experienced sharp decline, even though some Manchu rulers had great interest in Chinese Buddhism.\textsuperscript{39} Although the Qing was ruled by an ethnic minority, Confucian social order appeared to have reached its most stable state in China’s long history. How was it possible? What were the implications of the phenomena?

Coming from the Siberia region and with a relatively weak tradition in its political culture, the Manchu were eager learners of their neighboring civilizations. Ancestral worshipping with ethnic Han influence was practiced seriously


\textsuperscript{36} For Wang Yangming, see Araki Kengo, Buddhism and Confucianism, pp. 258-308. For Li Zhi and Huang Zongxi, see Mizoguchi Yuzo, Transformation of Ideas in Early Modern China, pp. 51-170, 234-52.

\textsuperscript{37} The Qing ruled large areas dominated by the Mongols, the Tibetans, the Uyghur, and other non-Han ethnic groups, over which the Ming did not have power. The Manchu’s control in these areas was aided by various religions, such as Tibetan Buddhism or Islam. The phrase “China proper,” used here for sake of convenience, indicates territorial regions where the Ming did have control.

\textsuperscript{38} With exceptions, such as the armed forces that the Manchu retained absolute grip on. Frederic Wakeman, The Great Enterprise, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

\textsuperscript{39} Yu Benyuan, Religion Policy of the Qing Dynasty, pp. 117-163.
decades before the Manchu army took Beijing. Once organized resistances were put down (often bloodily) in “China proper”, the Manchu emperors tended to explain their own victory against the fall of the Ming in Confucian terminologies. To themselves, it was the blessing of Heaven, Earth, and their Manchu ancestors. To the Chinese society at large, the Ming would be blamed for straying away from proper Confucian practice and causing its own demise.

In ritual practice, the Manchu emperors outperformed all previous dynasties in their observance of ritual protocols set by books on rites in the Confucian Classics. Altars to Heaven (tiantan), ancestry (taimiao), the State (sheji), and Temple of Confucius (wenmiao) in Beijing, taken from the Ming rulers, maintained and sometimes remodeled, were visited by the Manchu emperors at a much higher rate on average than emperors from all the other dynasties. But this does not mean they would willingly concede their cultural authority to rival forces. And, unlike the Ming that must deal with Buddhism and Daoism at its founding moment, the Manchu conquerors recognized that the major challenge to their rule would come from the Confucian literati class. Precisely in this respect the Qing learned most from its immediate predecessor. Specifically, the new rulers’ ruthless military campaigns were accompanied by great effort to minimize institutional disruptions and to rebuild patriarchal principle as the backbone for social order.

Despite armed and unarmed resistances led by Han literati-gentry class, the Qing reopened the civil examinations in 1645, merely a year after promulgating its rule in “China proper.” Twelve years later, the court issued its first royal edition of the Xiaojing (The classic of filial piety). Three years later in 1659, this particular book became required reading for the civil examinations, after being absent for the entire Ming period. Following the example of the Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang, the Manchu emperors Kangxi (reign 1661-1722) issued his own version of “Sacred Edict” (Shengyu) of moral admonitions. When the Yongzheng Emperor succeeded his father (reign 1723-1735), he revised the Sacred Edict—filial piety was a top priority in both versions. He also issued a new version of the Classic of Filial Piety, more accessible to common people. Along with ideological promotion came efforts to make patriarchal clans the solid rock for the dynastic rule. In fact, as a measure of self-protection, local clans already grew into the basic social unit in China’s agricultural society during the Ming. The socio-administrative role for large rural clans became more clarified under the Qing. In many places, clan organization took over local “community,” to be in charge of managing social welfare and security; running clan school; exercising kinship rules in place of official laws; and collecting taxes and fees to hand over to the government as a

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40 Yu Benyuan, Religion Policy of the Qing Dynasty, pp. 38-39, 61-65, 73-100.
41 Frederic Wakeman, The Great Enterprise.
To highlight his position, Yongzheng made the Sacred Edict a strict requirement for popular education, to be recited in public twice a month by local officials and tested for all primary level examination candidates. The measure lasted throughout the Qing dynasty. Meanwhile and for the first time in history, five ancestors along Confucius’s family lineage were brought out from obscurity, each bestowed by the Manchu throne a grand title containing the designator of “king,” supposedly in recognition to their unusually joined achievement to bring about a Sage into this world. Conspicuously, Confucius himself was not granted this disputed marker. Noticeably, it was in his decree to honor Confucius ancestors that Yongzheng became the first emperor officially confirmed the five spiritual authorities and their proper order – Heaven, Earth, Sovereign-ruler, parents, and master-teacher.

These measures had profound implications. First of all, moral values inherent to Confucianism were now preached according to the Sacred Edict, instead of the Five Classics or the Four Books. In this arrangement, the emperor would speak directly to the masses, assuming an enlarged role of a Heaven-endorsed ruler in the image of a fatherly-figure, as well as a guiding light leading people to civilized life, in the model of the Sage-kings of the Golden Antiquity. A commoner had indeed acquired the rights to worship Heaven and Earth directly, maybe plus Confucius. But, the Heaven and Earth in this setting were not accessed unmediated; and the mediating agency was the ruling emperor himself alone. With no direct access to specially designated sacrificial rituals, a commoner’s relationship to Heaven and Earth became instead a private matter, losing its sacredness in religious life of one’s immediate community.

Same logic was at work in literati members’ worship of Confucius. By legal code and ritual protocols, filial piety took priority over Confucius’s Sage-teacher’s position in the Qing. The “master-teacher” fell behind the other four spiritual authorities. The Dao genealogy, conceptualized by Zhu Xi, lost its battle with the ruler’s genealogy. Indeed, during the Qing, the ruler’s genealogy grew denser than before. Understandably, it included non-Han ruling houses. Furthermore, by Qianlong’s time (reign 1736-1795), all emperors and kings who once ruled in historical “China” were to be worshipped at the Temple of Historical Rulers. Qianlong explained his view on the matter several times. He insisted that a ruler’s title...
alone was enough to qualify for inclusion. It ought to be different from adding worthy “saints” into Confucius Temple, when the worthiness must be evaluated and debated by officials in charge of the shrine. Moreover, appropriating an ancient saying, Qianlong argued against racial discrimination towards non-Han rulers, claiming that the all-under-Heaven belongs to peoples of all-under-Heaven (tianxia zhe tianxia ren zhi tianxia ye). The appropriation’s stress is not on “people” versus ruler but on rulers from various “peoples” to be justly accepted to rule all-under-Heaven. After a hundred years under the Manchu rule, it is indicative that the Qing scholar-gentry class, unlike its counterpart during the Ming, had a very weak position to lay competing moral claims against imperial rulers.

Moreover, literati-gentry class also had a much weaker link to their own Sage, Confucius, than the Song-Ming neo-Confucianists. It is true that the Qing emperors paid tribute to Confucius more regularly than rulers in previous dynasties. However, before the twentieth century, sacrificial ceremonies offered to Confucius were always ranked at secondary level (except in the rare occasions when emperors held top-rank ceremony for Confucius at the shrine in his hometown). Throughout the Qing, all the Manchu emperors were clear and firm that they alone represented the highest unity under Heaven, unifying both ruling and teaching. Once spiritual authorities were centralized to the throne, intellectual life lost its organic role in society’s public life, reducing independent spirit and critical energy among literati members. The merged genealogies became a closed issue, leaving no theoretical ambiguity for literati thinkers to maneuver in the same way by which Wang Yangming and his followers did in the late Ming.

In the religious life of a Confucianist, the situation was probably unique to the Qing. To become a scholar-official or scholar-gentry, one must study by heart the Classics according to the officially sanctioned line of interpretation, which was primarily based on Zhu Xi’s theory. However, upon becoming the only member in society with this scripture education, the newly minted scholar-gentleman was not qualified to preach openly, unless he had passed higher ranks of the civil service examinations and was appointed to government positions. Even then, he could only preach the Sacred Edict or other “sacred” texts issued by the emperor. Learning would not guarantee one’s moral authority even within family life, because there, backed by law, ruling priority depended on patriarchal hierarchy. “Teaching” and “learning” were torn apart during the Qing, with the throne claiming the former and Confucian scholars specializing on the later. “Learning” was resulted partly from internal secularization; but without challenging the “teaching” power, it was not armed with secularism, a regressive problem that seriously affected the fate of Confucianism in the twentieth century.

47 Quoted in Yu Benyuan, Religion Policy of the Qing Dynasty, pp. 87-88.
49 Cf. Benjamin A. Elman, From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China, Cambridge,
Making Confucianism a Popular Religion for Today?

If we say that Confucianism was a religion, or the religion, in imperial China, with its own deities, scriptures, temples, and sacrificial rituals, which lasted for more than two thousands years without changing its essence, then the most extraordinary thing in modern Chinese history would be the sudden collapse of a Confucian socio-political order and the fall of Confucianism from its pedestal. The civil service examination system, a major pillar in the Confucian order, was abolished abruptly in 1905, in an entirely non-ceremonial fashion. Confucianism’s changing fate has prompted scholars to ask many questions. Joseph Levenson believes that it had lost vitality long ago, making the newly arriving Western learning increasingly more attractive to China’s most lively minds; and that educated Chinese kept talking about Confucianism mainly out of sentimental association to the past, not based on rational thinking. Mark Elwin, on the other hand, compares Confucianism to other great religions of the world and sees the collapse of scriptural Confucianism already coming before the twentieth century. The scriptures’ relative lack of sacredness is shown in the willful reading of Kang Youwei (1858-1927) and his contemporaries.50

Compared to the civil service examination, the legal system, another institutional pillar of the late imperial Confucianism, did not begin to change until well after the 1911 Republican Revolution. When change did come, it encountered strong resistance from the gentry class in local rural communities and had to go in a piecemeal fashion, often limiting its reform to big urban centers. It took a Communist revolution (1949) to make patriarchal hierarchy a target of legal reform and gender equality a social principle protected by law. The relatively slow social transformation, compared to the sudden turn-round in culture-related institutions, often lent support to conservative claims that Chinese society had its “nature” in Confucianism. However, Confucian activists in the twentieth century did not always side with conservative forces to oppose against modernization projects. Partly due to the teaching-learning split in the Qing, modern Confucian advocates came mostly from the old “learning” camp and tended to support modern rationalization, while arguing for a modernized Confucianism. Popular Confucianism is a new phenomenon in the twenty-first century.

From Kang Youwei to New-Confucianism

From Kang Youwei’s time onwards, many educated Chinese embraced new ideas coming from the West enthusiastically, but there were always others

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who wondered and worried about the same problem--the relevance of Confucianism to modern world, and its sudden collapse in the early twentieth century. More often than not, ideas introduced from abroad would trigger new understandings of life back home.

Despite his peculiar way of reading Confucian Classics, Kang Youwei always identified Confucianism with “China” and its future prosperity. His effort to elevate Confucianism to China’s national religion went hand in hand with his emphasis that Confucian tradition valued thinking with reason and so was compatible to scientific knowledge introduced from the West. Meanwhile, he insisted that a meaningful national identity could only be built on the basis of Confucianism and Confucianism was indispensable for inculcating morality in society. As Gan Chunsong points out, these goals often went contradicting each other, as well as frequently in conflicts with conservative and republican positions. Kang’s promotion of religious Confucianism was not always due to his religious conviction but for the purpose of constructing cultural and national identity.51 It is worth noting that Kang had also been active in debating China’s modern state, arguing for constitutional monarchy before the 1911 revolution and later on in the new Republic for “State sovereignty” (zhuquan zai guo), supported by Confucianism and in contrast to Republican idea of popular sovereignty (zhuquan zai min).52 Kang’s efforts were not very fruitful in reality. He ended up in becoming a religious leader of a small sect that did not bear Confucian marker in its name any more. With changing institutional settings, religious Confucianism retreated to become a minor faction with limited following throughout the century.

Many intellectuals like Kang responded actively to vacuums left by drastic reforms, covering a wide range of issues. Of these, a focal point was moral-ethical cultivation that was central to the Song-Ming neo-Confucianism. Starting with metaphysical emphasis in the late Qing, the issue went to two separate directions soon after the May Fourth New Culture Movement of the late 1910s. One turned to moral inculcation of school pupils, provoking repeated political rows. Contentious parties tend to argue that inculcation should be eliminated from modern education; or that teaching school children would be the best way - possibly the last way, too - to preserve our traditional culture. As such, the arguments do not always form meaningful dialogue between the parties. It has been a tenacious problem. Dispute over the Four Books’ inclusion into high school curriculum is still going on in Taiwan today.53

The other direction became the intellectual Confucianism of our time, known as xin rujia (New-Confucianism), which concentrates its energy on constructing metaphysical theories within the perimeters of neo-Confucianism.

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51 Gan Chunsong, “Between Knowledge and Faith: Kang Youwei and the Modern Fate of Confucianism.”
Formed in a period of great intellectual upheavals and going through years of wars and revolutions, the earlier representatives of this school were often active in public affairs or involved in politics. When the Communist forces took power in the mainland China in 1949, most of them stayed. But some of their outstanding disciples of a younger generation fled to Hong Kong, Taiwan, or other countries. Persistent endeavor by these refugee-scholars, including their own students, was crucial to Confucian revival phenomena thereafter. They have managed to retain intellectual prestige for modern Confucianism, making it a strong contender in offering sophisticated explanations about China, Chinese culture and civilization, or history and society, as well as about that of East Asia at large.

One particular incident became “a landmark for the Contemporary New Confucianism Movement”. On New Year Day, 1958, four leading New Confucianism figures published a document, entitled “A Manifesto for a Reappraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture”. The manifesto was originally envisaged for English-speaking audience, targeting Sinology field in the West for its arrogantly disregarding Chinese opinions. However, due to changing circumstances, the document was published in Chinese only by the end. There is no question that Orientalism had (and likely still have) its fair share in China-study field in the West. But at the same time, the manifesto also indicated an anxiety among its signatories over cultural identity, which was provoked through increasing contact with the outside world. Unlike Kang Youwei’s campaigns that concentrated on China’s domestic institutions, the manifesto was intended to urge the outside world to recognize the need of demarcating boundaries between different cultures. It aimed at constructing China’s own cultural identity by speaking to audiences outside its own cultural tradition.

The four signatories were based in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United States at the time. The issuing date fell into a peak period of the Cold War tensions, especially military tensions across the Taiwan Strait. Although the manifesto mentioned no contemporary political affairs, it set a precedent in its apologetic tone when discussing democratization potentials in a society dominated by Confucian culture. The reference was clearly Chiang Kai-shek’s government in Taiwan, with its prolonged martial law and oppressive “white terror”. For the manifesto signers and many of their students, it became imperative to acknowledge modern necessity of political democracy while defending Confucian norms in Chinese political culture.

In fact, the manifesto did not generate much interest East or West at the time. The New Confucianism was an isolated phenomenon in the postwar

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55 Ibid., pp. 104-8.
56 Ibid., pp. 105-7.
period. Things started to change in the 1970s, partly affected by two historical factors. On one hand, attacks on Confucianism in the Cultural Revolution provoked growing interest on the PRC and Confucianism in the West. On the other hand, several East Asian countries saw rapid economic take-off since the 1960s, prompting interest to detect their shared cultural traits. Confucianism easily became the top candidate in offering explanations. Thereupon, philosophical-spiritual Confucianism joined force with observation-based historical, political, or anthropological analyses. As mentioned earlier, it was this trend that brought Confucianism back to the mainland to popular attention in the eighties. However, as the explanations appeared relatively foreign in comparison to personally lived experience in the PRC, the excitement soon ebbed.

Cultural Identity and Chinese Uniqueness

According to Chen Ming, a leading figure in today’s Confucianism revival wave, when he was inspired by the New Confucianism and set up a new journal to promote it in the mid-nineteenth, people did not pay much attention. Popular interest arose mainly in the past five years or so.\(^{57}\) It is perhaps not far-fetched to imagine a connection between this wave and China’s rise as an economic superpower. With an average of 40% export rate to annual GDP over three decades, and with WTO membership in 2001, there was a sharp rise in foreign trade, as well as in foreign exchanges in every possible area. The success of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, held one month before the financial crisis exploded in the US, saw the surging of a collective anxiety over national identity. This anxiety proved different from classic nationalism. Instead of raising questions about ruling legitimacy in domestic political front, it longs for cultural identity vis-à-vis foreign nationals in the age of globalization. At the same time, there was growing interest, inside the PRC and abroad, to narrate and explain China’s success story. As in the case of the four East Asian “little tigers”, Confucianism once again became a popular choice in the many explanations.

