engage extensively in politics in order to prevail; that great wealth can provide both the resources and the motivation to exert potent political influence. Data on the US distributions of income and wealth are used to construct several Material Power Indices, which suggest that the wealthiest Americans may exert vastly greater political influence than average citizens and that a very small group of the wealthiest (perhaps the top tenth of 1 percent) may have sufficient power to dominate policy in certain key areas. [R, abr.]


In the Israeli case, judicial empowerment has come primarily through judicial initiative rather than emerging from majoritarian institutions or strategic considerations relating to electoral politics. Justices with deeper commitments to political-liberal rights engaged in a decades-long process of entrenching a political-liberal rights regime through jurisprudence. At the heart of this sea change in Israeli politics was a shift in ideas. [R] [See Abstr. 60.1990]


The attempt of the Georgian government to reform and restructure its military forces in the past ten years demonstrates the difficulty of conducting Western-style defense reform in post-conflict states, which have not seen a formal end to armed conflict. Western-style reforms are intended to bring Georgia greater peace, stability, and accountability, with the added benefit of training additional soldiers to support regional peacekeeping operations. Domestic political imperatives within Georgia, however, demanded that the government restore the territorial integrity of the state by “reintegrating” South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Adjara. In this context, administration, intergovernmental and doctrinal interoperability of Georgian forces was desirable, but only to the extent that it enabled Georgian forces to meet these primary domestic political requirements. [R, abr.]

60.2135 WU Guoguang — A shadow over Western democracies: China’s political use of economic power. China Perspectives 2009(2): 80-89.

This paper investigates how China’s success in economic development influences negatively civil liberties and democracy as practiced in the West, and asks why the growing economic interdependence between China and the global economy enables China to intervene in the political conduct of leading democracies but not vice versa. Empirically, the paper examines cases of Chinese foreign relations behavior in which China uses its economic connections with various leading industrial democracies to bend their international political behavior regarding visits by the Dalai Lama. It also highlights how economic interests relating to the Chinese market make multinational corporations vulnerable to Beijing’s political pressures. [See Abstr. 60.2139]


English version: see Abstr. 60.2135.

60.2137 YOUNG, Robert ; McCARTHY, Kelly — Why do municipal issues rise on the federal policy agenda in Canada? Canadian Public Administration 52(3), Sept. 2009: 347-370. [Résumé en français]

Under Prime Minister P. Martin, the federal government developed a “cities and communities” agenda, with Ottawa prepared to be much more active about municipalities. The pendulum has swung back under the S. Harper government, which is far less inclined to intrude into this area of provincial jurisdiction. But these recent developments are not unique. The federal government was involved with the urban file in the 1970s through the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, and there have been other historical instances of federal interest in municipalities. This article explores the factors that are associated with the place of municipalities and urban issues on the federal policy agenda. [R, abr.] [Part of a thematic issue on “Federalism, public policy and municipalities”, edited and introduced by Barbara Wake CARROLL and Katherine A. H. GRAHAM. See also Abstr. 60.2104, 2151]


The paper presents the coalition models used in the new democratic state of Slovenia and the stability of its coalition governments in the 1989-2008 period. It paints a picture of specific internal and external (international) factors influencing formation (democratization and independence, joining the EU, NATO, etc.). While there are different evaluations of the importance of the various coalition contracts, it is clear that specific institutional rules have contributed to the relative stability of Slovenian coalition governments, like the procedures of government-formation and instruments of control (constructive non-confidence vote) etc. [R, abr.]


Both advocates and critics of judicial elections concede that partisan elections are a democratic method of judicial selection. Does the value of democratic representation mean that US Supreme Court Justices should be selected through partisan elections? I argue not. Partisan judicial elections are actually far poorer institutional mechanisms for capturing the judgment of the people on legal matters than has been recognized. The role of parties in structuring a campaign distorts the deliberative environment surrounding judicial elections, creating significant barriers to voters expressing a judgment on matters of legal meaning. The kind of distortion is best understood through reference to a processual criterion of deliberative democracy, which provides a fitting normative template to ground theoretical inquiry into the reason-giving possibilities of existing democratic institutions and practices. [R, abr.]


To compare administrative reform in one of the world’s most ancient civilizations and in one of the world’s “youngest countries” produces some surprises. Administrative reforms in both countries are similar, but occur at different periods of history. The author discovers that some of China’s recent reform efforts resemble historic efforts in the US up to a half century ago. Other components of administrative reform in China reflect contemporary practices in the US. This phenomenon reflects convergence, rather than divergence. [Part of a Special Issue on “Comparative Chinese/American public administration”, edited and introduced by Marc HOLZER and ZHANG Mengzhong. See also Abstr. 60.1931, 1979, 2141, 2176]


How do two world powers with starkly different governing systems share common accountability problems, and why? Does the cycle of administrative reform produce additional need for reforms that come full circle, eventually exacerbating problems without solution? The authors examine governance in the US and China and point out that conflicts in government functions unique to each country result in strikingly similar accountability issues. [R] [See Abstr. 60.2140]

60.2142 Puissance (La) militaire chinoise (China’s military power). Monde chinois 18, 2009: 7-84.

Articles by Barthélemy COURMONT; Michel MASSON; Valérie NIQUET; Irving LEWIS; José FLYING; Nicolas VINOT; Emmanuel PUG; Olivier ZAJEC; Colin GERAGHTY; Hugo L. E. MEIJER.