However, as our brief historical survey has shown, religious features in Confucianism were quite dubious by the Qing time. No matter how many similarities can be detected between Confucianism and other major creeds, Confucianism was primarily concerned with governing the world and rectifying disorders within it, rather than aiming to be a religious tradition. Modern bids to make Confucianism a substitute for religion have thus always been based on nationalist, or supposedly civilizational grounds, such as in Kang Youwei’s case. To this, we can look at some of the fundamental propositions in one of the Four Books, *The Great Learning* (*Daxue*). In the following passage, an order of action is laid out to all under the Heaven (*tianxia*). It starts from individual human beings, who are

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\(^{57}\) Chen Ming “Approaching a Civil Confucianism: Interview with Mr. Chen Ming,” *Reflexion* 20, pp. 236-8.
enjoined to acquire knowledge to become cultivated persons. It then goes on:

“Once their persons being cultivated, their families will be regulat-
ed. Once their families are properly regulated, their states will be rightly
governed. Once their states are rightly governed, all that is under Heav-
en will be tranquil and happy.”

This formulation of the ideal human condition, ascending from the indi-
vidual to the family to the state and then to the whole known world, became the
short-hand popular understanding of Confucianism for centuries. Yet, China’s so-
cial life today would make all the four steps either unrealistic or undesirable. Let
us consider the four one by one.

At the level of the individual, the emphasis falls on moral cultivation of
the self. This starts with the acquisition of “complete” knowledge, so that the
heart (yi) is sincere and the mind (xin) rectified. But the ultimate end of study is
pacification of “all that is under Heaven,” which advances criteria in assessing suc-
cessful self-cultivation. In comparative sense, rather than being called to submit
unconditionally to the absolute authority of an Almighty, the imagined convert
of a Confucian religion must be ready to accept practical tests and prepared to
serve in the real world at large. In the old days, this would be measured, in theory
and in practice, by the civil service examination system. Passing the examina-
tions was a certification that the candidate had acquired the proper knowledge,
proper heart, proper mind, and proper personal cultivation; as a result, he could
be granted the right to step into a Confucian temple and participate in official
sacrificial rituals.

What is behind this procedure is the fact that Confucianism does not
open itself to the multitudes. According to this doctrine, the virtue of a gentle-
man is like the wind; whereas the virtue of the commoners is like the grass. When
the wind blows, the grass bends. The focus on self-cultivation through learning
on one hand and on self-cultivation to assure virtuous rule on the other split Con-
fucianism into two directions in modern times, one tending to moral education
of the self, and the other to political definition of good government. Thus, for all
the efforts of its advocates, in its relation to the common people, Confucianism
has never shaken off its image as essentially a preceptor. Anxious or weary indi-
viduals, suffering from insecurity, fear, or anguish under the mounting pressures
of the modern world, can hardly find in Confucianism the kind of existential sol-
ace offered by major world religions. Nor are they readily admitted into the ranks
of Confucian followers.

In fact, if there was any religious connection between officially sanc-
tioned Confucianism and commoners’ life in pre-twentieth century China, it was

not in the rituals performed by the educated few in honor of Confucius, but in the ancestor worship shared by neo-Confucianism and society at large. The Confucian emphasis on the family is more explicitly linked in the *Analects* to a patriarchal order, in which mourning rituals to honor forebears are focused above all on the male ancestral line. In late imperial times, this aspect of Confucianism as a system of faith was not only inscribed in legal codes but also kept up by local Han communities, where the law was not always vigilantly enforced by the State. Ancestral worshipping as part of religious life in ethnic Han communities is a fact that can be seen in the family-clan clustered bury ground, in contrast to, say, Muslim customs. However, as our historical review shows, in a secularizing process that went over many centuries, ancestral worship and filial piety had ambiguous relationships, splitting and remerging over time, resulting in a generally observed custom that had great internal flexibility to accommodate people of different social standings.

In the PRC after 1949, ancestral worship was officially regarded as superstition, to be eliminated by spreading scientific knowledge. That the official position did not encounter lasting resistance or challenge is a testimony to the weak religious intensity in the popular belief. Social life in China was already transformed by war and revolution before 1949. Further changes under political pressure, such as the Cultural Revolution, or sweeping marketization in the past three decades have made it utterly impossible to re-create the patriarchal order of imperial China. Yan Yunxiang’s anthropological study on individualization in Chinese society shows this clearly. According to Yan, social practice in both urban and rural areas, and more strikingly in the countryside than in big cities, has transformed the social role of a multi-generational family. Previously, it was a pivotal unit in the organization of social life, shouldering duties encompassing economic, cultural and political activities. Now it has changed into a residual cushion for members of satellite nuclear families to fall back on, who tend to be struggling as lonely individuals, often far away from home, in an alienating modern world.59

Still, if we remember the four domains of the dictum in the passage from the *Great Learning*, what follows the individual and the family are the administration of the state and pacification of all under the Heaven - a passage from personal life leading directly to political rule, lending the doctrine readily to adaptations into modern nationalism. The Song-Ming Confucianism maintained a religious dimension in its reverence to a mystic past and its deference to imperial rule as the representative of the Heaven. The Manchu Qing further strengthened the emperor’s claim to be the sole mediator between Heaven and human realm. In the post-imperial era, this religious dimension has been stripped from political settings. What remains in today’s political Confucianism is a residue imagination

that connects the State with some religious attributes without substantiating the contents. Its lack of modern religious significance is combined with a positivist approach towards its assumed political task, purportedly offering a definitive answer to how the whole realm under Heaven may be effectively pacified. These features have all contributed to making the revival of Confucianism today part of nationalistic fever.

In recent years, the PRC has seen many huge and lavish ceremonies performed at Confucian temples around the country. Yet there has been no steady supply of master of ceremonies. Officials from central or local government have attended the occasions, and so have scholars or intellectuals promoting the revival. But these people do not always take up the duty to actually monitor the ceremonies. More often than not, the commanding roles in these rituals are taken by professional performers, often in costumes of mandarin officials from dynastic times, making them into spectacles closer to tourist attraction than religious devotion.

Essentializing Confucian China

In recent years, many Chinese intellectuals have turned to Confucianism without seeking to make it an official religion. Yet, by jumping onto the bandwagon they lend intellectual credentials to the new revival. We have mentioned that the earlier New-Confucians struggled in relative isolation but still managed to pass on the cultural prestige of Confucianism through the twentieth century. In the new round, intellectual and scholarly works have been much more ambitious than their New-Confucian predecessors. Confucianism has become the shorthand for Chinese culture or Chinese civilization when arguing for various positions, often without critical comments to balance the view. Promoters of a Confucian religion are taking advantage of the situation. Obviously, it is also behind the justification to name the State-sponsored cultural campaign “Confucius Institute” around the world.

A leading example of intellectual-scholarly work in this regard is the massive four-volume work of Wang Hui, entitled *The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought* (Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi). The book traces the origins of modern Chinese thought to the Tang-Song dynastic transition of the tenth-eleventh centuries, but its main goal is to explain why China - and China alone in the whole world--has managed to keep its political continuity in territorial setting throughout wars and revolutions over more than a century. China did not split along ethnic lines after the 1911 Republic Revolution; nor did it fall apart by the end of the Cold War. In a lengthy introduction, the author criticizes strongly some Western constructions, such as “empire”, “nation-state”, teleological history, and origins of modern nationalism, believing that these have been blocking a proper under-
standing of China’s history. These are all very reasonable and interesting points. The problematic part is his main argument that Confucianism (ru xue), especially its emphases on an overarching, centralized unity (da yitong), is key to understand the political continuity in China’s modern history. Wang Hui also argues that, in the last thousand years of China’s imperial period, Confucianism had been able to regenerate itself once and again, responding to changing historical conditions energetically and capably, including, or in particular, the creative constructions of a multi-ethnic empire in a flexible conceptualization of “China” (Zhongguo) under the Qing, and a universally harmonious order between all various nations around the globe for the future.60

By the end, Wang Hui answers his own research question from a Han-centered viewpoint of Confucianism only. There is no examination from perspectives of the non-Han peoples. In this book and many other writings, Wang Hui has argued to view Chinese tradition as an overlooked rich resource for alternative imaginations. The most visible contrast in his work often turns into a geographic division between “West” and “China.” Although he has not argued forthrightly for a Confucian revival, Confucianism occupies a dominating position in his narrative about “China’s” past and receives little negative critique.

Another example would be the philosopher Zhao Tingyang who strives to construct a “world system” of all-under-Heaven for our own age. In Zhao’s understanding, our world is still a “non-world” in conceptual terms. What we have in the institution of the United Nations, or in the idea of international relations, are not visions about a desirable and feasible world, but rather, an over-stretched application of ideas based on the nation-state. A conceptualized world must be a political entity; with internal consistency; be “transference between different political systems;” and corresponding to ethical legitimacy. Quoting the same passage from The Great Learning, he claims that the Confucian political construction from family to state and to all-under-Heaven provides a best ethical model for a political world today, disregarding completely the patriarchal principle in Confucianism and its oppressive nature towards women.61

In today’s China, Confucianism is claiming an essentialized Chineseness openly and forcefully. It is against this situation that some advocates, such as Chen Ming, the editor of a Confucian journal we mentioned earlier, are promoting a “civil religion” of Confucianism (gongmin rujiao). He claims that to promote Confucianism as a civil religion is simply to say that Confucianism takes up a relatively greater role in our civil religion. It covers Confucian concepts of values that can also be accepted by followers of Buddhism, Muslim, or Christianity. In fact, Chen Ming freely admits that his own theory of Confucian civil religion is constructed with hope that Confucian tradition could gain greater influence in his

country of multi-cultural unity (duoyuan yiti de guojia). His hope is in turn built on the belief that has essentialized Confucianism in contemporary China.62

**Conclusion**

The Confucian revival has not produced numbers of converts comparable as yet to either Buddhist or Christian churches. But it is more audible than these, and is buttressed by governmental appropriations, scholarly endeavors, public ceremonies and private customs. Of all major faiths in the PRC, it is the most politically charged, laying nationalist claims to Chineseness, to represent China in a globalizing world, and to offer peculiarly Chinese contributions to a better future for the world. In such projections, Confucianism becomes the symbol for Chinese culture, Chinese tradition, or simply China itself. The danger is to non-Confucian traditions and ethnic groups living within the national boundary of the PRC, as well as to women’s rights and rights of other disadvantaged social groups. If a civil religion is to be desired, and if we recognize that Confucianism was not the “core” of Chinese civilization for more than two thousands years, then why do we have to promote a “civil religion” in the name of Confucianism? Thus if we return to the question posed at the beginning of this paper, whether any of China’s religious communities would be capable of putting forth their own candidates in a democratic election, it seems clear that it is the least religious of these, Confucian position, that would have most chance of giving rise to a political party in the 21st century China. This is a role that historical Confucianism never played before. It is a prospect worthy of our attention, and maybe of our worries as well.

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62 Chen Ming, “Approaching a Civil Confucianism: Interview with Mr. Chen Ming,” Reflexion20, pp. 258-9.
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modern politics).


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Шаохуа Ванг

СТАРЕ МУДРОСТИ ЗА НОВО ДОБА?
ОЖИВЉАВАЊЕ РЕЛИГИОЗНОГ КОНФУЦИЈАНИЗМА У КИНИ

Резиме

У последње време, конфуцијанизам се поново одређује као суштина кинеске цивилизације и као религија која је најбитнија кинеском народу у дугој историји. Научници апелују на Комунистичку партију Кине да учини конфуцијанизам државном религијом (guojiao). Које су политичке последице овог феномена? Могу ли ове тврдње издржати интелектуалне изазове? Изводећи кратко историјско истраживање религиозног конфуцијанизма у кинеској политици, заједно са анализом заједничких суштинских принципа који одликују различите позиције конфуцијанизма данас, овај рад тврди да је религиозни конфуцијанизам који данас презентују његови заговарачи уствари конструисан мит који датира још из времена Quing (1644-1911). Ово учење не садржи религиозни садржај везан за индивидуално постојање нити за друштвени живот у савременој Кини. Али његова снага првенствено долази из везе са државом, или колективној нацији (Zhonghua), и то преко света изван етничке Хан заједнице. Упркос овоме – или тачније због овог – ревитализован религиозни конфуцијанизам може имати највећи потенцијал да постане политичка сила у доби глобализације у Кини, већи него било која друга светска религија, чак и ако неке друге религије имају више следбеника у Кини од конфуцијанизма.

Кључне речи: религиозни конфуцијанизам, Даоизам, Све-испод-раја, дечја побожност, савремена Кина, национализам

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Анализе
Analyses
POLITICS, POLICY AND FAITH:
THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT IN AUSTRALIA

Abstract

In this paper we offer a critical assessment of the politics of the Christian Right and question the degree to which the religious values of the Christian Right are compatible with a democratic political culture. If religious values are equally political values making the separation of religious belief and political action a fraught exercise, then a number of issues arise. Political action inspired by religious faith should not prevent critical scrutiny of the underlying values, or more importantly, their influence in shaping public debate and public policy. If religious values are indeed political values, then do protections of freedom of religious expression privilege forms of faith-based politics over secular forms? And if so, to what end? We argue that a more nuanced analysis of the intersection of religion and politics is required to ensure that public politics is not threatened by particular forms of religious political activism that exhibit totalitarian tendencies. At the very least, close attention needs to be focused on particular policy advocates and the agenda they seek to advance with little accountability or transparency despite claims to represent the public interest. It is to these ends that this paper makes a contribution.

Key words: Christian Right, public policy, democracy, political values

Introduction

The rise of religious fundamentalism (along with secular fundamentalisms) as a political force has been the impetus for much renewed interest in the intersection of religion and politics. Strategic violence used as a means

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to achieve the political objectives of religiously inspired terrorist organizations brings forth all manner of sociological, political, and moral considerations as should be the case. However, the efforts of religious groups such as the Christian Right seeking to achieve similarly fundamentalist aims from within democratic institutions presents, in some respects, more perplexing problems as Ozzano recognises. To what extent can a democratic polity accommodate religious values that are entirely at odds with political values such as toleration, empathy and respect upon which democracy rests? How does one determine compatibility? Such questions imply that there are distinctions between religious and political values, yet this is not necessarily the case. A normative commitment to understanding religious values as intrinsic to political behaviour, as Jevtic argues “a determinant of politics,” does have analytical benefits. Approaching religion and politics in this way avoids the somewhat crude and unreasonable attempts of the new atheists to have religious faith deemed a pathology, as though religious faith can be medically compartmentalized and treated if not exorcised. By the same token, it is equally important to avoid the opposing inclination to embrace all faiths as though religion itself is not a deep source of friction between different communities of faith and non-faith. A more nuanced analysis is required to understand the relationship between religion and politics, one that recognizes the different expressions of faith and values that prompt political action and how these expressions are in turn influenced by their interaction in political contests that broad references to religion as a single category overlook.

It is with this level of complexity that we have undertaken our analysis of the Christian Right and the framework of values that drives their engagement in the public arena. It is not simply a matter of identifying particular values associated with the Christian Right that is at issue. The way these values are defined through political action and in turn contrary values are either disparaged or ignored is central to understanding the politics of the Christian Right. One of the key values of the Christian Right is the right of freedom of religious expression. It is precisely because the origins of this right lie in the long history of religious persecution that the Christian Right claim it is under threat, positioning themselves as the Christian voice excluded from the public arena by a hostile secular political culture. Yet it is the hostility of the Christian Right toward other communities (both of faith and non-faith) and their access to political leaders that has led to criticism of the politics of the Christian Right. There is certainly scope to interrogate the validity of the Christian Right’s contribution to public debate

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5 See for example Armstrong Karen, God. Think Again Foreign Policy, November 2009, pp. 54-60, Washington.
(as opposed to their right to express it). A deeper problem is that if religious values are intrinsic to their political behaviour, then political action prompted by religious faith can be privileged by the right to freedom of religious expression in a way that political action prompted by non-religious values is not. Such a proposition is even more problematic when what is rightfully regarded as religious can itself be subject to contest in the public arena and be used as both a source of legitimacy and disparagement. The debate over climate change in Australia features such paradoxes. Global warming has dismissed as a religion practiced by zealots immune to reasoned argument, yet theology serves as part of the reason for maintaining skepticism and religion a vaccine against the attraction of mythologies such as anthropogenic global warming.\(^\text{7}\) Indeed there are some climate skeptics that claim their fight against the dark forces controlling public institutions will be rewarded in heaven.\(^\text{8}\) The Christian Right in Australia may not represent a potent political force in and of itself, either electorally\(^\text{9}\) or in terms of particular policy outcomes.\(^\text{10}\) However, emerging networks of common interest, such as those between the Christian Right and conservative think tanks as identified by Maddox may extend the influence of the Christian Right in ways not readily apparent or quantifiable.\(^\text{11}\) We argue that there has been a conservative shift in Australian political culture. Whether or not the Christian Right has contributed to this shift, it is clear that their involvement in public debates and consultation by political leaders is accepted in a way that may not have been the case prior to the election of the Howard government in 1996. If the values of the Christian Right are not compatible with a democratic political culture, can such access be justified?

In this paper we examine the politics of the Christian Right through the discourse of family values and a case study focusing on opposition to same-sex marriage. After looking at the idea of political values and the Christian Right broadly, a brief introduction to the politico-religious landscape in Australia is offered in terms of basic demographic trends, public debate and the state of academic debate on the subject. This is followed by a close examination of the politics of the Christian Right, the marriage movement broadly and the National


Marriage Coalition. This covers the formation of the National Marriage Coalition and the inaugural National Marriage Forum, including some detail on key figures and organisations, their relationship with key politicians and the substance of claims being made. The merit of these claims is critically assessed in the next section and draws in links with key Christian Right figures and organisations in the USA that have been a source of support and attended Australian events as guest speakers. From this analysis, a detailed picture emerges of the politics of the Christian Right in Australia, one that we argue is incompatible with the values that underpin a democratic political culture.

Political Values and the Christian Right

To align political values with religious thought and faith is hardly innovative, or a surprising convergence. But the form in which this takes reveals deeper complexities that reflect culture and traditions which can be singularly nationalistic or varied to resonate with sub-national communal enclaves. Either way the pattern of alignment is not of immediate interest but rather the values that underpin and provide a source of intellectual and emotional nourishment to particularly idiosyncratic political identity. What sort of politics is emerging from the Christian Right, not for one moment inferring that we can regard the Christian Right as a monolithic entity, that has definable values driving policy? A second order question is one of definition: can we discern a political value from a faith-based belief? And to what extent do political values emerging from some theological mindset embrace an inclusive liberal democratic polity? The constant focus on various expressions of religious fundamentalism and the politics of terror often associated with the extreme forms, may well be justified, but other more nuanced forms of alignment remain under-scrutinised. The theological-political connection requires close examination because it reveals and opens up space for radical opposition based more on a critical scepticism concerning the truth-claims and ethical and moral legitimacy of political decision-making – especially the normative framework of public policy.

In his study of millenarian sects in the Middle Ages, Cohn makes some interesting insights into the excesses of political vision based on a revolutionary eschatology borne out of social anxiety, poverty and utopian fantasy. He points out that millenarianism was not monolithic but quite varied in the values and attitudes expressed, ranging from mild pacifism to violent forms of anarchism. The millenarianism that flourished among the rootless poor of western Europe often displayed a revolutionary character and exhibited peculiarities not shared by the usual revolts by peasants and artisans – an apocalyptic vision and exaltation of the life to come, an untrammeled belief in prophesy and a harsh intolerance of those who stood in the way.}

deemed unworthy. The intensity of these movements occurred in situations of mass disorientation and anxiety. Out of these circumstances, “traditional beliefs about a future golden age or messianic kingdom came to serve as vehicles for social aspirations and animosities.” The parallels with contemporary expressions of religious belief and the political implications emanating from a convergence of political values and faith-based pronouncements about the ‘good life’ and its composition should not escape even the casual observer. The work of Cohn has influenced John Gray most explicitly in his book, Black Mass, where he proclaims that Western civilization might be defined by way of millenarian thinking. The historical roots of this thinking, according to Gray, finds expression in modernity’s proclivity towards utopian political projects, most profoundly manifested in Bolshevism, Stalinism, Nazism and variety of Marxist-Leninist inspired ideologies. Gray points to the millenarian context of the ‘war on terror’ and in particular the Bush/Blair rhetoric about the ‘axis of evil’ and the pursuit of a ‘military neoliberalism’ and a democratic millennium. A religious fervour energises the political debate by the use of violence to realize liberal democratic ‘heaven on earth.’ The importance of Cohn’s work is that is provides pointers to the religious nourishment of ideas about the identification of an enemy. This is the political culmination of a fantasy or social myth around which a collective can be formed. Gray has extended this insight from Cohn to explicate the dangers of apocalyptic utopian political projects. Borrowing from Schmitt that ‘modern politics is a chapter in the history of religion’ politics is reduced to an insidious surrogate for religious salvation. Schmitt’s famous assertion that, ‘[a]ll significant concepts in the modern theory of the state are secularised theological concepts’ brings to the discussion important considerations of liberal democratic thought and religious values, that space does not allow for expansion. Nonetheless, the fact that Schmitt’s work is receiving critical attention in light of significant scholarship on questions of faith and secularism places the emphasis on the Christian Right as one expression of political dominance as proper and relevant. However, it is the utopian thought within this convergence of faith and politics that demands attention. Gray reminds us that Rightwing utopianism began as a secular movement, but as it became more militant it also became less secular. The joining of forces between neo-conservatives and Christian fundamentalists

has forged a defining moment in American political life over recent decades that has successfully mobilised dangerous myths – namely, the eradication of evil. To this extent, the politicisation of faith has fashioned a politics of despair and retribution against named enemies. Gray is right to argue that this violence can only be understood as an eschatological phenomenon.

The traditional values of Christianity are not out of sync with entrenched liberal democratic principles such as compassion, tolerance, justice and a heightened sense of what ‘we owe each other’. Such values have not been corroded away by aggressive secular political movements but more compellingly by schisms within Christianity derived from a utopian-based zealotry. Hedges has defined some of these schisms as fascist in their strategems and rhetoric underpinned more by visceral utterances than reasoned propositionism. His focus is on the Christian movement known as dominionism, which are small in number but influential in American politics. According to Hedges (2007) dominionists control at least six television networks, and a large proportion of the more than 2,000 religious radio stations. This movement departs from traditional evangelicism in that it seeks to redefine traditional democratic and Christian values to support an ideology that calls on the radical church to take political power. This movement is sustained by a theology known as Christain reconstructionism that seeks to politicize faith. Hedges is quite candid with his argument that ‘...the radical Christian Right is a sworn and potent enemy of the open society.’

Any form of extremism or crude fundamentalism is a threat to politics, and the nature of political life within the democratic tradition. The attribution of political power to religious belief is the core of what we understand to be a theocratic state, which is readily definable. The diminishing of liberal democratic political values by a growing religious radicalism determined to redefine these values by stealth, is not evidence of the supremacy of religious conviction over secularised political thought as the moral foundation of politics, but rather a diminishing of politics itself. The alternative is not to embrace some form of seeming progressive atheism, as advocated by Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens, as this is just another pernicious expression of fundamentalism strident in its attempt to eradicate the spiritual life from political judgment. Neither is it an enlightened move to exclude the religious voice from democratic politics, but rather an ethical demand to be vigilant and mindful of any manifestation of totalitarianism, be it religious or secular. Strands of totalitarianism are not always readily apparent within the pluralism of modern polities, which is why close critical scrutiny of policy advocates and positions is imperative to ensure an ongoing presence of a robust democratic public politics.

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Shifting (Religious) Contours in Australian Politics.

Within academic literature, the relationship between religion and politics has received more attention in recent years. Awareness of the dearth of scholarship in this area of academic study, especially within political science, has been documented, but in itself represents an acknowledgment of the importance of religion to the study of politics. The situation in Australia mirrors international developments. While it would be reasonable to suggest that religion has not occupied a prominent place in political science, it is nonetheless becoming a focus of scholarly study. This is perhaps as much a reflection of developments with the international field of political science as it is with trends within the Australian political context. The presence of religious influences within the political domain in Australia is becoming more evident. While no doubt never absent, the presence of religious faith and awareness of its influence in Australian politics has been more pronounced in recent years. Whether in terms of religious invocations in politicians’ speeches, bipartisan political support for efforts to ‘rediscover Australia’s Christian heritage’ through the establishment of the Australian Christian Heritage Foundation, or policy initiatives such as the controversial Chaplains in Schools program, religion is becoming more prominent in Australian political life. While these developments offer an interesting contrast to statistics suggesting a decline in religious observance, it is the political activism of the Christian Right that has generated the most controversy and sparked academic interest, particularly since publication of God Under Howard by Marion Maddox in 2005. The presence and political intentions of the Christian Right present a number of distinctive challenges. There are constitutional issues surrounding the separation of church and state and debate as to the place of religion in the public sphere. As alluded above, there is also debate as to whether the Christian Right should be considered a political force. All have made a valuable contribution debate and to further understanding the role of

religion, in particular the Christian Right, in Australian politics. However, few of these accounts have come to grips with the political aims and means of the Christian Right and the way in which political impacts can be achieved that are not explicitly evident in election results or particular policy outcomes. Ozzano has investigated various fundamentalist movements and questioned their impact on public policy.\(^\text{28}\) An investigation of the politics of the Christian Right in Australia could usefully contribute to Ozzano’s analysis, particularly given the relationship between the Christian Right in the USA and its counterparts in Australia that we have detailed elsewhere.\(^\text{29}\) Even then, the question still remains as to what kind of politics this produces and how compatible it is with political values that underpin and sustain liberal democracy?

Australian experiences of religion and politics offer some useful insights. Australia is rarely counted among states that are identified as examples of the global resurgence of religion, neither does it feature the kinds of radical religious movements that use violence as part of a political strategy. Indeed, the proposition that Australia is primarily a secular nation-state is not unreasonable\(^\text{30}\), yet there are some curiosities. Demographic studies do suggest a continuing overall trend of declining mainstream church attendance. In a survey conducted by the ABC as part of the Q&A program that pitted Richard Dawkins against Cardinal George Pell, 76% of over 20,000 participants voted that religious belief does not make the world a better place.\(^\text{31}\) Further to this, the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes suggests that churches themselves are among public institutions that are not held in particularly high regard.\(^\text{32}\) It may be that continuing scandal surrounding church (particularly Catholic) failure to protect children from predatory priests has had some impact as Hogan has acknowledged, however, there is no evidence to suggest that this has been decisive.\(^\text{33}\) Despite these results, it is also apparent that 70% of Australians maintain, or at least are willing to acknowledge a nominal affiliation with Christianity.\(^\text{34}\) There is a small, but noted


trend among Australia’s youth of interest in the vibrant worship typified by the Australian Christian Churches (formerly known as Assembly of God), though it is not clear whether attendance or faith will be maintained in the long term. While the deeper significance of these trends remains unclear – given that levels of spirituality and church attendance are hardly coterminous – it does appear that Australians maintain reservations about the role of the church and religious leaders in politics. This is perhaps best reflected in Gleeson’s study of the political strength of the Christian Right in Australia in which she concluded that based on analysis of the abortion debate, suggestions that Australia was falling victim to a politically rampant religious right were over-stated. Indeed, Gleeson notes that despite the efforts of key members of the Australian government and church leaders at the time to re-ignite debate about abortion in Australia, the issue instead seemed to galvanise support for the longstanding consensus supporting pro-choice.

However, a different set of statistics drawn from recent social research adds further detail and provides an indication of the political complexity of religion in the public arena. In April 2012, a number of Australian newspapers featured a story regarding survey results that suggested religious faith was an active and important component of life for a large number of Australians. The research suggested that Australia was more religious, indeed Christian, and more tolerant and accepting of the religious faith of others than would be expected given the commonly held belief that Australia is defined by a secular culture. Coverage of the findings featured in the Courier Mail, Herald Sun, Perth Now, Adelaide Now and News.com at a time when spiritual reflection is already encouraged by the celebration of Easter. Whatever the purpose of media coverage, it would seem that the point of the survey was to address what is described above as a general scepticism of the role religion should have in public policy, perhaps even politics more broadly. Drawing on the survey results, Rev Peter Kurti, Visiting Fellow of the Religion and Free Society Program at conservative think tank the Centre of Independent Studies, argued that these results demonstrate the acceptability of faith in public life and the shrillness of militant secularists’ desire to have religion removed from the public sphere. Based on the survey results the position adopted by Kurti would seem reasonable and media coverage would have

contributed to this end.

The problem, in part is the questionable practices of McCrindle Research who conducted the survey and analysed the data.\textsuperscript{40} There are also questions surrounding the organisation responsible for commissioning the research. Olive Tree Media is an incorporated association and as a charity receives tax concessions. The board of Olive Tree Media is made up of various groups associated with the Christian Right.\textsuperscript{41} For example Karl Faase hosted the Australian Christian Lobby's (ACL) National Marriage Webcast in 2012. He also sits on the Boards of Samaritans Purse and Billy Graham Evangelistic Association (BGEA) whose funders include the Walton Family Foundation, Richard and Helen DeVos Foundation and Orville D. and Ruth A. Merillat Foundation.\textsuperscript{42} Other members of the Samaritans Purse Board include Franklin Graham (also on the Board of BGEA and prominent figure among the USA Christian Right), Wendy Francis (Queensland Director of ACL and Committee member of the Family Association of Queensland) and Robert Greaves (Chairman of Youth for Christ International).\textsuperscript{43} Youth for Christ International is another organisation whose various chapters have received funding from key financiers of the Christian Right in the USA including Lynn and Foster Friess Family Foundation, Dick and Betsy DeVos Foundation, Richard and Helen DeVos Foundation and True Foundation.\textsuperscript{44} This is not to suggest that key conservative philanthropies are directing a campaign to assist the political aspirations of particular religious groups in Australia, but to indicate how particular these religious faiths are. This example also offers some insight into the political/religious networks that exist and the shared interests of the Christian Right in Australia with their counterparts in the USA. That such alliances exist suggests that the dominionist impulse and apocalyptic fantasies that define the Christian Right in the USA may well have some influence on the Christian Right in Australia and so the concerns raised by Hedges equally apply.

Population demographics, electoral trends and the outcomes of particular public policy debates offer limited insight into the significance of Christian Right values for Australia's political culture. Such indicators do not conclusively account for public policy outcomes, which more often than not are determined


\textsuperscript{44} Further details of the network of philanthropic foundations supporting neoconservative and Christian Right groups can be found at http://www.bridgeproject.com
at least in part safely between electoral cycles and not always openly in the public domain. Even the focus on public policy for signs of influence may be fraught given the recently reported assertion by former prime minister Rudd that his replacement by current prime minister Julia Gillard was in part owed to a deal with Christian Right figures Joe de Bruyn and Jim Wallace. There is also no accounting for a long term commitment to act on religious values that seems to typify the Christian Right in Australia as Ozzano notes of the Christian Right in the USA. In this respect, the issue is not whether Christian Right values are influencing public policy, but rather, what would the impact on democratic political culture be if they did. Maddox has argued that the Christian Right (drawing on support networks linked to the Christian Right in the USA) identifies and cultivates wedge issues to gain political traction. This suggests that the attempt to shift public policy on abortion is as much a means to an end as it is a policy goal of the Christian Right. In which case, limited success on this issue will mean attention will shift to other issues or a reframing of the language that the broader public find more persuasive. In the meantime, the aim of having a greater say in the public area and policy debates is achieved as their continued contributions further normalises the presence and consultation of the Christian Right over key issues. If religious values are an intrinsic determinant of political action and faith among the Christian Right is an unwavering belief in biblical truth, then an analysis of events such as elections and particular debates offers little. What is more helpful is an analysis of the values of the Christian Right and the way in which these values shape public debate, especially in terms of the identification of problems for public policy to address and the impact this can have on various communities. This provides insight not only into the relationship between religious values and political action, it also offers a clearer picture of the kind of society the Christian Right are endeavoring to create and which particular interests this may benefit.

**Family Values and Political Engagement**

Developing an understanding of ‘family values’ cherished by the Christian Right is somewhat difficult as it a vague term, perhaps deliberately so. Family values are often listed along other values that are associated with freedom of religion and sanctity of life. Such values are unlikely to generate a great deal

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46 The Canberra Declaration from the Australian Christian Values Institute (another organisation founded by Warwick Marsh) serves as a useful example. As a statement of faith, it associates family values with the idea of the family as a man and woman joined in lifelong union that guarantees children their biological birthright of a mother and father. *The Canberra Declaration* July 23 2010 http://www.canberradeclaration.org.au/the-canberra-declaration/read-the-declaration.html (accessed 31.8.2012). CultureWatch a website maintained by prominent Christian Right member and editor of Australian version of the *Marriage Manifesto* Bill Muehlenberg offers no further clarification or detail.

of controversy, likely owing to the broad appeal each set of values is likely to generate. After-all, there are few that would oppose family values, any more than values associated with the sanctity of life or religious freedom. Space does not permit an examination of the latter two and our focus remains family values even though each set of values has obvious interconnections based on the underlying Christian belief upon which each are based. Our examination of family values as affirmed by the Christian Right involves an analysis of what is conveyed publicly in terms of how problems are defined and what is at stake, for which family values are the answer. The picture that emerges is further enhanced by addressing the deficits in the Christian Right account, specifically what could be said, but is not. As a political project, the campaign for recognition and adoption of family values as the proper platform for public policy is conditioned by the need to disguise much of the religiosity that informs it. Indeed, the rather crude initial attempts to articulate a case for family values at the inaugural National Marriage Forum have given way to a more reasonable, nuanced and subtle defence of the Christian Right position. Such adaptation could be heralded as an outcome of engaged democratic debate in which ongoing public deliberation has shifted the Christian Right to a more reasonable position. Nonetheless, the framework of family values remains, for many, tied to a literal reading of select scripture and an unwavering faith in the inerrancy of the bible as the Word of God and thus absolute truth. The right to practice such dogmatic faith is protected in the Australian Constitution, however, this should not translate into the right to be heard by most political leaders, nor inform public policy.

The inaugural National Marriage Forum (NMF) was the first real attempt to organise a marriage movement in Australia. Under the banner of protecting and preserving family values, the Christian Right gathered in Parliament Hall in July 2004, along with representatives from both the Liberal National Coalition (who formed government at the time) and the Australian Labor Party (ALP). The NMF was designed to have a direct influence on the formulation and passage of legislation aimed at strengthening the legal definition of marriage and the conference was addressed by politicians from the major political parties.\textsuperscript{48} Despite the complexity of problems and pressures facing Australian families, attendees and invited speakers represented a very narrow selection of views.\textsuperscript{49} There was also a clearly demarcated religious narrowness evident in the organisations that organised the NMF that is typical of Christian Right forums. The Australian Christian Lobby (Jim Wallace), the Fatherhood Foundation (Warwick Marsh) and the Australian Family Association (Bill Muehlenberg), forming the National Marriage Coalition, all bear a striking resemblance. The broad values


framework to which each subscribe is generally underpinned by a conservative Christian faith and support for their agenda is commonly derived from but not limited to politically engaged Pentecostal and charismatic churches. For each, preserving family (Christian) values is central to the salvation of society, racked by the scourges of modernity or at least modern ‘isms’ such as secularism and postmodernism. Indeed, same-sex marriage is identified as one of the greatest threats to the ‘traditional family’ that is already under siege from policy reforms such as no-fault divorce, access to abortion and a decline in observance of the traditional roles of parents. It should be noted that according to Porter, there was almost no representation of the mainstream churches.

Campaigns undertaken by these organisations are both designed to and in turn draw on the appearance of broad-based community support. However, closer examination reveals a small network of prominent figures running these organisations through which they appear to wield considerable and largely unaccountable influence. At the same time, the Christian Right seeks to demonise and marginalise those advocating for marriage equality as a strident, but vocal minority. Unlike their USA-based counterparts, there is much less indication to the uninitiated of the religious fervour that underpins their discourse family values. Indeed almost all the organisations are discreet about


54 This type of framing saturates the literature produced by the Christian Right. Typically the broader the target audience, the less explicit is the vitriol. The submission by Warwick Marsh representing the Fatherhood Foundation is a typical example. Marsh Warwick, To the Senate Standing Committee on Marriage, Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Marriage 30. July 2004 http://www.fathersonline.org/resources/30July04%20Marriage%20Submission.doc (accessed 20.12.2010). In contrast, Bill Muehlenberg is much less guarded. Muehlenberg Bill, The End Is Near (Or It Sure Seems That Way) CultureWatch 28.August 2012 http://www.billmuehlenberg.com/2012/08/28/the-end-is-near-or-it-sure-seems-that-way/ (accessed 30.8.2012)
the religious orientation each holds, the one exception being the generically named Australian Christian Lobby, who nonetheless adheres to a particular view about what being Christian means.

The Forum was addressed by senior political figures including former Prime Minister John Howard, former Deputy Prime Minister John Anderson and former ALP shadow Attorney General Nicola Roxon demonstrating the degree to which these interests command bipartisan attention. The principal reason for the NMF was the possible delay in the proposed Marriage Amendment Bill (2004) being passed, particularly as the passage through parliament of its predecessor, the Marriage Legislation Amendment Bill (2004) had met with resistance. The purpose of the Marriage Amendment Bill was to formally define marriage and to ensure same-sex unions were not recognised in Australia, including those performed in a foreign country that did legally sanction such unions, which received bipartisan support. Its predecessor, the Marriage Legislation Amendment Bill (2004) had been opposed by the ALP owing to a provision seeking to prevent same-sex couples from adopting children from overseas countries. It is also worth noting the actions of the then government to hasten the passage of legislation seemingly to pre-empt two applications filed in court to have same-sex couple unions performed under the laws of another country recognised under Australian law and because of heightened concern among the Australian community. A number of parliamentarians supporting the Marriage Amendment Bill spoke of the NMF as evidence of the ‘silent majority’. The ALP supported its passage albeit with reservations. This is contrary to the provisions contained in the Marriage Act (1961) and the spirit that informed it and contrary

55 This continues to be the case. Similar representation of the major political parties was evident at the National Strategic Summit in 2007 and Julia Gillard has continued the trend of serving Prime Ministers meeting with religious leaders at functions organised the Christian Right. See Shanahan Dennis, Julia Gillard Reaches Out To Church Leaders The Australian 5.April 2011 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/julia-gillard-reaches-out-to-christian-leaders/story-fn59niix-1226033650529 (accessed 11.5.2012).
60 Roxon Nicola, House of Representatives, Hansard, 24 June 2004, p. 31460
to the recent opinion of the full bench of the Family Court which stated ‘it would be potentially highly destructive to the institution of marriage for its definition to be frozen at any point of time.’ Such circumstances and the nature of the issues described above would be expected to warrant broad public consultation, however as indicated, this was not the case.

With the above policy issue in mind, speakers addressing the audience attempted to convey the dire circumstances facing Australian society owing to a decline in esteem for the institution of marriage and why it needed to be saved. Only three of the speakers addressing the forum are available from the National Marriage Coalition website. Perhaps the most controversial address was given by Dr. David van Gend (2004), who spoke of the need to protect the integrity of marriage from destructive social trends evident in certain ‘lifestyle choices’. In seeking to affirm the basis for his support for the Marriage Legislation Bill, van Gend argued that ‘every little mammal needs both the warmth and comfort of the mother and the playful rough and tumble and as well as the protection, of the father’. van Gend was insistent that homosexuality not only existed outside the ‘circle of life’, but that as it was a choice, homosexuals were excluding themselves, therefore opposition to same-sex marriage and adoption was not discriminatory. van Gend cited the study of homosexual behaviour by American psychiatrist Dr. Robert Spitzer. Both the study and its conclusions were controversial, in particular the claim that homosexuals can make a choice to maximize heterosexual tendencies while minimizing their unwanted homosexual inclinations. Drawing on the study, van Gend insists that ‘[b]eing gay is more truthfully understood as a deeply ingrained but treatable psychological condition like any other, not an inborn identity’. As a consequence, those determined and dedicated enough to seek proper treatment can become ‘biologically marriagable’ and re-enter the great circle of life.

Bill Muehlenberg (Culture Watch, National Vice President of Australian Family Association and former Research Coordinator for Focus on the Family Australia) spoke of the ‘overwhelming and irrefutable’ evidence that families

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have almost always consisted of a man and a woman joined in matrimony from which children follow, which was now in jeopardy from an intelligentsia bereft of commonsense.\(^6\) In what begins as a scathing attack on both intellectuals and politicians, Muehlenberg’s address to the Forum cites a number of academics, mainly anthropologists, as support for his argument that marriage defined as “mum dad and the kids” is a geographical and historical universal human norm. Muehlenberg states “[i]n virtually every known human culture, the family unit, cemented by marriage, has been the norm. Do not let anyone tell you otherwise.”\(^6\) He goes on to provide a snapshot of supposed findings from social science research. The findings are largely quotes from various academics that includes Robert Lowie, Amitai Etzioni, James Q Wilson, Lewis Terman, Kingsley Davis. Each furnishes Muehlenberg’s speech with some statement affirming the presence and persistence of family and marriage as important institutions. Despite this, Muehlenberg is not clear, nor is any evidence offered in terms of why, how or from whom the idea of marriage or family is under threat. Nevertheless, Muehlenberg concludes by imploring his audience to ‘redouble your efforts to protect marriage. It is too valuable to let go of without a fight’.\(^6\)

Mary Louise Fowler (from the Australian Family Association) impressed upon the audience that they were faced with ‘a defining moment in our nation’s history’ and the need to rally support for the Marriage Amendment Bill, which if not passed threatened to ‘drive a knife deep into the flesh of marriage and family’.\(^6\) Like Muehlenberg, Fowler was emphatic that the very future all that marriage means and represents could “slip from us” if the Marriage Amendment Bill was not passed. Fowler proceeded to explain her convictions by outlining the ‘Principal of Unity’ that essentially means ‘1+1 =1’. She reinforced this principal with an anecdote from a kitchen renovation during which a builder ‘married’ two pieces of wood, making two into one piece. She continued with a description of the virtues and dedication required to make a marriage work and the quasi-religious mysticism of the ‘conjugal act’ – known only to married couples. She finished with a description of the importance of family and the benefits for children of having married parents, because “[m]arriage provides a framework of stability and certainty”.\(^7\) Not unlike Muehlenberg, Fowler offered no indication of how the institution of marriage and the families constituted within it was un-

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\(^{6}\) Ibid.

\(^{6}\) Ibid.

der threat. This did not preclude her from concluding that failure to pass the Marriage Legislation Amendment Bill would ‘divest ‘marriage’ of all meaning, and [would] propel our families further into a tail-spin of destruction’.71

**Problems with the Christian Right Case**

In all three cases, the insistence that without legislative action marriage, families and society as we know it are doomed is reminiscent of the campaign conducted by the Christian Right in the USA, in many cases drawing on the very same documents.72 In much the same way, all three addresses display a cavalier regard for evidence-based argument that typifies much of the Christian Right’s effort to justify their agenda. That is, rather than draw on scripture, the Christian Right camouflages religious objections in social science. In doing so, social science is presented in the same way as their Christian faith – in absolute terms beyond any form of fallibility and yet this is very far from the truth. For example, the study referred to by van Gend was so compromised that in 2012 Robert Spitzer offered an unqualified apology to the gay community for the damage it had caused since.73 In many cases, the quotes used by Muehlenberg are highly questionable. Some quotes are taken out of context so that a particular passage is cited as though the entire body of the original author’s work concurs with Muehlenberg’s very narrow understanding of marriage. For example, he quotes anthropologists such as Bronislaw Malinowski and Robert Lowie to this effect. However, Malinowski’s work on the Tobrianders in some respects indicates only passing similarities with the Western concept of family as described by Muehlenberg. Again, Muehlenberg’s quote from Lowie that denies any historical validity for “sexual communism” ignores a great deal of empirical evidence of tribal culture that embraced many and varied forms of family units – including polygyny and polyandry – for economic, political and demographic reasons quite apart from some notion of deeply spiritual connection as described by Fowler’s ‘conjugal act’. Among some tribes there was no recognition of biological bonds


72  For example The Canberra Declaration was inspired by The Manhattan Declaration (2009) produced by prominent architects of the Christian Right in the USA such as Chuck Colson (Prison Fellowship Ministries; Chuck Colson Center for Christian Worldview), Jim Daly and James Dobson (Focus on the Family), Maggie Gallagher (Institute for Marriage and Public Policy), Robert George (Professor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University), Tony Perkins (Family Research Council) Alan Sears (Alliance Defense Fund, now Alliance Defending Freedom) and Mark Tooley (Institute for Religion and Democracy). For more information on Chuck Colson see Political Correction, Chuck Colson and the Manhattan Declaration 25.November 2009 http://politicalcorrection.org/factcheck/200911250002 (accessed 20.5.2012).

in family or kin formations.\textsuperscript{74} Other academic authorities quoted by Muehlenberg include Lewis Terman, a controversial figure given his interest in eugenics and credited with developing IQ tests (Mitchell, 2000).\textsuperscript{75} Like Muehlenberg, Fowler offers little evidence to support the central concern of her address. The anecdote describing the marriage of two pieces of wood illustrates the significance of marriage, but not why same-sex marriage could not emulate such a union. Indeed, the anecdote offers more support for same-sex union for if two pieces of wood are married to ‘look as one piece of timber’, then each piece would need to look the same to begin with.\textsuperscript{76}

Although none of the speakers specifies Christian marriage, family values are framed in Christian terms. Indeed, both the conjugal act and the circle of life metaphor have religious resonance, yet neither is explicitly Christian. It is worth noting that the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) shows that trends in marriage and divorce rates have been relatively stable over the period from 1996 to 2011\textsuperscript{77}. In fact the number of marriages has slightly increased while the number of divorces has declined slightly. Further ABS data also offers some other interesting trends\textsuperscript{78}. As the average age of couples getting married has increased, the divorce rate has actually declined and the average duration of a marriage before separation has also increased. As the number of registered marriages has increased, the number of marriages involving religious ceremonies has continued to decline and the number of couples cohabiting has also increased. In 2009 and 2010 the number of marriages performed was 120 000 and 121 000 respectively – a record for Australia in a calendar year. This could be compared with 46 300 people living in a same-sex relationship in 2009-10. Such figures tend to suggest a few trends pertinent to the case for marriage presented by the Christian Right. Religion, at least in an organised sense, is of decreasing importance to marriage (and perhaps by inference families) since the appointment of the first civil celebrant in Australia in 1973, yet there remains a strong culture of marriage. Broad trends suggest the majority of Australian families are constituted by registered marriage. Despite the declining role of religion, the advent of no-fault divorce among other reforms, this culture appears to be strengthening if anything. Based on these statistics,

\textsuperscript{74} Lowie Robert, Primitive Society New York, Boni and Liveright, 1925.


there is little evidence of a cataclysmic decline in family stability and given the very small number of same-sex relationships (not all of which desire to marry), it would appear that legalising same-sex marriage would be unlikely to have a dramatic impact on the trends evidenced above. Thus to suggest that the most common form of union in Australia is under threat from either same-sex couples seeking to adopt children overseas or have their relationships legally recognised is a vast over-statement, especially with no evidence.

In the absence of solid or reliable evidence, the apocalyptic rhetoric and dominionist tendencies of the Christian Right in Australia are more apparent. This is not coincidental, as mentioned above given the influence of the Christian Right in the USA. Among the Christian Right in Australia there is a very clear demarcation between good and evil and the constitution of each. Though the context and content can change depending on the circumstances and the audience, it is nonetheless presented in very simple binary terms of absolute right and absolute wrong. At the 2012 marriage panel broadcast on Vision Radio Australia (a Christian network of local stations supported by United Christian Broadcasters), a panel member noted that Australia had moved beyond homophobia. Yet in less public forums, the vehemence of anti-gay feeling is evident. In September 2009 at the Fellowship of the Round Table debate on internet censorship, Jim Wallace Managing Director of the Australian Christian Lobby voiced his opinion of homosexuality when questioned about the moral authority of the church when over 600 clergy have been prosecuted for abuse if children. Wallace almost seemed to suggest that the church was a victim, linking homosexuality to paedophilia and insisting that had the church known the sexual orientation of the clergy involved they would never have been placed in positions of authority. Bill Muehlenberg continues to rage against same-sex marriage on CultureWatch. In the section on ethics, homosexuality is by far the largest category and in one post for example he went as far as agreeing with a comment that religious believers who disagree with same-sex marriage will have electronic chips implanted to ‘re-educate’ or zombify them. As mentioned, the Christian Right maintain such steadfast convictions even when the basis for their case is drawn from supposedly empirical research. As the speakers at the inaugural conference demonstrate, there is no evidence of doubt or circumspection. Yet reports released by the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) indicate that based on currently available studies, there is little to no evidence of systematic detriment to children raised

by same-sex couples.\textsuperscript{82} In fact, the AAP finds that where evidence does suggest detriment to the child, this is more commonly associated with exogenous factors such as the absence of rights and recognition of same-sex relationships rather than some dysfunction intrinsic to the relationship itself. Such findings stand in stark contrast to the efforts of Focus on the Family, American Family Association and the Alliance Defending Freedom to substantially weaken anti-bullying measures being promoted in the USA. The actions of these organisations are prompted by the fear that such measures will successfully combat bullying of LGBT youth.\textsuperscript{83} In essence, the actions of the Christian Right contribute to the social stigma that generates the very dysfunction they misattribute to same-sex families and homosexuality. As J Matt Barber from Liberty Council and Liberty University brazenly argued “Kids who are engaging in homosexual behavior often look inward and know that what they are doing is unnatural, is wrong, is immoral, and so they become depressed and the instances of suicide can rise”.\textsuperscript{84} The selection of guest speakers to address the National Marriage Day Rally also demonstrates the very narrow range of views that punctuate the Christian Right case for family values. Recent speakers have included Allan Carlson and Rebecca Hagelin who are noted members of the Christian Right in the USA.\textsuperscript{85} The speaker invited to address the National Marriage Day rally in 2012 was Don Feder. Although unable to attend (the head of the National Civic Council Peter Westmore addressed the rally instead) Don Feder shares Allan Carlson’s affiliation with the World Congress of Families (WCF) and antipathy to any form of marriage other than that celebrated by the Christian Right. The World Congress of Families (and its parent organisation the Howard Center for Family Religion and Society) has connections to most Christian Right organisations in the USA, including the Americans for the Truth About Homosexuality, Focus on the Family and Family Research Council, Concerned Women of America, Institute of American Values and the Population Research Institute.\textsuperscript{86} Supporters also include the Alliance for Defending Freedom which engages in litigation around the globe in defence of religious liberty from a Christian Right perspective, much like


the Liberty Counsel, and was founded by key Christian Right Leaders. The WCF organises conferences for the purpose of networking and strategising on how to protect ‘the natural human family [a]s established by the Creator and essential to good society’. The influence of the WCF stems less from grassroots support (a recent conference in the Netherlands attracted only 400 supporters), but from their well-connected and established leadership strengthened during the Bush Administration, which granted a number of its membership NGO consultative status at the United Nations. The next congress is to be held in 2013 in Sydney Australia. The organising committee for the Australian congress includes Mary Louise Fowler (Australian Family Association); Ron and Mavis Pirola (Catholic-based Renaissance of Marriage); Trafford Fischer (Seventh Day Adventist Church Department of Family Ministries); Peter Westmore (National Civic Council) and Greg Stone (Universal Peace Federation – Unification Church). Upon a recent visit, WCF managing director Larry Jacobs was greeted by Cardinal Pell and Liberal MP Kevin Andrews.

In 2010, Jacobs endorsed an article written by WCF Communications Director Don Feder. In the article, Feder lambasted a host of right-wing luminaries such as Glen Beck and Ann Coulter for failing to defend families by not opposing gay marriage vociferously enough. In Feder’s words ‘surrender on gay marriage is … surrender on civilisation’ which appears to imply the end of freedom of conscience, free speech and the free exercise of religion and a dramatic increase in social traumas such as ‘illegitimacy, juvenile crime, drug abuse and female-headed households’. Other contributions to the WCF website include a critique of same-sex marriage as symptomatic of larger social problems, the latest in a long line of initiatives that have undermined marriage in the USA. Like Feder, Baskerville (whose position at the Howard Center for Family


91 WCF is among a host of Christian Right organisations that has also promoted the controversial documentary Demographic Winter. The decline of the human family directed by Rick Stout and released by Family First Foundation. The documentary claims large portions of the human race (notably predominantly in the West) are hurtling toward extinction, owing largely to anti-natural family measures/trends such as use of contraception and abortion, cohabitation, divorce and especially same-sex marriage and anti-child cultures all seemingly stemming from a loss of faith. See Feder Don, The Philosophical Roots of Demographic Winter Remarks to The World Congress of Families V August 2009, Amsterdam Netherlands. Feder was the Communications Director and public spokesman for the documentary. No doubt this material would have figured in the speech he would have delivered at the National Marriage Day Rally had he been able to attend. For a critique of the documentary, the theology and the organisations behind it see Joyce Kathryn, Missing: The “Right” Babies The Nation February 14 2008; Joyce Kathryn, The Dead of Winter. The religious war for women’s wombs Search Magazine January/February 2009.
Religion and Society was funded by the conservative philanthropy of the Earhart Foundation) argues that the decline of marriage was strongly associated with the institution of no-fault divorce in the 1970s. No fault divorce has effectively undermined the principal purpose of marriage, that is to establish fatherhood. Since that time, domestic violence and child protection have become state sanctioned growth industries used to subvert the role and position of men, creating a culture of fatherlessness and therefore social instability. In Baskerville’s worldview, parenthood is first and foremost biological, a private realm of adult freedom once protected from an intrusive state but now subject to all manner of interference (much as seat belt laws to tobacco and gun lawsuits to welfare) in the ‘interests of the children’. Baskerville laments ‘[t]oday it is not possible to form a binding agreement to create a family’ and there is nothing to stop biological parents having their children confiscated through no fault of their own and given to groups with political influence. Even if there is any truth to the claims made by the WCF, it represents at best a fringe view in an otherwise broad debate. Yet despite the extremism of views presented or sanctioned by the WCF, the National Marriage Coalition continues to draw its guest speakers from such company and at the same time, continues to attract politicians from across the political spectrum, including Senator Corey Bernardi. Feder and Baskerville typify the fundamental flaw at the centre of the Christian Right case for marriage and family values – family breakdown is viewed as the primary cause of social and psychological dysfunction. While this may be true in cases, establishing a causal relationship is nigh on impossible yet the Christian Right insist all reputable social science research puts this relationship beyond doubt. Therefore, any policy recommendation stemming from the families values framework is fundamentally flawed.


94  Senator Cory Bernardi was recently involved in political controversy over a speech in Federal Parliament against the Marriage Amendment Bill (no. 2) 2012. For a transcript see Bernardi Cory, Bills: Marriage Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2012 Senate Hansard http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlinfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;db=CHAMBER;id=chamber%2Fhansards%2F12b86a2-b8ee-4367-ad53-c5359a072920%2F0198;orderBy=_fragment_number,doc_date_rev;page=0;query=Dataset%3Ahansards,hansards80%20Date%3A18%2F9%2F2012;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 21.9.2012). Those familiar with the discourse of family values signalled by the reference to traditional marriage would not be surprised. Indeed, Chuck Colson argued that in order to stop the ‘homosexual juggernaut’ we need ‘to once again establish that we are not lower than the animal species’. See Colson Chuck, The Love That Won’t Keep Quiet Christian Worldview Journal 23.July 2012 http://www.breakpoint.org/the-center/columns/colson-files/18177-the-love-that-wont-keep-quiet (accessed 13.9. 2012).

Conclusion

It may be that certain religious (and perhaps non) faiths are sympathetic to the definition of marriage and the role it has in stabilising family relationships as envisioned by the Christian Right. Such sympathy may remain despite the absence of empirical research providing support for the claims made by the speakers mentioned above and the Christian Right broadly. This is not to suggest that families subscribing to the values framework of the Christian Right do poorly in comparison to others, but that the evidence suggests they do no better in coping with the trials and tribulations of modern life – at least in Australia.96 The problem is that the Christian Right has, through strategic lobbying, careful planning and from within the federal parliament itself, imposed their particular definition of marriage and family on the rest of society, very few of whom share their beliefs. Such a definition enshrined in public policy is based on the demonization of particular sexualities as predatory pathologies and ‘lifestyles’ as harbingers of civilisational destruction. It is based on or at least is informed by a very narrow understanding of the judeo-christian tradition, yet is justified on the basis of, at best, highly dubious social science. It elevates a very particular family formation as virtuous, while condemning the rest as more likely to create dysfunction and generate social ills. It is also incredibly reductionistic. The Christian Right’s defense of marriage and family values is undertaken on the basis that the institution of marriage is in decline and no longer valued in the way it once was. The reason is a succession of public policy reforms that have weakened the bond of marriage and allowed other family arrangements to multiply. For the Christian Right, the weakening of the institution of marriage is the cause of social breakdown, economic decline, moral deviance and on a grander scale, a gentrifying population, the Global Financial Crisis and the touted rise of neopaganisms such as global warming. To insist on a strengthening of family values and a reinvestment in marriage as defined by the Christian Right as the solution to so many problems is an incredible act of faith, one that should have little appeal to policy makers. On this basis alone there is little justification for the attendance of so many political leaders in any official capacity at gatherings organised by the Christian Right.

The intersection of religion and politics as either contested or complimentary discourses is the identifiable problem. Political action based on values of compassion, tolerance and pluralism is the key, whether those values derive from religious belief or secular humanism is not of critical interest. Many values that we have addressed in this paper are shared by both discursive communities, yet there are clearly defined groups determined to shape public policy through political strategies under the guise of the common good or public interest. Our concern is how specific groups manipulate and generate normative frames for

policy based on the assumption that there exists widespread public support. In the paper we have shown how campaigns undertaken by certain organisations are both designed to, and in turn, draw on the appearance of broad-based community support. The politics of public interest is nowhere more clearly on display. Closer examination reveals a small network of prominent figures running these organisations through which they appear to wield considerable and largely unaccountable influence. In a democracy supposedly based on enlightened secular humanist ideals and values, the prospect of such a politics is profoundly disturbing.

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Маркус Смит и Питер Марден

ПОЛИТИКА, ПОЛИТИКЕ И ВЕРА.
ХРИШЋАНСКА ДЕСНИЦА У АУСТРАЛИЈИ

Резиме
У овом раду ми нудимо критичку оцену политике хришћанске деснице и питамо се до којег степени су религиозне вредности хришћанске деснице компатабилне са демократском политичком културом. Ако су религиозне вредности једнаке политичким онда је раздвајање религиозних вредности од политичке акције лоша пракса, и број питања расте. Политичка акција инспирисана са религиозним уверењима неће спречити критичко опхођење према основним вредностима, или што је још битније, њихов утицај на јавну дебату или јавне политике. Ако су религиозне вредности стварно политичке вредности, да ли онда слобода вероисповести привилегује верски засноване форме политике у односу на секуларне? И ако да, са којим циљем? Ми сматрамо да је једна нијансинирана анализа укрштања религије и политике потребна да би се осигурало да јавне политике не буду третиране како посебне форме религиозног активизма који показује тоталитарне тенденције. На крају, пажња мора бити усмерена на посебне политике и њене представнике као и агенду према којој теже са мало одговорности и транспарентности, упркос тврдњама да представљају јавни интерес. Ово ће бити допринос овог рада.

Кључне речи: хришћанска десница, јавне политике, демократија, политичке вредности

Примљен: 17.03.2012.
Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between religious and political involvement in members of Catholic associations today in the northern Italian Region of Lombardy, which in last decades appeared to anticipate Italian political changes. Right through history religion has been intensely politicized in Italy, with religious associations always playing a prominent social/political role. This study draws on material from an original survey to focus on the associations themselves and their membership in order to flesh out their character and political orientation. It will then go on to use its findings to test the consistency of a hypothesis presuming a growing internal heterogeneity in electoral behaviour.

Key words: electoral behaviour, religious associations, Italian politics, Lombardy

Falls in church attendance and upholding religious values

Religion in Italy has always been highly politicized, and the party system in the First Republic was in fact built up with explicit references to the existing religious cleavage. The network of religious associations was an important political actor with a high capacity for mobilization, in a role which is becoming increasingly incisive in the changing Italy of today (and abroad - see for instance Jevtic 2002, 2007 and 2011 on the relationships between religion and politics). Even though some scholars focused on religious associations political orientation (e.g. Marzano 1997; Contin 1992; Rusconi and Saraceno 1970), there is a lack of extensive quantitative studies on the electoral preferences

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1 E-Mail: alberta.giorgi@gmail.com
2 The paper is based on a research project carried out in 2006 by PolisLombardia (University of Milan-Bicocca). It included a survey addressed to active association members in Lombardy and a telephone survey addressed to Lombardy population (funded by Coordinamento regionale dei Centri Servizi per il Volontariato della Lombardia). The research design followed on from a previous research (1992), made by IREF (Istituto di Ricerche Educative e Formative).
of religious associations members. Moreover, the social basis of the parties is now dwindling, and Catholicism itself is becoming a political instrument of unification based on values, so much so that both political debates and the literature often treat the Catholic vote as one. Lombardy is considered as a forerunner of Italian political trends (Biorcio 2001): basing on original survey data, this paper offers an overview of the growing electoral heterogeneity of religious associations, in order to argue for further investigation.

Quite a few studies highlight a falling level of worship all over Europe, with the rate of churchgoers progressively declining since the fifties (Inglehart and Norris 2004). Secularization theorists maintain in fact that there is an irreversible decline of religion in the European societies of today, and offer empirical evidence of the general decrease in worship as well as behaviour patterns distancing from religious morality (see Beckford and Demerath III 2007). Other scholars argue that contemporary religions cannot be reduced to traditional forms of worship alone, and underline that a spiritual dimension has been gaining strength in the last few decades (Hervieu-Léger 1999; Dobbelaere 1999; Wuthnow 1998; Davie 1994; for Italy, see Garelli, Guizzardi & Pace 2003). Indeed, they take into consideration the increase in non-regular churchgoers and other indicators of religiosity, plus the changing role of religion in contemporary societies as indirect indicators of a growing spiritual dimension. In the literature, these phenomena are known collectively as forms of non-traditional faith (see Hervieu-Léger 1999), a category that includes those who judge religion important in everyday life and uphold religious values and involvement. At the same time, they do not perceive church and clergy as the only intermediaries with the sacred, but promote a more individualized relation with religion. All in all, it appears that although traditional indicators of religiosity record a decline, religion still plays an important role at both individual and public levels.

From a secularization perspective, scholars analyze the consistency of the ‘religious cleavage’ in contemporary European society and explore whether religious attitudes can still be considered indicators of political orientations (see Knutsen 2004). In some countries a direct relation emerges, while others reveal a more complex situation (Olson 2007). As is well known, the political opportunity structure influences the relations between religiosity and electoral behaviour.

In Italy Catholic church attendance and the vote proved to be closely linked, allowing predictions on electoral behaviours based on worship, during the First Republic 1948-1992 (see Ceccarini and Diamanti 2007; Segatti 1999).

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3 Scholars have been increasingly questioning the role of religion in pre-modern societies as it is traditionally framed, criticising, for example, the idea of an “Age of faith” as a myth (see for instance Ellison and Sherkat, 1999). Given the complex and multidimensional nature of the secularization debate, we shall be discussing here only the aspects related to the individual dimension of faith.
After the collapse of the Christian Democrats, who had always won the majority of regular churchgoers’ preferences, the link was more tenuous. Churchgoers’ votes were dispersed (Biorcio et al. 2008; Maraffi 2007; Segatti and Brunelli 2010) and since then, no matter their efforts no political party has yet been able to unify the diaspora (as scholars define it, see Marzano 1997). In spite of the differences in electoral behaviour and church going, however, Catholics have a common attitude towards values and ethical issues, which sometimes turns into a unified political orientation, especially when mobilized by political leaders (Biorcio et al. 2008; Segatti and Vezzoni 2008).

What now follows is a brief description of trends in church attendance and commitment to civic/religious associations in Italy, which will then lead on to a portrait of active members of religious associations and an inquiry into the interconnections between political and religious attitudes, in order to test the hypothesis of a growing internal heterogeneity in the electoral behaviour of religious associations members.

**The slight fall in worship in Italy**

Since the fifties, there has been in Italy a gradual drop in regular (at least once a week) church attendance (Biorcio et al. 2008; Pisati 2000). At the same time, there has been an increase in both non-regular churchgoing and non-attendance. Between 1993 and 2007, regular churchgoing fell from 39 to 34 per cent, whereas non-attendance went up from 14 to 19 per cent (data Istat-Multiscopo; the figures refer to Catholicism, the most widespread religious group in Italy). While in other European countries the number of non-regular churchgoers is on the increase, the figure remains steady in Italy, and the rate of regular churchgoers is still one of the highest in Europe. According to the European Value Survey, at the end of the twentieth century only Slovakia, Poland and Ireland had higher regular church-going rates. These figures suggest that in Italy Catholics have a traditional attitude towards worship (the so-called religion-within-the-Church behaviour, see Cipriani 2003), and that individualized forms of believing as *bricolage* or *religion à la carte* (Hervieu-Léger 1999; Wuthnow 1998) are less present than elsewhere in Europe. Traditional religion has indeed deep roots in Italy, to the point of helping shape the culture. It is indeed very widespread, and reaches down into popular culture (Cipriani 1986 and 2003). Some forms of popular religiosity are still alive and common, indeed, especially in the southern regions (Nesti 2006). At the same time, there are charismatic movements and calls to Catholic awakening both as hybridizations within the traditional clergy, and as autonomous groups developing close to the Catholic church (Marzano 2009; Martelli 1990). However, local level trends of church attendance show several conspicuous differences (see Diotallevi 1999).
The graph shows the 1997-2007 trends for regular Church attendance in Italy by macro-regions. As it can be seen, at a national level regular worship is slightly but steadily on the wane. Among the macro-regions (Southern Italy, the Centre, North-East, North-West and Islands), regular attendance deviates up to 7 per cent from the national average. This is the case of both Southern and Central Italy, which record a 14 per cent difference. In the former, the regular Church-attendance rate is higher than the national average, despite being on the decline. In the Centre (the line at the bottom), where Communist party was deeply rooted, the regular church going rate is the lowest, and further declining – faster than elsewhere. The case of the North-East is quite different. A heterogeneous area, composed of regions featuring a dense Catholic network, it also includes Emilia Romagna, where the Communist party used to obtain a very high electoral consensus. The high rate of regular church attendance recorded at the end of the nineties fell under the national average in the time span of a decade. Indeed, between 1997 and 2007 the regular church going rate fell by as much as 9 per cent. Differently, the North-West reports a slight decrease until 2003, followed by a steady growth of regular church-going, and in Lombardy alone, signals a potential inversion of the declining trend. Thus, the national average conceals several differences, with decreasing and increasing trends of regular church-going in the various regions.

There is no difference either in the composition of church-attenders. Research carried out since the fifties in various territories records no change in who goes to church. The highest rate of regular attendance is among women, the very young and the over 65’s. Those who belong to the lowest or highest income/education levels are more likely to be regular church-goers than those with medium-incomes and medium-education (Martelli, 1990: 325). The 1997
and 2007 Istat-Multiscopo data record no noteworthy variation in the composition of congregations.

It can be concluded, therefore, that between 1997 and 2007 regular church-attendance in Italy shows a slight but steady decline, with no changes in the composition of worshippers. There are some differences however in the macro-regions: on the whole, regular church-attendance is on the wane in Italy, apart from the North-West, where there is some evidence of an increase.

The relation between religion and civic engagement

Between 1997 and 2007 the Italian population involved in civic associations was stable in number. As indicated in international literature (De Graaf & Ruiter 2006; Lam 2002; Becker & Dhingra 2001; Wilson & Janoski 1995), regular churchgoers showed a high rate of participation, and were mainly involved in volunteering associations. Indeed, in both 1997 and 2007 this was their most popular choice. Though having a high rate of multiple affiliation, fewer opted for associations dealing with culture, leisure or environment, peace and rights.

Religion-based volunteer groups are mainly confessional (that is, they are formally connected with the church structure). On the increase since the seventies, they have been gaining in importance over the last few decades (see also Martelli 1990). Indeed, in the late eighties a radical reform of the welfare system took place, giving a new role for a wide range of non-profit organisations, which have been gradually included into the welfare state (devolution, cfr. Gori 2005). The Italian state is, in fact, traditionally weak in the area of civil society, its role taken over by many volunteer associations furnishing social services and leisure activities.

The relation between church going and civic involvement is in fact very important. Confessional organisations were reorganized back in the 1920s, when Pope Pio XI gave a formal structure to a wide range of religious organisations, and focused particularly on the pivotal role of Catholic Action (Verucci 1999). The organisations later diversified, forming a wide range with radical differences in terms of devotional practices and activities (Diotallevi 2002, Favale 1991). This dense and widespread network of associations, organized in terms of age (the Catholic Action), jobs (the Catholic Unions), or committed to specific fields of action (poverty, drink/drugs or immigration, etc), was originally seen as an important point of reference for collective action and building community ties.

As mentioned, the Catholic network was a political resource for the Christian Democrats during the First Republic, even if their relations were always full of tensions and deceptions on both sides (Contin 1992; Scoppola 2006; Marzano 1997). It was an instrument on the one hand for getting votes, on the other for socialising, with leaders moving frequently between associations and the party. Within Catholic civic involvement associations there has always
been a high degree of internal differences. It can be seen particularly in the
mobilisations of the sixties and the Vatican Council II (1962-1965), which made
deep changes to the Catholic world, partly fostering a modernisation of reli-
gious practices and culture. Vatican Council II started off a process of renewal
within Catholicism concerning clergy involvement within society, the every-
day life of believers and the status of the laity. The consequences were soon to
be seen in Catholic associations, as for example in lay involvement in religious
activities and organisations (Garelli 2006).

Among Catholic associations, political cleavages emerged more sharply
and gave birth to different kinds of spiritual, social and political engagement
(Favale 1991; Marzano 1997; Rusconi and Saraceno 1970). Highly politicised
religious groups, more or less connected to the Marxist cultural milieu, sprang
up and promoted a renewal of Christian practices and culture, lead by clergy
sometimes in open conflict with the church itself (Tosi and Vitale 2009). At
the same time informal communities and new confessional movements were
started off, like Communion and Liberation, Opus Dei, the Focolare Movement
and the Neocatechumenal Way.

The political orientation of the Catholic Church and its forms of action in
modern society were at times put into doubt. Nevertheless, though the years
passed, voting for the Christian Democrats was not seriously questioned until
their 1992 collapse (Ceccarini and Diamanti 2007; Maraffi 2007). In the Second
Republic, Catholicism has revealed a wide range of less easily traceable atti-
tudes to the political changes.

Catholic commitment within Italian society takes the following forms: spir-
Itual groups and movements; associations addressing specific social groups or
focused on specific activities; political-religious groups; volunteer work. Most
of these groups have some connection with the clergy, even when they are for-
mally autonomous. But they have huge differences in terms of practices and
aims (Favale 1991; Marzano 2008; Garelli 2006). Some, like the outgoing Com-
munion and Liberation, whose heartland lies in Lombardy, promote a religious
community life embracing the spiritual and emotional, private and professional.
More inward-looking groups, such as Catholic Action, are focused on a spiritual
dimension. Finally, it is important to underline that at the local level priests play
an important role in shaping parishes activities, either focusing on traditional
church services or acting as reference points for religious groups and promoting
civic engagement. A recent research points out territorial differences. While on
the whole priests are especially concerned with families and the problems of the
young, in the North-West they promote an ‘environment parish style’, reaching
beyond the boundaries of their parishes (Bressan 2003), in a pastoral style which
affects the civic commitment of their congregations (Becker and Dhingra 2001).

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4 Garelli (1991) and Marzano (1996) number nine areas of catholic groups/movements, while Pace (1988) accounts for four.
Because of the widespread and historically important network of religious-based associations, the present research looked into the relation between religion and civic engagement. It employed a logistic regression model in order to estimate the net causal effect of Church attendance. As controlling variables, socio-demographic variables that can affect both Church attendance and civic engagement were included. Namely, it was hypothesised that older women of a lower education level living in the South would be associated positively with Church attendance and negatively with civic engagement. A logistic regression model was then examined that included civic engagement as a dependent variable, religious attendance as an independent variable and socio-demographic variables as controls. The model estimated that in both 1997 and 2007 the odds of being involved in a civic association are significantly higher with churchgoers than non churchgoers. Furthermore, with regard to age, sex, education and origins, regular churchgoers are more likely to be involved in volunteer associations than in leisure, cultural, or ‘peace, ecology and rights’ associations, in line with international studies (De Graaf and Ruiter 2010 and 2006; Lam 2002; Becker and Dhingra 2001; Wuthnow 1998; Wilson and Janoski 1995).

Church attendance is therefore generally associated quite strongly and positively with high rates of civic engagement, especially in the area of volunteering. The research then wondered whether this relation produces specific profiles within civic associations, especially in Lombardy, given the increase in regular church attendance in the last few years. The next paragraph will consequently deal with the role of religion and religion-based organisations in civic engagement in Lombardy.

Religion-based organisations in Lombardy: differences from other associations

Lombardy records the highest rate of regular church attendance in the North, not far off those reported for the southern regions, which have a reputation for being highly religious. In 2007 it stood at 38 per cent and in the whole of Italy only Campania (45), Puglia (42), Molise (40) and Sicilia (39) recorded higher rates (data Istat-Multiscopo). Lombardy stands out for the way its decline in church-going is lower than elsewhere.

In order to analyse the forms of civic engagement in Lombardy, this paragraph will focus on original data collected in 2009 through a telephone survey (1519 calls to Lombard residents), aimed at highlighting the differences between those involved in civic engagement and non participants. In Lombardy, in 2009, almost the half of the population was involved in some way.

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5 Multinomial regression model.
With its long tradition in Lombardy, civic engagement has created a dense network, and now records a higher rate of participation than elsewhere in Italy (Biorcio 2001). Between 1997 and 2007 the rate was stable, while political involvement was on the wane. This points to a loss of interest in the political sphere as area of commitment, but not in civic engagement. Furthermore, in the last few years volunteer associations have been growing in number, especially in the field of solidarity, where religion-based associations are mainly present (La Valle 2006 and 2004) with key-roles (Gori 2005). Lombard civic associations have been always known for their pragmatism and market-oriented attitudes (Biorcio 2001). For instance, the networks of Compagnia delle Opere or Communion and Liberation promote a Catholicism that is heedful of economic and business interests.

During the last few years several differences have emerged especially because of the introduction of the subsidiary-system. In allowing associations to play a more important role in the welfare system and to be funded for services provided, competitive processes for resources have been triggered, as has happened in radically diverse welfare systems where competition is present (Scheitle 2009; Marwell 2004). Religious associations have consequently been affected by a huge change in their role and activities, without having a solid coordination or the old backing of the DC. Whatever their difficulties, their role is growing within the context of Lombard public life and civil society.

The involvement of Lombard inhabitants in religious civic engagement is quite high: 25 per cent, with 8 per cent participating in religious associations alone. For ‘religious associations’ we mean both church-related associations, and formal/informal groups with religion-inspired concerns. Civic engagement of a religious nature is clearly the most popular form in Lombardy.

A profile of participants: attitudes and composition

The rate of regular church-goers taking part in religious associations is quite high (70 per cent), more than the triple the rate in secular ones (22), and more than double the rate of those not belonging to any associations (29). The rate of regular church-attendance is 70 per cent among those involved

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Tab. 1 Civic engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic Engagement</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non participants</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in religious associations</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in secular associations</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in both religious and secular associations</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in both religious and secular associations. Belonging either exclusively to religious associations or to both religious and secular organisations, is therefore a key indicator of the kind of religious practice in civic engagement groups. Those taking part in religious associations alone are recorded as having the same church attendance rate as those belonging to both religious and secular organisations.\(^6\)

**Tab. 2 Religion and civic engagement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Involvement in both</th>
<th>Involvement in religious associations</th>
<th>Involvement in secular associations</th>
<th>Never or hardly ever</th>
<th>A few times in a year</th>
<th>About once a month</th>
<th>Almost every week</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tot. N (N: 1520)</td>
<td>(N: 255); 100</td>
<td>(N: 129); 100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non participants</td>
<td>Inv. in secular associations</td>
<td>Inv. in religious associations</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot./N N: 851; 100</td>
<td>N: 285; 100</td>
<td>N: 851; 100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Polis Lombardia/CSV (2009).*

With regard to the socio-demographic composition of members, there are more females than males in religious associations, with men being more involved in other kinds of groups. The elderly, who have a lower participation rate than other age groups, are mainly involved in religious associations. In contrast, the young (18-25), who are more likely to be involved in civic engagement, take part less in religious associations and are mostly likely to belong to secular groups. 30 to 44 year-olds are over-represented in religious associations. On the whole, people with a lower education level are over-represented among non participants or participants in only religious groups. On the contrary, those who have a high or medium level of education are more likely to belong to secular associations or both religious *and* secular associations. It follows that while religious associations mainly consist of elderly women with a low level of education, most members of secular associations are well educated youngsters.

The research then asked whether the socio-demographic differences signal differences in opinions or behaviour patterns, in order to assert whether the religious associations are different from other forms of civic engagement or whether the main differences should be traced out between those involved and those not involved.

According to some scholars, believers' opinions may converge towards some key ethical questions, such as medically assisted procreation, euthanasia (or abortion). Such convergences could, indeed, be manipulated by politicians (Ceccarini and Diamanti 2007; Maraffi 2007), who presume a convergence exists between regular church attendance, values and political preferences and

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\(^6\) The phenomenon is consistent with spillover effect: regular churchgoers have a higher probability of being involved in both religious and secular civic associations than non churchgoers (De Graaf e Ruit, 2006).
use this to try to win votes. Indeed, church attendance apart, recent data show that values and the importance attributed to religion and belief in the church do affect political preferences (Biorcio et al. 2008).

At this point in the research, we felt it opportune to consider the attitudes of the Lombard population towards some actions openly and famously condemned by the Church, such as divorce and abortion to see what differences exist between members of religious and secular associations.

Tab. 3 Values and behaviours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Admissibility of abortion (for self or partner)</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Under special circumstances</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Tot.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non Participants</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement only in secular associations</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement only in religious associations</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in both religious and secular associations</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The attitudes of non participants do not diverge from the average: the majority of interviewees accept abortion in special circumstances. Fewer accept abortion than divorce, which is socially deemed more acceptable.

Those involved exclusively in religious associations are more hostile than both those involved only in non religious associations and non participants. 49 per cent of Catholic association members reject abortion under any circumstances, 26 per cent higher than the average. Participants belonging only to secular organisations think quite differently: their acceptance of abortion is higher than the regional average. Those involved in both religious and secular associations have a similar attitude to that of religious association members: on the whole, they are against it.

In terms of attitudes and actions, the profile of religious association members is quite different from those involved in other areas of civic engagement and the non involved. The attitudes and actions of the church goers involved in civic associations are different from those of uninvolved churchgoers.

As regards more general topics, such as politics or public responsibility, religious associations members have their own orientations.
On the whole, the profile of religious association members is similar to that of non participants, but very different from the profile of secular association members. Both religious association members and not participants have high levels of agreement over the statements about safety and family responsibility. Public responsibility seems to be defined in this case as ‘community responsibility’, namely, towards the private sphere. In the same way, those who are involved only in religious associations mostly maintain that immigrants can be a danger for the nation’s identity (which is evidently considered quite important). Collective responsibilities and civic commitment thus, have a ‘proximity’ character. On the contrary, secular association members are generally more confident, prefer public to community commitment, and do not agree that immigrants can be a danger for the nation’s identity. On the whole, this category prioritizes public responsibility towards society in general over the family and the private community.

In the analysis of the relations between civic engagement and collective responsibility, there emerges a need to consider the culture and style of associations. Group structure affects the relations between members and society: but the kind of influence can be in fact radically diverse (Lichterman 2006; Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003). Moreover, studies focusing on the relations between religious and civic participation underline that the desire for commitment is strictly connected to religious belief, that is, to the role assigned to civic commitment within the faith (Wilson and Janoski 1995). More in general, dimensions of religiosity (worship, prayer, beliefs and values) have different effects on attitudes towards civic engagement (Lam 2002).

Defining values as Catholic or more generally as religious is not an easy undertaking. Some scholars maintain that in Italy, as elsewhere in Europe, the secularization process has given rise to a more individual attitude towards religion, so that the sense of belonging to a religious denomination would have little influence on individual behaviour (Pace 2003). Others define this process as a more general change that affects religions on the whole. Faced by the deep changes in contemporary societies, religious leaders have been softening the elements of

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**Tab.4 Attitudes towards general topics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non participants</th>
<th>Involvement in secular associations</th>
<th>Involvement in religious associations</th>
<th>Involvement in both religious and secular associations</th>
<th>Tot.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Priority of responsibility towards family</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants are dangerous for national identity</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better safe than sorry</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people can be trusted</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Polis Lombardia/CSV (2009).*
doctrine related to specific religious duties and enforcing their support of more general and shared values. Like other institutions, the Catholic Church too is affected by a deep transformation of the forms of authority (Lagroye 2006; Martelli 1990). Therefore while the Church preserves its authority and assumes the role of guardian of values, its declarations indicate moral orientation rather than duty or obligation (Davie 2004). Moreover, in the analysis of the role of religion in Italy today, it must never be forgotten how Italian politics were transformed radically in the nineties, when the collapse of the Christian Democrats broke up the political horizon of many Catholics and set off a general re-configuration of the networks of religious associations.

The differences in values to be found in civic engagement emerge as being linked to more general transformations concerning both the roles of religion and politics.

**Attitudes towards politics**

The differences between participants in religious and secular associations are even more evident when considering their attitudes towards politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tab.5 Political self-positioning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in secular associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in religious associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in both religious and secular associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Polis Lombardia/CSV (2009).*

The first important result is the political distance between religious associations and other civic engagement groups, while the political orientation of non participants is consistent with the regional average. Thus, left and centre-left are over-represented in the participants of secular associations, and, quite symmetrically, centre, centre-right and right record lower percentages. On the contrary, the centre, the centre-right, and the right are over-represented in religious associations. Members of both religious and secular associations have a preference for the centre (including centre-right and centre-left). Therefore, religion-based groups seem to be right (and centre-right) oriented, whereas secular associations side with the left (and centre-left). With those involved in civic engagement, on the whole, the rate of non answering is lower than the average, which
can mean that the civic engagement, and therefore the assumption of some collective responsibility, can make political choices easier.

However, these are general data, related to the majority of religious association members. To in-depth the profile of participants and the differences between civic engagement groups and explore differences in the Catholic world, the next paragraph will focus on active members of Lombard associations.

**Activists and the religious sphere: different profiles**

The research sample focuses on some areas of civic engagement, not on the whole sphere. The sample-building process depended on a comparative rationale. It included 172 formal and informal associations and 1,064 surveys of professional and volunteer activists. The research design also included for each association a specific group survey aiming at collecting relevant data (such as the number of members, the year of foundation, the network). The associations sampled included both church-related and independent religious associations: the groups sampled were classified as religious or secular because of their confessional character or because of the explicit reference to religion in their statutes/presentations.

The sample included 29 per cent religious associations, which had mostly developed in the parishes, either informally or as local centres of a national confessional organisation like ACLI (the Italian Association of Catholic Workers), either promoted by the clergy or founded by groups of church attenders. The activities are mainly at local level (parishes, neighbourhood, city), even if there is also evidence of associations operating at a national/international level (like AGESCI – the Scout organisation - and PIME – the Pontifical Institute for foreign missions).

Religious associations aim on the whole to spread and intensify education, social solidarity, relief for the needy, the defence of life and an international cooperation. Secular associations have partially different objectives with their emphasis on the defence of rights and wider focus (peace, alternative economies...). Furthermore, religious associations sampled are not involved in political activities, like presenting petitions or staging protest campaigns, but are very engaged in activities of informing and enlightening, even though their main group activity is described as providing services. Because of their local activities, religious associations have contact with city councils, but only a few have wider networks reaching other levels of public administration. This is in line with the findings of international analyses, which suggest a growing importance of the local level of politics (see Scheitle 2009; Marwell 2004). As for relations with other groups, religious associations seem to be divided into two areas: the first deploys a dense network of relations with other groups all over the country, whereas the second works with looser relations (Colozzi and Martelli, 1988, defined the configuration of the networks between religious associations as an archipelago).
the whole, almost all Catholic associations are affiliated to a network of relations, at least with the local parish. At a national level, there are networks of formal confessional organisations (like AGESCI and ACLI). Other regional or national networks are the Families Forum, or the network focused on the defence of life (like the Life Movement, against abortion, or the Life and Science Committee – against medically assisted procreation). Some associations are affiliated to the Third Sector Forum, others are involved in the Peace Movement. None of the religious associations here sampled have explicit links or connections with political parties. The networks listed are very different from one another, either in their political orientation or in the kind of activities they promote.

Even though the leaders of the religious associations do not orient members, the question arose in our research whether there are differences within this archipelago, or alternatively the participants share a specific civic culture. Among the interviewees there is a balance in terms of religious participation. The rate of non church goers involved in civic associations (40 per cent) is close to the rate of weekly church-goers (39 per cent). The others are non regular church-goers (with some internal differences). On the whole, the sample is divided into regular church-goers and non church-goers, whereas the rate of non traditional religiosity is lower (this is consistent with international studies, see Lam 2002).

The composition of religious associations

Religious associations mainly consist of regular church-goers (76 per cent), while the rate of non church-goers is very low (7). On the contrary, secular associations have a certain rate of regular (22) and non regular church-goers (26), even though they are mostly composed of non church-goers (52). There is a quota of regular churchgoers involved in secular groups (spillover effect), concentrating on care giving, family support and fair trading.

A typology of members on the basis of church attendance and field of civic engagement was then constructed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activists</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Numb.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular churchgoers in secular associations</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular churchgoers in religious associations</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-regular churchgoers in secular associations</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-regular churchgoers in religious associations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-churchgoers in secular associations</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-churchgoers in religious associations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PolisLombardia Activists Survey (2007/8)
As can be seen, there is a clear link between religious practice and civic engagement: among members, 22 per cent are regular churchgoers involved in religious associations, and 37 per cent are non churchgoers involved in secular associations. Regular churchgoers also participate in secular associations (16 per cent), while non churchgoers rarely join religious groups. This suggests that religious associations are quite homogeneous in terms of members. As for gender and education, the composition is quite balanced, except for non regular churchgoers involved in religious associations. In this case, male participation is double the female one, which means that women involved in religious associations are mainly regular churchgoers. On the contrary, men are involved in religious associations even when they are not regular churchgoers. In line with the findings of the literature, members of religious associations are mainly recruited by relatives or parish members, while members of secular associations are recruited by friends (Wuthnow 1998).

The definition of a group’s main activity is quite different in the various categories. On the whole, activists mostly define their associations as volunteering. Regular church-goers belonging to religious associations also underline the social engagement aspect of what they do. Those who are involved in secular associations, especially non churchgoers, define their activity more as political or civic engagement. Finally, non regular churchgoers, either involved in religious or secular associations, highlight the aspect of service and social solidarity. For regular church-goers affiliated to religious associations, the most important reason for their engagement is seen as the chance to help others. Civic engagement is mainly perceived as solidarity, as in the teachings of Social Catholicism (Ambrosini 2005; Becker and Dhingra 2005; Wuthnow 1998). Non regular churchgoers express a more general desire for friendship and human contact, while the non churchgoers focus on social, political and public engagement. The religious and secular give quite different reasons for choosing civic engagement.

Activist attitudes towards politics

The analysis of civic engagement in Lombardy shows some differences between religious and secular associations, especially in terms of political attitudes and actions.

| Tab. 7 Interest in Politics |
|-----------------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                             | High interest   | Low/No interest |
| Non-participants            | 32              | 68              | 100             |
| Involvement in religious associations | 19 | 81 | 100 |
| Involvement in secular associations | 40 | 60 | 100 |
| Involvement in both religious and secular associations | 32 | 68 | 100 |
| Total                       | 32              | 68              | 100             |

While non participants have a low interest in politics, in line with the average, there are some differences between religious and secular associations. In the latter interest in politics is 8 per cent higher than the average, while in the former non interest is 13 per cent higher than the regional average. Political activities, like taking part in marches and political meetings, signing referenda or demands for the law to be changed, involvement in local political activities and political debates or joining political parties, have different degrees of participation. While with members of secular associations interest in politics goes hand in hand with political activity, participants in religious associations have a lower degree of political activity. Therefore, political and the civic engagement have different meanings for different participants. Religious associations focus specially on care giving in a pragmatic way and their members see themselves as distant from party politics (see also Ambrosini 2005).

A question that arose from the research was whether religious associations could be considered specific areas, different from other civic associations, or whether there are internal differences. It is an important question, especially for analyzing the effects of the Christian Democrats collapse on the relations between politics and Catholic associations.

When considering association members’ attitudes towards actions explicitly condemned by the church, the differences between churchgoers and non churchgoers become more evident. The sample does not allow any generalizations, but it can offer some suggestions. Regular churchgoers are more likely to be against homosexuality\(^7\), divorce and abortion, while the non regular churchgoers are more liberal. As regards abortion, the rate of non admissibility with regular churchgoers is 74 per cent and the rate of those who consider abortion always admissible is only 9 per cent. On the contrary, with non churchgoers, the rate of admissibility is 67 per cent.

A typology of churchgoers was built on the basis of church going and accepting abortion: CERB (Civic Engagement, Religiosity and Beliefs)\(^8\).

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7 For a discussion on religion and homosexuality see Hunt 2010.

8 Wilson & Janoski (1995) show that in the same religious tradition (they consider Protestantism) differences between conservative/libertarian views are linked to civic engagement in terms of both choice of commitment and the kind of associations.
Alberta Giorgi: RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS IN LOMBARDY: VALUES AND POLITICAL CHOICES • (pp333-357)

Tab. 8 C.E.R.B. (Civic Engagement, Religiosity and Beliefs)\(^9\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Practice</th>
<th>Regular churchgoers</th>
<th>Non regular churchgoers</th>
<th>Non churchgoers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admissibility of abortion</td>
<td>Traditional 34% (N: 339)</td>
<td>Non traditional conservatives 12% (N:122)</td>
<td>Conservative 11% (N: 105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admissibility of abortion</td>
<td>liberal 4% (N: 44)</td>
<td>Non traditional liberals 9% (N: 85)</td>
<td>Liberal 30% (N: 293)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PolisLombardia Activists Survey (2007/8)

The majority in the sample are traditional churchgoers, who attend church on a weekly basis and have values and attitudes in line with the teaching of the Catholic Church. The area of liberal churchgoers covers the few who attend church services regularly without sharing the Church’s condemnation of abortion. A high percentage of non churchgoers consider abortion admissible (liberal non churchgoers), while the percentage of conservative non churchgoers is lower. The area of non traditional religiosity is mainly composed of non traditional conservatives, who condemn abortion and a small percentage of non traditional liberals.

Religious associations are mainly composed of traditional churchgoers, while non religious associations consist of liberal non churchgoers. Going into depth, and considering the distance from the average, we see that conservatives (against abortion) prefer to join religious associations. On the contrary, liberals are more involved in secular associations, except for liberal churchgoers who are mainly involved in religious associations, as noted by international studies (Becker and Dhingra 2001; Wilson and Janoski 1995).

Tab.9 C.E.R.B. within associations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Traditional churchgoers</th>
<th>Liberal churchgoers</th>
<th>Non traditional conservatives</th>
<th>Non traditional liberals</th>
<th>Conservative non churchgoers</th>
<th>Liberal non churchgoers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secular associations</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious associations</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PolisLombardia Activists Survey (2007/8)

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\(^9\) The labels of Liberals and Conservatives are assigned with respect to individual attitudes towards abortion. In tab. 8, these labels are combined with individual religiosity (worship), in order to build a typology. Tab.8 shows both percentages and number of respondents. Then, we consider the typology distribution within associations (tab.9).
The relation between the commitment group and values seems to be really high. We wondered whether it happens also for political attitudes. The members of associations are very interested in politics and quite committed, on the average. The commitment group makes the difference: whatever the church attendance, their different degree of interest in politics depends on their civic engagement. Hence, members of religious associations are less interested than members of secular associations. The rate of political commitment of non churchgoers involved in secular associations is double the political commitment of regular churchgoers involved in religious associations. On the contrary, interest in politics is widespread, except for non churchgoers involved in religious associations, who express rage and diffidence towards politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tab. 10 CERB and politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church goers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: PolisLombardia Activists Survey (2007/8)*

In our sample, the interviewees express a preference for the left (47 per cent); the centre is quite widespread too (41), while 12 per cent are on the right. Some differences emerge in the typology. Firstly, liberals are mainly left-oriented, both non churchgoers and non regular churchgoers, while regular churchgoers are mostly centre-oriented. On the contrary, conservatives are mainly centre or right-oriented: regular churchgoers mostly prefer the centre, while non regular churchgoers are nearly double the average on the right.

The outcome suggests that political distances depend on value differences more than church attendance, which is in line with the results of recent studies on the Italian population (Biorcio et al. 2008; Maraffi 2007). The choice of vote is related to beliefs more than to religious practice.

From this perspective, it is interesting to analyze organised voting: while having their internal differences, Catholic associations, considered close to the Christian Democrats until 1992, have had to redefine their political representatives in a system where the local level of politics is gaining in relevance. Religious associations affirm their values at a national level and at the same time

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10 Consider, for instance, the ‘Family Day’, organized by the Forum of Family associations together with other church-related movements in order to promote the value of the traditional family. The mobilization took place for the first time 12 May 2007, against the proposed law on the recognition of homosexual couples.
deal with local political representatives for resources.

On the whole, members of religious associations are mainly centre (54 per cent) or right (16) oriented, while members of non religious associations are mostly left oriented (54). In order to explore internal differences, we isolated religious associations and analyzed the political orientation of their members.

Tab. 11 CERB and associations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Traditional church goers</th>
<th>Liberal church goers</th>
<th>Non traditional conservatives</th>
<th>Non traditional liberals</th>
<th>Conservative non church goers</th>
<th>Liberal non church goers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PolisLombardia Activists Survey (2007/8)

Firstly, it emerged that non believers involved in religious associations are mostly centre oriented, higher than traditional believers and conservative non regular churchgoers. On the contrary, liberal non churchgoers involved in religious associations are left oriented, as well as liberal non traditional believers and liberal churchgoers. Even in this case, value preferences affect the political attitudes of members.

This is an important fact for the analysis of Catholic associations and the vote of their members, and confirms our hypothesis of internal differences within catholic associations. Within religious associations, there are some liberal and left oriented groups which differ from those mainly centre or right oriented associations more in line with the church’s teaching.

**Beyond religious involvement: religious associations heterogeneity**

The analysis of the relations between religion and civic engagement leads to some interesting results. First of all, in a contest of a general decline of regular religious worship, Lombardy emerges as the only Northern region where traditional religion maintains an important role in the everyday life of inhabitants. Moreover, the relation between church attendance and civic engagement has always been very close. Regular churchgoers are more likely to be involved in associations than non churchgoers.

Religious associations seem to constitute a specific area within civic engagement, both in terms of composition and in terms of politics and values.
Nevertheless, some differences appear, going to from that Catholic archipelago (Colozzi and Martelli 1988), where the diversity of activity goes hand in hand with political diversity.

This data confirm the hypothesis of a progressive heterogeneity within religious associations in terms of political behaviour. Rates of church attendance are therefore no indication of political orientation. Values and ethics are a more reliable and meaningful indicator of political orientation. As the most recent analyses on civic engagement suggest, the culture of the group affects the attitudes of the individual (Lichterman 2006; Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003; Wilson and Janoski 1995). Catholicism is famously a collective faith, based on testimony and solidarity, so that public commitment and civic engagement have key roles (Lagroye 2006; Perniola 2001). Nevertheless, ‘acting religiously’ can have several meanings, among both the clergy and the congregation. At least two religious styles can be identified (Lagroye 2006). The first is based on the relevance of tradition and attributes enormous importance to church attendance and traditional values and to the mediatory role of priests between the profane and the sacred. The second is closer to civic engagement and its concern with the needy both within and outside the community. In this case, priests are mainly a point of reference for the community (similarities can be found with Protestantism in the US, see Wilson and Janoski 1995).

Religious associations closer to the first style mainly focus on their community, in family support associations or parish youth centres and express a right-wing political orientation. Those of the second style promote social responsibility and focus on the broader society are left-oriented11. On the whole, the latter have a long history of exchange and relations with leftist movements (Tosi and Vitale 2009).

In the last few decades religious associations have been redefining their political role, which is sometimes not in line with Church thought. A deep dissatisfaction towards the political sphere has recently emerged, causing a reconfiguration of role of religious associations within the political field. This indeed, could be a fruitful field of study. After the collapse of the DC, its acolytes were dispersed through the right, left and centre, and likewise the religious associations. Moreover, we should analyse the role of specific associations in Lombardy, such as Communion and Liberation, which have an important role in shaping the relationship between religion and local politics. In general, religious associations divide between a neo-collateralism close to the political lobbies, and advocacy activities focusing on pragmatic relations with local politics. The hypothesis of a growing internal heterogeneity in religious associations has been confirmed by this study, noting also that while these different religious styles sometimes blur, in other cases they trigger distancing and therefore reconfigurations in the wide catholic archipelago.

11 On the influence of religious culture on associations structure and electoral behavior, see also Liu et al. 2009.
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Алберта Гиорги

РЕЛИГИОЗНЕ АСОЦИЈАЦИЈЕ У ЛОМБАРДИЈИ:
ВРЕДНОСТИ И ПОЛИТИЧКИ ИЗБОР

Резиме

Циљ овог рада јесте да анализира односе између религиозног и политиког учешћа чланова католичких асоцијација данас у северној Италији и региону Ломбардија, који у последњим деценијама представља политичке промене у Италији. Кроз историју религија је била интензивно политизирана у Италији, са религиозним асоцијацијама која су одувек играле важну друштвено/политичку улогу. Ова студија извлачи закључке из оригиналног истраживања које се фокусира на ове асоцијације и њихово чланство са циљем да укаже на њихов карактер и политичку оријентацију. Онда ће наставити са тестирањем тачности хипотезе која претпоставља увећавање унутрашње хетерогености у изборном понашању.

Кључне речи: изборно понашање, религиозне асоцијације, Италијанска политика, Ломбардија

Прихваћен: 17.05.2012.
REVIEWS, CRITICAL VIEWS AND POLEMICS
ANCIENT CHINESE THOUGHT, MODERN CHINESE POWER
Edited by Daniel A. Bell & Sun Zhe. Translated by Edmund Ryden.

A bold attempt to introduce ancient Chinese perspectives on international relations theory, *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power* is the latest publication to come from Yan Xuetong’s ongoing research project that explores the interstate political philosophy of China’s pre-Qin era. The book is translated from Yan’s recent research on pre-Qin international political philosophy and its implications for the rise of China. As professor and director of Institute for International Relations of Tsinghua University in Beijing and one of the most influential Chinese scholars on international relations, Yan seeks to reestablish ancient Chinese thought as a significant asset for China’s rise to a modern power and to enrich the current study of international relations theory by drawing intellectual resources from the era before China was unified by the Qin state in 221 BC.

The core of the book consists of three essays by Yan on interstate political philosophy from pre-Qin China, followed by critical commentaries by three brilliant Chinese scholars, and then Yan’s response, all translated from Chinese. Appended to the chapters and three useful appendixes giving background information on Yan’s research. In the first part of the book, Yan began his research into the philosophies of pre-Qin China in 2005 alongside his colleague and contributor to this volume, Xu Jin. Their first publication in 2008 takes the view that Chinese texts prior to 221 BC are of special importance to scholars today, because interstate relations during that era could “share many similarities with contemporary international politics” (Yan and Xu, 2008: 3). One year later, the second edited volume of Yan and Xu, *Thoughts on World Leadership and Their Implications* (Yan and Xu, 2009) brings together their commentaries on a wide array of pre-Qin works. The second book deserves special attention because each of Yan’s chapters in this current volume (Chapters 1-3) is a translation from his edited volume *Thoughts on World Leadership*. The following three commentaries and Yan’s response (Chapters 4-6 and 7) are translated from a 2009 special issue of a journal that Yan edits, the *Guoji zhengzhi kexue* (Quarterly Journal of International Politics).

In part one of the book, Yan starts the first chapter by comparing various
outlooks of seven thinkers from the 8th to the 3rd centuries BC on interstate politics through an examination from four different angles: “ways of thinking, views on interstate order, views on interstate leadership, and views on transfer of hegemonic power” (p.21). For Yan, the ideas of the ancient Chinese thinkers have vivid implications for China’s rise: “Should China increase its material power without at the same time increasing its political power, China will have difficulty being accepted by the international community as a major power that is more responsible than the United States” (p. 65-66). The next chapter concentrates on the work of Xunzi to illustrate how morality, hard power, strategic reliability, force, stratagems and norms can together shape interstate order. Adopting Xunzi’s discussion on these different types of power, humane authority (wang), hegemony (ba), and tyranny (qiang), Yan pinpoints the importance of moral standings as the main difference between a humane superpower and a hegemonic superpower. Chapter 3 surveys the normative and individual bases for hegemony, which can be viewed as the main theme of the book *The Stratagems of the Warring States (Zhanguo ce)* compiled at least 1,900 years ago to record the history of the Warring States Period. Recognizing that “contending for hegemony was a key theme of interstate politics” during this era, Yan and Huang note that a proper appreciation of *The Stratagems of the Warring States* can aid “a deeper understanding of the real state of international politics today” (p. 137) and then insist that this will bring useful messages for research into national power, international system research, as well as China’s strategy for ascent.

Part two of the book contains reactions and critical commentaries by Yang Qianru, Xu Jin, and Wang Rihua. The three essays constitute a lively demonstration of debates happening within the Chinese academic community. For instance, following Yan and Huang’s examination of the hegemonic philosophy of *The Stratagems of the Warring States*, Wang acknowledges their arguments and further advocates that ancient China’s theory of political hegemony emphasized political power rather than military, economic, and military-economic power found in the Western theories and becomes the core element of Chinese version of hegemony (p.194-195). In general, their respective chapters argue for better contextualization in the reading of pre-Qin texts, insisting on benevolence and justice in pre-Qin concepts of interstate leadership.

Yan’s rejoinder opens part three of the book. Pointing to how ancient Chinese political thought may enhance the theoretical and empirical study of international relations, Yan calls for careful learning from “the distinction between humane authority and hegemony in pre-Qin times” (p. 219). Yan’s commitment to Realist understandings of IR, which he passionately defends in his interview with Lu Xin, shape his views about the purpose of studying pre-Qin thought as well as his selection of materials to include in the research. Together with Yan’s essay, these two pieces underscore Yan’s longstanding interest in marrying the study of international relations with China’s early political traditions.
Encountering terms like “Confucianism,” “Moism,” “Legalism,” some may ask why Yan does not mention religion at all in his work. In his narration of interpreting ancient Chinese political thoughts for modern context, Yan mentioned various pre-Qin philosophical schools, which are often labelled as “Chinese religions” by some cultural historians on China. In this book, it seems that Yan deliberately avoids to use the word “religion” to describe those schools. Certainly, this cannot be understood as Yan’s purpose to bring unnecessary mistiness or confusion. Probably in this way, he is apparently joining religious scholars such as Thomas David DuBois who advocates that “the modern concept of religion is Western in origin” (DuBois, 2011: 4). Indeed, if someone looks up the word religion in a Chinese dictionary, he will find it translated as zongjiao, a word rendered from Japanese shūkyō, and neither of them are native to Asia.1 For most Chinese readers, the word religion instinctively calls to mind an ecclesiastic institution - a church, in particular a church of Christianity.2 The distinction between religion and philosophy, somewhat arbitrary even in Western thought, makes even less sense in China. Many, if not all, Chinese “religions” are either agnostic or even atheistic, at least in their orthodox, scriptural form. The original texts of what would later become Daoism say nothing about who lives in the spirit realm. It is then not confusing anymore that Yan, a native Chinese who he received his PhD in UC Berkeley, primarily employs terms such as “political thoughts” to represent what might be described as “religious advocations” in Western sense.

One of the main contributions of Yan’s book is his in-depth interpretation of pre-Qin thinkers’ understanding of the role of morality in interstate politics and how it is linked to state power and international stability. Contrary to Western theories of international relations, Chinese pre-Qin philosophy distinguishes between different types of leading state in international politics and argues that the moral level of state leadership determines the state political power (p.101-102). The logic behind that is that tyrannic state leaders who rely solely on “hard power” will eventually loose the support of the people, whilst leaders with high morality will adopt prudent policies and the accumulated effects of these policies will lead in the long term to the increase in the comprehensive power of the state. Thus, “the humane authority has the role of taking the lead in implementing and upholding international norms, whereas hegemony lacks this” (p. 214). As for the reason why Yan writes this book, it is well summarized in his own words: “If we can rediscover more interstate political ideas of ancient Chinese philosophers and use them enrich contemporary international relations theory, this will provide the guideline for a strategy for China’s rise” (p. 106).

1 “Zongjiao” did existed previously in ancient Chinese texts, but it had a more narrow meaning; see Yu, State and Religion in China, p.5-25.
2 The Chinese term for “church” is “jiaotang”, literally meaning “hall of religion”, while Buddhist temples or Daoist monasteries all have specific names containing other words rather than “jiao”. For a detailed study on definitions of “religion” in the Chinese context and their historical transformation, see Goossaert and Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China, esp. ch. 10 and 11.
Although Yan’s discussions on international norms and interstate policies are insightful, there are some problems in his approaches. For instance, readers should not be too surprised to see that one of the volume’s editors, Daniel A. Bell, has tellingly commented that Yan’s vision seems to be “quite far removed from the current reality” (p. 17-18). This is mainly because Yan has not explained how the international norms he introduces in the book can be translated into foreign policy practices under the political rule of today’s China. Indeed, Yan admits that pre-Qin theorists have recognized the impact of domestic factors on international politics, and he reiterates the need for China to promote democracy if it is to uphold political morality abroad. Yet he does not lay out how he envisages Chinese state leaders carrying out this kind of moral leadership or “humane authority,” even though the ancient philosophers have all highlighted how crucial good political leadership and human talents are to the state.

Despite these limitations, Yan Xuetong’s Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power is a path-breaking project that integrates ancient Chinese philosophy, Pre-Qin history, and contemporary international relations theory. Both for those who welcome a China that is increasingly active at the global level, as well as for those who do not, it seems the time is right to thoroughly engage with the ideas and proposals of prominent Chinese thinkers today like Yan Xuetong. Although there may still be unsettled disagreements among scholars about his book, no one can dismiss or ignore the scholarship and theoretical contributions Yan has brought to the field of international relations. World historians and researchers on political theory will benefit tremendously from finally having access to an expert and enjoyable survey of Chinese ancient political philosophies and their relationships to contemporary political discours in the English language.

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References


THE SERBIAN POLITOLOGY OF RELIGION LIBRARY

In the past five years, two major steps were made regarding the publications within Politology of Religion—the journal and the library. The journal “Politics and Religion” has been published semi-annually since 2007. Four years later, The Serbian Politology of Religion Library came to existance. The Serbian Politology of Religion Library was founded by Dr. Miroljub Jevtic, an IPSA member and a professor of Politology of Religion at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade, Serbia. The library’s publication was supported by the Center for Study of Religion and Religious Tolerance in Belgrade. While Dr. Miroljub Jevtic stands for the editor in chief, the editorial board members are Dr. Dragan Novakovic, Dr. Zivojin Djuric, Dr. Zoran Jevtovic and Dr. Tomislav Brankovic. It is necessary to point out that Serbian Politology of Religion Library is the first library in the world focused on the youngest discipline within the political sciences. The objective of the library is publication of scientific monographs and postgraduate theses based on this emerging scientific field. So far, the project has been unique. At the moment, all publications are available in Serbian language. The library content can be retrieved from the Virtual Library of Serbia (http://www.vbs.rs/).

The publications, listed in alphabetical order, are:

“Albanian Question and Religion” by Miroljub Jevtic
“Political Orientations in the Works of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic” by Ksenija Martinovic
“Political Relations and Religion” by Miroljub Jevtic
“Serbian Orthodox Church and Bearers of Political Power in Serbia from 1990 to 2006” by Dragana Andjelkovic Petrusic
“The Influence of Islam on the Status of Women in Bosnia and Herzegovina” by Jasmina Indjic

“The Albanian Question and Religion” by Miroljub Jevtic is approaching the religious system and its relation to politics from both internal and external perspective; the religious structure of Albanian population serves as a basis for contradiction between Christian and Muslim Albanians—moreover, the religious divide is seen as an obstacle towards the constitution of united Albanian nation. Furthermore, the author leads us to the analysis of the misleading premise—-that Albanians are indifferent in religion-related sense. The Labor Party of Albania (sometimes referred to as the Albanian Workers’ Party) was founded as a result of struggle for creation of the Albanian nation. Albanian Christians were striving
for left-oriented and communist ideals. Two main arguments were used to prove that point: one was showing that Christians were predominant among communists when the communist movement was formed; the other shows Christian domination within the party during the World War Two. However, after the World War Two and the Christian leaders’ liquidation, the Muslims became dominant in the party. The Labor Party of Albania becomes the true representative of Islamic tradition. Why is analysis of religious antagonism within the ruling communist party in Albania important? It leads to an explanation of religion’s role after the breakdown of the one-party system. With the breakdown of the one-party system, struggle for freedom of religion and renewed work of religious groups come to life. The impact of renewed religion was strongly influential; the growth and Islam’s influence affected the relations between Greece and Albania, as well as the relations between Muslims and Catholics in Albania. The Albanian Question analysis would be incomplete without giving an insight into the role of religion in Kosovo and the role of the Islamic community in secession activities in Kosovo and Metohija. The Albanian issue, international relations and the stability of Balkans are strongly connected.

The first chapter of “Political Orientations in the Works of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic” by Ksenija Martinovic is discussing Christian ethics in the political thoughts of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic. Moving from the ethical to esthetic aspects of Velimirovic’s thoughts, Martinovic is exploring spiritual messages, esthetic of thoughts and moral. In “Political Orientations in the Works of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic”, Martinovic dives into several works of Velimirovic, analyzing them from the esthetic, moral, ethical and political angle. The concept of Serbian national statehood in Velimirovic’s work is raising several questions, from various theories on nation and national statehood, to the history of Serbs and the Orthodox Christian faith. The last chapter reveals the concept of Serbian national character in the works of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic. After defining Serbian nationalism, Martinovic moves to the concepts of Svetosavlje and nationalism- the nationalism of St. Sava. This chapter is the core of her work, where the aspects and the content of Svetosavlje’s nationalism are explored.

“Political Relations and Religion” by Miroljub Jevtic aims at showing the inseparable ties between religion and politics. In spite of being the youngest, Politology of Religion is seen as one of the most important disciplines in the fields of political science. The monograph deals with several religious streams and the influence of confessional factors on numerous questions, such as the role of religion in the constitution of South Slavs’ national identities, relations between religion and genders, ties between religion and migrations, the influence of religion on the population renewal in a biological sense and the multicultural

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1 Nikolaj Velimirovic or Saint Nikolai Velimirovich of Ohrid and Zica (1881–1956) was an influential theological writer.
2 Svetosavlje is Serbian Orthodox Christianity, built upon the work of St. Sava. Some sources define it as “Nationalism of Saint Sava”.
society in general. The misuse of language in national and religious politics frame is discussed. In the context of Serbian question, the influence of religion on Serbia’s conscience is explored, and the Serbian Orthodox diaspora and the unity of Orthodox Church in the USA are analyzed. The book discusses the political and religious questions in Ivo Andric’s and Alexis de Tocqueville’s works: while the roots of politology of religion can be traced in de Tocqueville’s work, Andric’s writings share certain Islamic political views. The example of religious political party is given in a chapter dedicated to the work of Komeito party.

“The Serbian Orthodox Church and Bearers of Political Power in Serbia from 1990 to 2006” by Dragana Andjelkovic Petrusic gives an insight into modern Serbian statehood and its relation to Serbian Orthodox Church. Various roles and impacts of Serbian Orthodox Church in relation to Serbian statehood are described, such as organization and structure of Serbian Orthodox Church and its social impact. Furthermore, the focus moves to exploring the relations between Serbian Orthodox Church and subjects of political power. Within the topic, various questions are raised and analyzed- starting from the law and political regulations to the relation between the Serbian Orthodox Church and political parties, as well as NGOs. Relations between church and European values or democracy and church are some of the topic examined, upon which conclusions regarding the perspectives and potential development of future relations are made. The relations between Islam and nationalization and Islamisation and Albanisation are explained in the Albanian and ex-Yugoslavian context. The issue of interreligious relations in Albania and its influence on the military stability of Albania is discussed in the concluding chapter.

“The Influence of Islam on the Status of Women in Bosnia and Herzegovina” by Jasmina Indjic. The role of Islam in the beginnings of contemporary political systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina is addressing several issues- starting from the role of Islamic community in the breakup of SFR Yugoslavia. Influence of Islam on Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and its influence on profilation of political systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina is being explored. Bosnia and Herzegovina serves as an example of Islamic policies of the West. Indjic moves to exploring the social relations and the status of women in Bosnia and Herzegovina The law stands as an important category and both Sharia (Islamic) and secular law are observed in relation to the status of women. Various other factors (such as NGOs, Western culture, migrations) and their views and attitudes towards women are a crucial part of Indjic’s analysis. Islamic marriage in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina develops discussion around the law regulations concerning Islamic and secular marriage, Islamic marriage rules, polygamy and mixed marriages, ending with the question of hijab’s return. The relation between Islam and the secular order in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the role of women, shows the complexity of the subject. On the one hand, Indjic analyzes the influence of Wahhabism on women’s position and the conflict between Hanafi School and Wahhabis regard-
ing women’s question; on the other hand, she observes the position of women from the EU and professional associations perspective.

The planned editions are “The Role of Women within the Norms of Hinduism” by Biljana Ribic and “Politics and Religion in Belgrade Press at the End of 20th Century” by Ana Krazic.

Nika Sturm

References


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УПУТСТВО АУТОРИМА

Политикологија религије је научни часопис који објављује текстове теоријског карактера који се баве односима религије и политике. Осим тога објављује приказе књига из политикологије религије и сродних дисциплина, научну критику и полемику. Редакција прима текстове искључиво у електронској форми на следећу адресу politikologijareligije@yahoo.com. Сви радови подлежу анонимној рецензији најмање два рецензента. Рецензентски процес траје од 2 до 4 месеца. Редакција даје апсолутну предност текстовима на енглеском језику. Да би текст био узет у разматрање за евентуално објављивање мора бити написан у следећем облику:

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